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ART. I.—*Reason and Faith: or, the right use of Reason with regard to Revelation.*

ON no subject is there put forth more confused and crude thought joined to arrogant pretension, more ignorance and superficiality united with presumptuous claims to superior wisdom, than on that of Reason and Faith—their relation the one to the other, and the nature, limits and legitimate sphere and use of each. By a certain class of persons, not few in number, the independence and almost, or quite, divinity of reason is boastfully asserted, and set over against an unquestioning faith in the word of God. They set reason up above that Word, put it in the stead of the Spirit of God himself, and make it the supreme arbiter of truth—forgetting that its only legitimate province is to find out and deal with the facts that are, and as they are. To know the truth is to be free. John viii: 32. What a man may assert, however boldly, is nothing to me. I want—not his opinion, not what, in his judgment, ought to be—I want to know what is the fact. Fact, and not opinion, or the pretended oracular utterances of deified reason, is that which will stand. Notwithstanding some men may affect to despise it, and no matter though it may seem humble and unpretending, as did the Truth himself when he appeared the Word made flesh, fact,

and it alone will stand and abide steadfast, when the boldly advanced opinions—the boasted triumphs of reason—shall have vanished like the empty, painted soap-bubbles—the gaudy, glittering nothings—which they resemble and are.

We propose to inquire a little into the real province and the limits of reason, with special reference to things revealed. The importance of this inquiry in a day when reason is, by many, unduly exalted, and forced from its proper place of subjection to the Divine mind and will into the place of supreme authority which belongs to the Divine mind alone, will, we do not doubt, be regarded as a sufficient excuse for this inquiry, notwithstanding the numerous abler and more elaborate discussions of the subject which have been put forth and are frequently appearing.

We are far from indulging the disposition or purpose to degrade or revile reason—for it is a high and noble faculty. Our purpose is to try to find out its place and use. It is not to degrade or revile it to say that out of the place assigned it by its and our Creator, it is weak and helpless. Within its proper sphere it can do marvelous things. And joined to faith, and held in subjection to the word of God, it can do more by far than when it is sought to be made supreme. What we propose is to show that it has simply to find out and deal with facts, and not to say to the fact, "Thou art not so—thou art otherwise!" It has to deal with two classes of facts, viz: those of nature and those of revelation. Of the latter, and its manner of dealing with them, we are to speak. And allow the remark here, that whereas we say it has simply to find out and deal with facts, this is not to confine it within straitened limits and to impose on it only an easy and ignoble work. As will more fully appear herein-after, it has here ample room wherein to exercise itself, and a work to do which will task it to the very uttermost of its power. It is here it has gathered all its substantial treasures, achieved all its real triumphs, and secured all that will abide as lasting monuments of its great excellence. The universe is its.

In a day when denials are made, on grounds of pretended reason, of many or all of the great cardinal truths of revelation,—as, for example, in regard to sin, its nature and punishment, the total depravity of the heart of man, the necessity of an atonement and its nature, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, the tri-personality of the Godhead, the resurrection of the body, the general judgment, the future punishment of the wicked, etc.,—it is of the last importance that we should understand what is the real province of that reason, or wisdom of man, of which the Scriptures thus speak: “The world by wisdom knew not God.” “Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise.” “Oppositions of science—gnosis—falsely so called.” “That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men.”

Those persons who exalt reason to the place of supreme authority, are loud in their boast of having attained to a peculiarly large measure of liberty, on the ground of having emancipated themselves from a childlike—which they are pleased to confound with a childish—faith in the Bible, on the teachings of which they assert the right of reason to sit in judgment. They contradict the great Teacher in regard to that declaration of his: “If ye continue in my word, ye are my disciples indeed, and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. . . . Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin. . . . If the son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.” John viii: 31, 32, 34, 36. True independence consists in knowing things as they are, and in acting in entire agreement with their known nature. In regard to natural things, liberty consists in knowing them and in the power to act according to the known laws which govern them. In regard to things social and political, liberty consists in having knowledge of them and in the power to act according to the known relations and duties they involve. Many who confess this, no sooner turn to the great subject of revealed religion, of the nature, attributes and claims of God, and of the spiritual

and moral state of man and his relations to the law of God, and of the way of salvation, than they adopt the very elements of bondage in theory and practice, and, while boasting they are free, become slaves, by substituting their own prejudices and lusts, and baseless assertions—miscalled reason—for the discarded sure word of God, which is a collection of truths, shown to be so by evidence most abundant and satisfactory. They reject the infinite truth, and yield willing obedience to the feeble creation of their own perverted understanding, calling it God, and putting it in the place of God—and glory in this as independence. They will not have a God within whose thought eternity lies comprehended, and whose being fills immensity, but they will have a God whom their reason can comprehend, and whose word and work they can subject to their understanding; a God born of their own brain, and knowing no more than they can know. They will have for, and worship as God, their own thought, or idea, or conception, externalized, or projected outwardly, and given by them his being and qualities, and they will receive as his word, only what they have given, or permitted him to speak. And this is independence! And as for man, so far from human nature being what the Scriptures represent to a simple, plain-minded, unsophisticated reader, to one reading while he runs, to a wayfarer who may be a fool, it is anything which their closet-dream, or romantic philanthropy, may choose to have it. Instead of being altogether vile, totally depraved, enmity against God, as the word of God declares it is, it is essentially good, lovely, and loving, only too often overlaid with vices and wickednesses, the incidental consequence of surrounding evil influences, or temptations, which are to be rejoiced at, because they exercise inherent virtue for its advantage and for its development through conflict unto a more robust strength. This discovery they have made—not, as we have said, in the word of God, nor yet by going out among men and collecting the facts of human conduct, nor yet by careful examination of their own hearts, but by sentimental theorizing,

which they call reasoning, and on which they build their claim of independence.

The boasters of the supremacy of reason, beginning with calling in question the truth of some certain facts, or doctrines, of revelation, are in danger of ending with calling in question, or plainly denying, the existence of God—which is the logical result of their theory. The atheism which prevailed so largely during the latter part of the last and beginning of this century, in France especially, was the consistent result of the dogma, that all things are to be tested by reason, in order to ascertain their truth, or whether they are what they assume to be, and have a right to be so accepted: that belief is not to be admitted until reason, made supreme judge, has delivered its decision upon the merits of the matter proposed for our believing assent; not upon grounds of experiment and demonstration, or testimony, but accordingly as it harmonizes, or otherwise, with our preconceived notions of the fitness of things. Atheism is the consistent result, we say, of such a dogma. For there is nothing so incomprehensible, so incapable of being grasped by our reason, as the eternal self-existence and omnipresence of God, as an intelligent, independent Being, without any reliance upon the visible world or universe, of which he is the creator and upholder by the word of his power, the existence or annihilation of which leaves him unaffected by increase or diminution.

The legitimate use of reason is to discover truth, not to create it. This is very important to be remembered, for, if we mistake not, the want of a clear conviction of this very obvious proposition, is the point of departure toward much fatal error. Reason can not make anything, nor unmake anything; nor make anything that is other, in the very least measure, or kind, than it is. It is not a creator at all. Reason is simply an explorer and discoverer, a finder of things that are already. Its use is to lead us to the fact, to bring us where the fact is, to lift up the veil behind which the fact dwells, and to place us in its presence; and not to make that fact, not to dispute with it, not to contradict it, not to deter-

mine whether it is what, and as, it ought to be, but simply to find it, and to find that, and what, it is quite independently of us, and of any notions that may have been entertained by us, and that may be lying in our minds—lying there, it may be, in more than one sense.

What, for example, is the use of reason in regard to writings that may be presented to us, with the claim made in their behalf that they are a revelation from God? Simply to decide upon grounds of legitimate evidence, whether they are what they claim to be. If they are found to be so, then reason has nothing to do in the way of sitting in judgment upon the wisdom, or suitableness, or truth of their contents, farther than to seek to find out by the application of the proper, recognized methods, what the contents really are. God can not lie, nor can he err, and our highest wisdom, and the noblest use to which our reason can be put, is just to try to find that he has spoken, and what he has said, and then take for granted, with implicit confidence, that it is true and right, precisely what is best and ought to be. Its agreement or not, with our notion of right and propriety, or fitness, is not to be made the test that anything is, or is not, from God. If anything that purports to be from him strikes us as being unjust, or unrighteous, or unwise, we are not on that account to reject it—but have we the necessary proof that it is from him? If so, it is our place to accept it, not as unjust, or unwise, but as just, and wise, and good, our own notions being found by it to be erroneous.

There are those who seem to admit, who profess in general terms, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God, who nevertheless take back, in effect, the admission, or deprive it of practical force, by asserting the right to bring each word or fact to the test of their reason, not to inquire, proceeding according to the just laws of evidence, or criticism, whether it really belongs to the Scriptures, but to be received or rejected, accordingly as it seems to them to be right or not right. Thus, while they profess to receive the Bible as the word of God, its several parts

have no authority for them, until they receive it from their own reason. Their reason gives to the word of God all its authority, and until it so gets it, it has none. It has not authority for them, therefore, as, and because it is the word of God, but because their reason approves it. Such a doctrine, or this doctrine, if it is not against the idea of a revelation altogether, certainly deprives revelation of the chief part of its benefit, and of all its authority. It leaves each person at liberty to judge for himself what is, and what is not revealed, to judge, not upon the ground of the application of the rules of evidence, internal and external, but upon the ground of the agreement, or not, with his opinion of the thing declared, whether or not that thing ought to have been declared, whether or not it agrees with his notion of right, or is consistent with some theory he happens to hold. He is left to try the truth of a word, or asserted fact, and therefore its right to be regarded as a revelation, by its accord with his opinion, instead of trying his opinion by the declaration of Scripture. On this we will have more to say directly.

It is obvious that a consequence of this asserted liberty must be, that each person will, in point of fact, have a different Bible, or rule of faith and practice, from every other person, even though all may profess to hold the same Scriptures to be the Bible, the word of God. What is with one authoritative as the voice of God, is not so with another, yet each has the, for him, genuine Bible. And, also, what is of no authority with one has full authority with another. And according to the theory on reason we are considering, both must be right. For reason, the reason of each for himself, is supreme judge of truth, and for him there is no appeal from its decision. For him some certain word or sentence, is the voice of God. But for another the voice of God is not heard in it, and therefore it is not the voice of God for him. This results necessarily from the theory that no word of the Scriptures has authority, as from God, until reason, the individual reason of each man for himself, has sat in judgment on it, and given in its decision. One person will put a certain,

another a different, meaning upon a certain passage, and still another will reject it altogether; not upon any fixed principles of criticism, or of interpretation, but accordingly as it consists, or not, with his preconceived views, his prejudices. Yet each is right—all are right. Each has, for himself, the very truth—the voice of God.

Thus the Scriptures are a sort of chaos of unformed, undigested materials, meaning nothing authoritatively, in particular, until each man has for himself, asserting the independence of his reason, used his liberty to select and refuse and arrange them, and has constructed a world for himself such as pleases him. It is less God's world than his. Notwithstanding God has said, by his spirit, "Let there be light!" the light is darkness, and the world abides still in darkness, until the reason of each man has said, "Let there be light," or has pronounced upon the light which God created, saying, "It is light!" or has so pronounced upon portions of the whole, the portions upon which it has not so pronounced continuing to be darkness. This is the legitimate result of the theory—for the theory is that reason must determine in regard to the merits of the fact itself, and the determination of reason is for each man to him the law of God. But my reason and its determination is not a law for you, nor yours for me. And almost inevitably they will differ, and so each of us will have a different Bible. The theory is, "No creeds! Away with confessions of faith! Man independent of man, reason of reason, and reason of revelation!" Is it not evident, then, that the Bible is anything, all things, or nothing, capable of being made into ten thousand, all equally Bibles, each equally the word of God, yet each differing from all the rest, and no one the word of God, having authority, but not the word of God and without authority—to all except the one whose reason has vested it with divine authority—but the very word of God, having full Divine authority to him? Nay, more than this—when a man has gotten his Bible, it must not be taken for granted he has that which will be his Bible all his life, nor even that he will be found to-morrow in possession

of the very same, which he to-day acknowledges to be his Bible. It is true it is to-day the voice of God, his revealed and authoritative will to him. To-day God speaks to him in some certain form of words which have a certain understood meaning. But to-morrow the voice of God will have ceased to be heard in that form of words, or he will speak them with a different meaning. The revealed will of God will not be the same to-morrow that it is to-day. For reason—the individual reason—each man's own reason—will not abide stationary, immovable. It must progress and change its judgments, and as it progresses and changes its judgments, so must the Divine mind as revealed. The revelations made by the Holy Spirit will not remain fixed. They must declare what reason dictates, and adapt themselves to all its varying moods. Hence the person will have the very same Bible not long at a time. It speaks such and so now, but no other person, nor he himself, can possibly tell or guess what or how it will speak at any future time. He exalts his reason above, or unto the place of God. Asserting for it independence he denies, in effect, that God has or can have an independent revealed will. That is, he denies that it is possible for God so to make known his will to men, that it shall be and speak, the same, and have the same full authority, to all men, every-where and every day. In other words, while he may profess to believe in a revelation from God, and that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are that revelation, he deprives his professed belief of all its practical value by the kind of liberty and independence he asserts for his reason. For of what use is a revelation which can make known for our faith and practice only that which our reason first dictates, or permits? If it is agreed that it is of important benefit as communicating matters which reason would not by itself have discovered, still even such matters are without authority until reason has sanctioned them, while if they are such as it can not comprehend, they are rejected; perhaps to be restored to their place among things revealed at some future period. For the theology we are opposing is such as

to give as one of its results the rejection now from revelation of that which hereafter will be restored ; and, it may be, regarded as particularly important and especially obvious. For something which during the infancy of reason, and while one has little acquired knowledge, seems mysterious, and in fact quite incomprehensible, may after a little while appear very plain and easily intelligible. Now, according to the theory of the supreme authority of reason, as long as a person is in the former state, the thing is no part of revelation, and is destitute of authority over him. But as soon as he passes into the latter state it becomes a thing revealed, and its authority over him is complete. The reverse process may take place. Something claiming to be revealed may, during his mind's childhood, seem to him right and wise and good, and may be unhesitatingly accepted for what it claims to be, which, as his knowledge increases and its relations to other things become apparent and complicated, he will feel compelled by the application to it of his theory to reject. The consequence will be that his Bible will be growing in one direction and becoming less in another—increasing in regard to certain matters, and diminishing in regard to others. New branches will be starting forth from the trunk, and old falling off. Falsehoods and fables and myths will be forming into truthful statements and narratives and histories, while the true will be changing into false. His Bible is composed of dissolving views—the former things of faith passing away, new things appearing.

Now we consent most cordially, and hold most firmly, that each particular part of the Scriptures as well as the entire Scriptures may be tried, and ought to be, whether it is the very word of God, or to determine upon the validity of its claim to be so. But we hold and insist that it must be tried by some other rule than that which gives as its result to each man, as the authoritative word of God to him something which all other men reject, and which has for them no binding authority ; some other rule than that which gives to no two men the same law ; which speaks to

no two men the same voice of God ; which makes that Divine voice and authority to you which is not such to me ; and which gives to you and to me to-day as very truth to be believed and obeyed with the whole heart and mind and strength what to neither you nor me will be truth, but will be falsehood to be repudiated, rejected and hated to-morrow. The claim is set up by the boasters of the independence of reason, of the right of each person to judge whether the Scriptures in whole or in part are from God, and what they teach ; not by well-established rules touching evidence, criticism, interpretation, etc.—for this is the right of all, contrary to the teaching of the Papal church—but by forcing each several part and word to utter what, and only that, his reason can accept without repugnance, no matter at how great soever cost of violence done to the just laws of language. If by any means any particular passage should utterly refuse to be so constrained as to speak the meaning their reason requires—and it must be obstinate indeed if it will not yield to their compulsory and conveniently lawless method—then this affords the sufficient proof and ground for casting it out as an interpolation, or for declaring it to be a corruption.

It is obvious that on this principle there can be no certainty as to the real meaning of Scripture, but that it is a different book to each several reader. Thus the great, chief importance of a revelation—which is that we may have something sure, and that speaks the same word with the same meaning to all persons at all times, and in all states of mind and feeling in regard to the subjects appropriate to a revelation, and that call for it—is taken away. Reason is infallible church : always infallible, though Pope is against Pope and council against council.

Such a rule can not be correct. Truth never changes. Truth is eternal. "The word of God liveth and abideth forever." Reason changes—it changes, and often reverses, its judgments. Therefore, reason can not, rightfully, sit in judgment upon truth. Its judgments must be judged by the truth. We consent that the Scriptures, or any given part

or passage thereof, may be tried, whether they, or it, are, or is the very word of God. But not by a rule that leads to such results, and which its advocates themselves would be ashamed to apply to any other document with a view to find out whether it is what it purports to be, and what is its meaning. The Scriptures—as a whole, or any portion thereof—is to be tried, just as we try any other writing, upon the ground of the evidences, external and internal, which exist in independence of our reason, and are ever the same without regard to its judgments. Our reason dwells and moves and acts within its only proper sphere when it is occupied with those evidences, finding out what they are and what they establish—and not when it is trying the truth itself, without respect to them, by its consistency or not, with their notion of right and wrong. When it is occupying itself with the evidences by which the truth is to be found, it is occupied legitimately, nobly, and gets worthy and glorious results. When it occupies itself otherwise, it is occupied dishonestly, and produces puerilities, and doltings, and fables, by whatsoever sounding names their deluded authors may call them. And so far are we from denying the right to exercise our private judgment upon the evidences, and so far from requiring a superstitious faith—a faith for which we can not render a reason to him who asks—we invite and demand the most rigid application of all the established rules that are used for determining the authenticity and meaning of any other document. Let it be understood, then, that the Scriptures require, and call upon all who believe them to be the word of God to require, that they be tested whether they are the very word of God they claim to be, by any, and by all, means the most rigid and exacting which may be properly applied to any other writing of importance—as for example, a will, or a title to an estate. Any method which would be recognized as fair and legitimate to determine whether a certain writing claiming to be the Constitution of the United States is such in fact, and whether any given passage in it is genuine—really belongs there—and also to

determine the exact meaning of any particular section, or article, or clause, the Sacred Scripture invites to be applied to itself. It will shrink from no such inquiry and examination, and will abide by the result of the closest scrutiny.

But as the Constitution of the United States would not submit to be mutilated, or to have its meaning determined on no other ground than the mere whim or prejudice of each person, or on the ground of its consistency, or otherwise, with what the reason of each person may presume to decide is right or wrong, and for no better cause, so neither will the Scriptures. It demands that its claims to be the word of God shall be thoroughly investigated. But it will not consent that the reason of man, which it pronounces corrupt and perverted in its natural state, and not able to "receive the things of the Spirit of God, which are foolishness unto it, neither capable of knowing them," shall declare for its—the Scripture's—meaning, its own—reason's own—notions. It demands that when its claims to be the word of God are established by legitimate method, its contents shall be accepted as truth, however they may contradict our opinions.

There must be some certain and fixed laws whereby to determine the genuineness and real meaning of any word that lays claim to a particular origin, or authorship, else we are forever floundering amid a chaotic mass of always changing notions, and can not be sure, at any time, that we have the truth, nor that we shall be able ever to know it. Among the variety of the conflicting judgments which reason announces, which is true? Each lays claim to truth—claims, indeed, a certain inspiration, and infallibility, and each man must accept the decision of his reason as authoritative for his faith and practice. To him it is the voice of God—and one has as much right as another to hold his judgment for truth.

We repeat—for we are so often charged with holding to a blind, uninquiring superstitious faith, that it is necessary to make ourselves clearly understood—that we shun or deprecate no legitimate inquiry, no matter how rigid and

uncompromising, into the justice of the claim of the Bible to be the word of God. Nor do we forbid—on the contrary, we invite—an investigation, by all recognized laws of criticism and interpretation, to find the meaning of each of its several books and sentences and words. The many and able works of a great number of believers—works of various kinds—didactic, polemic, expository, critical, apologetic—stand as proofs of this. But how shall we proceed to find whether the Scriptures are the word of God? or whether a particular passage is of that word? and, if so, what it means? One man says, My reason tells me that inspiration, as that word is understood by orthodox Christians, is impossible and absurd. So he disposes of the matter. Another man says, My reason tells me an inspired revelation from God is possible and reasonable, and—if we are to have any correct knowledge of God, and of our relations to him—necessary. Now which of these are we to believe? One has as much right to his opinion as the other to his. But neither has a right over me to require me to receive the judgment of his reason. I say, what is the fact? Let us have that! Therefore, we appeal from what reason says to facts as they are presented in independence of reason, substantiated by sure evidence, such as we would require and count sufficient if the genuineness of a document, claiming to be the Constitution of the United States, was the matter in question.

Or, again, suppose it is admitted, in general terms, that the Bible is the word of God, given by inspiration. It is proposed to inquire in regard to some particular passage—“Is it genuine?” Let the passage be this—“Except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God!” One man, says, doubting, “How can this be?” Another says, My reason tells me that it is mere unmeaning nonsense, it is simply absurd. Still another says, My reason approves it, as pointing out a necessary change of human nature from a state of sin, in which my experience tells me it lies. Here, again, the judgment of one, as merely a judgment of reason, is as weighty and as worthy of credit as that of another—

one doubting, another denying, and still another affirming, that the given passage is genuine, and neither one nor another good for anything as a settlement of the question. What then? Why, let us to the evidences! the proofs! which exist independently of reason, and let us use our reason upon them with a view to find what is the fact in regard to it. If they establish its genuineness, it is genuine. And, as to that result, it is of no consequence what reason has to say upon the merit, or supposed merit, of the passage itself, or of the doctrine it teaches.

Once more. Let the genuineness of the passage be granted, and suppose the inquiry is raised, What does it mean? One man says, It can not mean what it seems to mean, for that would contradict reason—in other words, would contradict my theory concerning the moral condition of the human family. Another declares, It does mean what it seems to mean, for reason points out the necessity of such a great, radical change of human nature. Here it is to be remarked, that there is a fallacy in the use of the word “reason,” in that the individual reason, or the reason of each person, is put for reason in general, or universal reason. The reply to the foregoing declarations is, We can not consent that the meaning of the passage shall be determined by your reason, or made to rest upon whatsoever theory you may have formed touching the moral state of mankind. We must rather judge your theory by its meaning, when the meaning shall have been discovered by the legitimate application of the just laws of language, criticism, and interpretation. If its meaning contradicts your theory, your theory must fall—not the real teaching of the passage in order that your theory may be saved. Let us inquire, What do the words naturally mean? What is their connection with that which goes before, and that which follows, or the preceding and following context? Are the words to be taken in their literal or in a figurative sense?—a matter not to be decided by a simple, arbitrary declaration that they are, or are not, but by well-known, settled rules. If they are figurative,

what is the nature of the figure, and its laws? What, if any, are the explanations made by the speaker, or author of the passage? Who is he? What are his claims to be believed? When, by pursuing such inquiries to their results, we have found the meaning and authenticity of the passage, then we have the truth. And by the truth, reason and theory must be tried and approved, or condemned—not the truth by them.

According to the theory of reason to which we are objecting, we can not establish the first principles of religion, viz: the being of God. For by what power or exercise of reason that can be made to bear upon the proposition, there is a God! can it be demonstrated to be true? It must be kept in mind that the very substance of the theory requires that we discard, as quite inadmissible, the conclusions that may be drawn from the proofs of his existence that appear in nature, or the universe. It requires that we be able to comprehend all that the proposition contains, or implies—that our reason be able to comprehend, to fully grasp, and know by a direct, intuitional force of understanding or insight, such things as self-existence, eternity, immensity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc., and upon the ground of so doing, pronounce that they are, and also, by the same power or exercise of reason, that they are qualities or attributes of a self-conscious personal being. It must be able to know such things by itself, independently of all evidence—itsself, or its independent knowledge or intuition of them, its own and only sufficient evidence. Unless it can do this, the proposition must be rejected and condemned as an assertion of somewhat that is impossible, absurd and—confounding, as is constantly done by those we oppose, what is above or beyond the reach of reason with what is contrary to it—repugnant to reason. Yet it is merely idle to profess to be able to comprehend it. It utterly escapes our grasp, and must forever do so. We can make no proximate approach unto it. “It is higher than heaven, what can we do? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and

broader than the seas!" "The world by wisdom knew not God." "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor?" Reason must itself have divine attributes, in order to be able to comprehend Deity.

Begin, then, with the doctrine that the words of Scripture are to be tested by reason, to determine whether they are true according to some rule in our own mind—some standard that is independent of all outward authority, and that discards testimony, to which standard they must conform—and the inevitable logical result is Atheism.

But do we say there is no use to which our reason must be put in regard to the question, Is there a God? Do we teach there is here no place for it? that it must be quite put aside? By no means. It has its use, and that highly important, even essential. We must regard its use as imperative upon us. Neither in this case, on this question, nor on any other do we discard it. We do not cast contempt on it, nor seek to bring it into odium. We profess to honor it as highly as those do who adopt the theory of its supremacy, and we confidently believe we bestow upon it the higher honor, just as we find out and contend for its power and use and limits, as they are by the purpose and creative act of God. To assert for it more than this, is not to set it free, but to bring it under bondage. They who assert for it more than this, are they who dishonor, weaken and abuse it. We must use our reason in reference to the proposition, There is a God! Not upon the intrinsic merits of that proposition—that is, not by attempting to grasp and comprehend the idea of God, of his being and attributes, and rejecting it as untrue if the attempt should be unsuccessful—but upon the evidences that point to it. In other words, we may arrive at the conclusion there is a God! and hold it with a thorough, firm, and undoubting conviction, as if we were able to comprehend it immediately by our reason, by reasoning from the existence and phenomena of the actual universe, and the proofs it contains of power and wisdom, pointing us to an intelligent Cause. These may safely enough lead us to

adopt the proposition as true. But still the truth itself, as to its how or manner, as to its own essence, lies and must forever lie before us a great unsearchable and incomprehensible infinitude of height and depth and length and breadth, in the presence of which all that reason can do is to bow down itself and confess it can know nothing—humbly prostrate itself in simple adoration before Him, the amazing brightness and marvelous abounding of whose glory are past finding out.

On the ground of the theory of the supreme authority of reason, the declaration is made by many of those who consent—as on their own principles they can not, without disregarding, as we have just seen, the result to which logical consistency points them—to the Being of God, that a written revelation from him is impossible, and belief therein absurd. Here again a confusion is made between things contrary to reason, and things not subject to it. They can not understand how God can by his Spirit inspire the minds of men to speak or write what he wishes to make known in the very words he dictates—therefore he is not able to do so. At any rate, we are under no obligation to believe he has done so, or can do so, and to credit any word that purports to be from him by supernatural revelation, and to submit to its teaching as authoritative, until we can understand. This is as rational as to affirm that in this great universe there are and can be no operations in the worlds of matter and mind beyond what they can trace through all their hidden courses up to their secret springs—no processes in nature beyond what they can see through and through and fully comprehend in every part and at every stage taking place—no facts beyond what they can discover, and, placing themselves where they are coming into existence by means of Divine creating energies, tell how and why they are, and all about them—and no Divine energy in creating beyond what they can and do perfectly comprehend. Unless they can—if not preside at, at least—sit by and sit in judgment upon, as fully comprehending the manner and the reasons of all that is done, they will

not believe. In effect, they blasphemously claim for their reason, as the condition for believing in the existence of the worlds, what is attributed to Divine wisdom, that it "was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, it was brought forth, when there were no fountains abounding with water. . . . When he prepared the heavens, it was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened the foundations of the deep; when he gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth, then it was by him as one brought up with him, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him—rejoicing in the habitable part of the earth." Such knowledge of whatsoever God does, whether in material or spiritual nature, is claimed as a necessary condition of faith—if consistency is maintained by him who holds that faith in a written revelation from God is to be withheld as repugnant to reason, unless and until reason can understand all about it. Surely it is no harder to believe in such a revelation, than that once mere emptiness, void, and night filled all that vast space through which innumerable bright worlds sweep in their immense courses, and which is full of glorious fountains of gushing light—that these all arose out of the nothing that was before them. How absurd this idea is—that we can have no verbal or written revelation from God, because we can not tell how, while here lies round about us a whole universe of facts of which our reason can not tell us how one came to be! It tells us they are here—tells us this through the testimony of our senses—but not one word about how they are. They say to us, Here we are! and demand that we accept them. If our reason presumes to say, I do not understand how you came to be, therefore you are not! they are, and obstinately stay, nevertheless, and show the contradicting reason to be but a fool, and its folly is punished by its being condemned to be shut up in darkness. Because, forsooth, he can not see the pro-

cess whereby the eternal, infinite, omniscient Spirit—Jehovah—inspires men, and communicates to them and to the world by them, things quite beyond what reason could have found out by itself, things which God alone could originally know, which yet it is of the very last importance should be made known to us, our salvation depending on our having knowledge of them—and because we can not understand how he does it, therefore he can not do it! Therefore we are condemned to ignorance of things, on knowledge of which our salvation depends, because we can not tell how it is possible for God to communicate them to us. The only ground the objection has on which to stand is—not that it is contrary to reason, for in the very nature of things this can not be shown, but—that it is beyond our reason.

We say, in the nature of the case it can not be shown to be contrary to reason. For if so, it must be because it is contrary to some fact already known to our reason. But to what fact is it—revelation—contrary? There is not one known to us. It is only more than anything else that we know. And if we go on the principle of admitting no more than we know already, how rapidly will we increase knowledge? The truth is, this theory, if rigidly carried out to its logical results, would render the acquisition of knowledge impossible. It would require not only the denial of God, but also of a visible universe. We could not admit the existence of any substance, material or spiritual. There is not one thing that can by reason be affirmed to be true, or declared to be not true, simply upon the ground of any judgment we can make upon its inherent merits. For no one thing can rightfully be declared to be true, or not true, until it is tried by some other and known thing—known otherwise than by a judgment of reason acting independently of all help—which either establishes or contradicts it. So the fact of a revelation can only be pronounced false upon the ground of some other fact being known that makes it or proves it to be so—some fact with which it would be inconsistent—and not at all upon the ground of mere absence of

knowledge, or inability to comprehend it, or the mere want of some other known fact, by which to sustain it. Nothing is inconsistent in itself. And the very fact that anything is above and more than our reason, and stands by itself independent of anything that is known, makes it quite impossible for us to show that it is contrary to reason.

Strictly speaking, nothing is contrary to reason. We are apt to be deceived by the phrase, and to be led to imagine that reason is itself, or at least contains within itself, originally, prior to experience or observation, all truth, or the types of all truths, so that we have but to bring any proposition to be judged by its agreement or not, with its independently existing type, or idea, in our reason. Now, reason is nothing of this sort. It neither is nor contains truths, nor their ideas or images. It is not a sort of supreme, independent, divine, institutional faculty, self-illuminated or inspired, and flashing light upon what subject soever is presented to it. Its use is to compare truths, or what purport to be such, among themselves. It may decide that a given thing is not true, on the ground of some other thing, the truth of which is known, contradicting it. When we use the words "contrary to reason," we ought to remember, therefore, that nothing more nor else is meant than that some certain proposition is contrary to some fact, the truth of which is known and established, and not to reason itself; though reason pronounces the judgement, having discovered the contradiction.

On the ground of the asserted supreme authority of reason, some reject, as contrary to reason, the doctrine of the Trinity of the Godhead. On the other hand, we say it is sheer idleness to seek to determine upon grounds of pure reason how God subsists. If there is any absurdity in the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, that can be made to appear only by means of some known fact touching the Divine Being which it contradicts. Now, what known fact does it contradict? We ask for that fact. There is not one within the whole range of our knowledge. That God is one in essence or substance, is a different proposition altogether,

unaffected by any proposition in regard to plurality of persons in the Godhead. Unity of essence is one proposition; plurality of person is another. Unity of essence or substance is contradicted by, or inconsistent with plurality of essence or substance. And unity of person, or personal unity, is inconsistent with plurality of persons. That is, to say that God is one and several in the same sense, would be an absurdity. It would be a contradiction to say that God is one, and yet several as to substance; or that he is one and yet several as to persons; or to say that he is one God, and yet three Gods. But that one essence can not subsist under the form of several persons is what reason can not rightfully declare to be contradictory in itself, or inconsistent with any fact known to us. We can simply know nothing about it by reason alone. We must wait for light. This doctrine, or denial of the orthodox doctrine, claimed to be eminently rational, is really extremely irrational. There is no sound philosophy in it.

If we are told the doctrine of the plurality of persons in the Godhead is a contradiction, we demand, and have a right to demand, that some known fact be given, to which it stands a contradiction, concerning the mode of the being of God. If it is answered, His unity is that fact! We reply, If unity of substance is meant, it is not so, for the one has no such relation of sameness, or in any other respect, to the other as to render them incongruous. They are different things altogether, with no more opposition between them than there is between unity of essence and plurality of attributes; or than between unity of mind and plurality of thoughts; or than between unity of soul and plurality of affections. No more, so far as reason can determine, and no more, so far as any fact known to us causes to appear. Without pretending that there is any resemblance beyond that which may do for illustration, we might with as much propriety as is done in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity by those who deny it on the ground asserted, that it involves a contradiction, take our stand and say, the soul is a unit, simple, indivisible, therefore it can not admit a plurality of

thoughts or of affections. To all evidences of a plurality of thoughts or affections, we would reply, Evidences, facts, are nothing; for my reason tells me the proposition involves an absurdity. And reason is supreme arbiter, making nugatory all seeming evidences, proving all facts, so appearing, which point to a different conclusion, deceptive. If still pressed with the inquiry, How does the proposition of the unity of the soul contradict a plurality of thoughts or affections? our answer would be, The soul is one, therefore it can not be many! If reminded that it is freely admitted that the soul is one, is a unit, but that its thoughts and its affections are many, and that this is the thing affirmed, we would be very careful to not notice, to not see the explanation, and quite ignoring it would persist in declaring, It is absurd to suppose that the soul is one soul, and at the same time many souls. Now, this ridiculous quibbling would be just as rational, just as legitimate a use of reason as that which pretends upon purely rational grounds to find a contradiction between the plurality of persons in the Godhead, and the unity of the divine substance. The same thing can not be one and several in the same sense. But reason can never make it appear that a particular object can not be one in a given, understood sense, and many in an entirely different sense; that in regard to Deity one essence, involving unity in regard to such matters as eternity, self-existence, omnipresence, omniscience, indeed in regard to all Divine attributes, may not pass over, as it were, into several persons. We must know more than we now know before this can be shown to be contrary to reason.

Or, take the ordinary metaphysical division of the soul into understanding, will and affections. Who has ever objected to this division on the ground that one can not be three; nor three one? that the soul being one, this division involves an absurdity? Here the understanding is not believed to be a different substance from either the will or the affections, nor any one of the three different substances from the soul itself. Moreover, it is not considered an objection

to these distinctions that we can not tell how they are, that we can not explain the separate mode of each. They exist in harmony, each distinct and not the others, yet no one so independent of the others as to be capable of being without them. These three agree in one, and are one—one soul and not three souls. Nor are we aware that it would involve any difficulty to say of any one, It is the soul; or to ascribe to it the attributes of the soul. This would, if said, mean no more than that it is of the substance of the soul. It is the soul willing, or the soul knowing, or the soul loving or hating. If the distinctions named are ever objected to, it is upon quite other ground than that they involve the absurdity of making one three, or three one. Yet no one can tell us how each one of these three divisions exists in what we may call personality, and yet not in separation, or difference, or plurality of substance; how each has its own character, by which it may be known and contemplated by itself, and yet has no separate essence.

It would be difficult indeed to show that reason revolts at the doctrine of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, even when not enlightened by revelation. The pantheist—whether represented by him who thinks it honest and consistent to hold his pantheism along with the profession of the religion of Jesus, and with the claim to have attained unto the highest walks thereof, or by the worshiper of Brahm, in eastern lands, who claims that remote ages have handed down to him the doctrine he holds, too high for the vulgar mind—the pantheist, in a super-eminent measure, asserts the Divinity of reason. Yet according to him, God reveals himself in a countless number and endless succession of persons. His God is one—one substance—out of which the whole visible universe proceeds. And all of individual things, beings and persons, the universe contains, are but the phenomena of his God, unconsciously striving to become, or struggling into temporary, sensible objects. God attains his, probably, highest state of development, and most exalted consciousness, in humanity. All men are therefore persons holding

or subsisting in God. Here, then, we have philosophy—so called—itsself teaching plurality of persons, and persons innumerable, and in an endless succession of coming and departing generations in unity of substance. Surely, in view of such a doctrine claiming to be eminently rational—a doctrine that presents us with the spectacle of numberless persons and individuals belonging to a vast variety of orders coming and going, appearing and disappearing, emerging from the one universal Divine substance, and returning to be again swallowed up thereof, their personal consciousness lost in an unending succession—the boaster of the supremacy of reason may well pause before bringing against the evangelical doctrine of the Divine tri-unity the charge of absurdity, of being contrary to reason. Even the natural reason does not always revolt at it. As we have just seen, it sometimes teaches it, or teaches plurality of persons in unity of substance, in its most extravagant form. It sometimes goes so far as to deny that any of all the persons who, and of all the individuals that, are, exist, or can exist, in any other manner than as developments or phenomena of Deity. It asserts that all persons are in one Divine substance, holding and rooted in it and drawing their vital force from it, as all the trees of the forest are rooted in and derive vitality from one soil; or as all the waves and billows of the ocean are of the one great mass of waters, on the bosom of which they roll and heave; or as the colors of the rainbow are phenomena of the one ray of light, itself invisible. To the charge that the evangelical doctrine is contrary to reason, we may then reply, by placing reason against reason, or judgment of reason against judgment of reason—set philosophy against philosophy, and not be disturbed at the charge until they agree—until reason itself gives forth a certain and consistent sound or decree. There is good cause for thinking that nothing is absurd in the judgment of reason, or too hard to be accepted by it, which agrees with the inclination of the heart, and flatters its proud boast of independence, while anything, no matter how simple, is esteemed by it an absurdity, which rebukes

its arrogant pretension, and is distasteful to the carnal appetite.

We think it is evident by this time that there is utterly an abuse of reason, a forcing of it forth from its proper sphere, a parade of sophistry, and a pompous show of folly, when the attempt is made to apply it to a determination of the essence of truth itself in a way that assumes for it the power of immediate, independent, authoritative and infallible judgment. Those who adopt that theory in regard to it, are apt to assert for themselves a peculiarly large measure of learning and wisdom, and to put on the airs of superiority in those respects over common mortals, whom they affect to pity for their bondage to ignorance and narrow-mindedness and superstitious reverence for the good "old paths." With how much right they do so, it is not difficult to decide; nor who they are who are really the slaves. Genuine superiority is usually found not far away from humility, and is most self-unconscious.

The fact is, that notwithstanding the boast of the supreme excellence of reason, and notwithstanding its real excellence and grandeur when properly apprehended and used, it is one of the feeblest of things when tried within spheres that lie beyond its legitimate domain—within which spheres some would force it to dwell. Within them it is absolutely helpless, and all its strivings are vain and fruitless of substantial results. Instead of having found freedom, it is the slave of more prejudices; and instead of developing a robust strength, it remains a puny babe. It can not go. It has no means nor power of progress. When it throws away its proper helps—such as the facts of experience, observation, testimony, etc., which conduct to knowledge, and attempts to go by itself, unassisted, to form, to judge, to create, independently, it at once becomes an infant, and must always stay so. It may be pleased, amused, self-satisfied with its speculations, but its speculations are puerilities and nothings—which amount to nothing, prove nothing, and rest upon nothing. Its course is a headlong career through

empty space, full of air-images, and philosophical nothings painted. Reason can only go from strength to strength, and from result to result, by being aware of its own self-helplessness, and leaning upon its suitable aids. It was never made to go alone—to go out by itself upon the vast deep of immensity, and by itself call up real, substantial creations to people it. It can go only by means of foothold foundations already laid—by means of truths which defy being comprehended in their inmost nature, and which demand to be accepted upon sufficient evidence, and which, accepted, support and assist it over fathomless gulfs, where, otherwise, it must flounder and sink, and abide forever, vainly struggling as amid the unprogressive void.

Try reason forth yonder, where, beyond life's limit—beyond the little circumference which bounds the small space where our earthly existence is pulsating itself away—can reason tell us where away?—yonder, where death lies in profound silence! Can reason give a tongue and voice to death, so that it shall tell us what it is? and what bounds of space and duration are set to its dominion? or whether it is boundless? Can it declare to us that vast and awful mystery? Reason has stood on that border, and tried to penetrate into that unknown to which our destiny bears us onward with resistless force, and has tried to catch the sound of some voice speaking from the deep, but has been compelled to confess it can see, or hear, or know nothing—or in sheer ignorant presumption has boldly given forth for its judgment, "Death is an eternal sleep!"

Try it on the question of immortality—can it answer? Is time all with which we have to do? Is our destiny all fulfilled in time? Are our cares, our hopes, our labors, our loves, our hatreds, our gains, our developments, all finished when our time on earth is ended? Reason can inform us nothing—nothing surely. Reason declares that as man passes hence he "leaps into the dark," not knowing what will be his next experience, nor whether any. But suppose, as it can not, reason should be able to answer the question,

and answer on the side of immortality—an immortality in possession of which all men shall appear in full, personal consciousness—then can it tell us concerning immortality—what are its states? its conditions? its relations? How are those who shall be clothed with it affected by their conduct in their previous life? What employments does it afford? Is it a state of activity? or of mere quiet, passive contemplation? Is it light? or is it darkness? Is it hope? or is it despair? Is it heaven? or is it hell? Is it a place, or state, of new trials? fresh opportunities? a place, or state, where mistakes made now, and here, may be corrected? or is it a place, or state, allowing no such things, but where are being forever found out only the consequences of present views, and beliefs, and conduct? Reason can not answer. Why? Because reason has no experience there—because reason has no facts which have been brought thence. Deprive it of, or deny it, facts—imagine it dwelling by itself in an absolute void, and reason can not tell what is, and what is not, possible. Nothing, to its apprehension, would be impossible, and, perhaps, we might say, nothing would be possible—or, all things would be alike possible, or alike impossible. For, as we have repeatedly said, its province is simply to employ itself with things that are already, for the sake of finding out their reality and nature and relations. In the absence of all things, therefore, it has nothing at all to do—no judgments to form, no decisions to make.

To illustrate a little farther the point that out of its proper sphere, that is, out of the region of facts—the place of experience and observation—reason is utterly helpless and weak. How much of our reasoning is founded upon the ideas or facts of time and space! Take these away from under it, and what would support it, or keep it from falling straight, headlong, unimpeded, through no sustaining element, down through emptiness itself, without ever finding a resisting medium on which to spread out its wings to lift up itself? In other words, without them, the universe would be to it as one great void. But what are time and space?

They are creations, are created things, or facts, and depend for their being on the will of God. They depend for their being, as we know them, upon our succession of thought and change of place. They belong, therefore, to the dominion of experience—rank themselves along with the things we know by experience. Now, if reason is that independent power, or faculty, which some claim it to be, it must be able to go by itself, without the helps of time and space. But can it? It can not. Let any one try to reason independently of them, and the utter inability to do so will not be long revealing itself. No finite mind, or reason, can take up its position, or make its habitation, in eternity, or immensity—absolute, empty, boundlessness—and think or act solely in their light, under their conditions. To do that is the prerogative of God alone. "Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." Of him alone is it true that "a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years." To be able to inhabit eternity, is to be able to be above and without change. If reason can take its position in eternity, it can live above change. Yet of none but God alone is it true that he is "without variable-ness or shadow of turning;" "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

This discussion will not be considered useless by those who have given attention to the signs of the present time, and who have noticed the extensive prevalence of the theory that all things are to be tested by reason—by its illegitimate use.

Reason boasters bring their taper light to explore the temple of God—which is all sublimely beautiful in the unquenchable light that breaks forth from the unspeakable glory which surrounds the great throne—in which Divine light all its parts appear standing forth amid the splendor of all-pervading brightness. They go about this temple—the grandeur, and immensity, and perfection of beauty of which proclaim the glory of God, the builder, while his praises are declared by the sun, and moon, and stars, which,

revolving within its vast dome, are its illuminating fires, and the songs of angelic choirs, lifted up to Jehovah, are its ravishing music—they go about it, holding their taper lights, ignoring the light of God, and proclaiming the supreme excellence of their own, to scan with mole eyes the porches and the altars, and the aisles, and the buildings, and then pronounce wisely and learnedly, as they imagine, upon the proportions, and the adjustments of the several parts, and the display of the presence or absence of architectural taste and skill. This pleases, and that displeases; this is right, and that is wrong; this is ornamental, that is a blunder and a blemish; this is properly located, but that is quite out of place. And so they give us a new version—an improved universe—not what really is, but what ought to be according to their superior judgment. They take on themselves to correct the faults of the Divine Architect, and give us instead their plan and theory of the spiritual temple, claiming for it a right to be preferred over that of which the Scriptures contain a description. Of this they speak with, perhaps, a certain condescending praise, as admirably well suited to former ages when there was little light, and to a people emerging from the ignorance of barbarism and superstition, but far behind the demands and necessities of this day of free, independent inquiry and progress. These pretenders—self-constituted leaders of boasted progress—grope their way back until they arrive among the arcana of creation, and hold the taper light of their reason to explore amid the mysteries of forming worlds, and then pronounce philosophically, as they think, upon the various processes, though in fact they mutter only things foolish and unintelligible, as did the ancient oracular pretenders and dupes from the dark caves in which they sat. They make their boasted explorations, and publish their vaunted valuable discoveries—"oppositions of science, falsely so called"—amid the secrets of the creation of the worlds, seeing with mole eyes by taper lights, where to faith beholding in the great light of the glory of revelation, all appears a brilliant pro-

cession of suns and stars going forth sublimely out of chaos and night and void, at the word of God—"Let them be!"

But now in this day of advanced progress we must not talk of faith. We must not see anything in God created light. Now we must see only in man made light. Divine revelations, flashing, and sparkling, and gushing from everlasting springs of infinite love and wisdom, until worlds, and times, and new creations sport and praise in the bright shinings and splendors thereof; these must depart. Man, as a reasonable being, must away with all this work and worth of God, as a fable, must not believe in them, must cast them out if he would be free and assert his proper dignity, and must himself try his hand at a creation over the desolate ruin he has made. New moral philosophies must arise, new systems of virtue and vice, new theories concerning holiness and sin. The moral philosophy of the Bible must be given up. The way of salvation it makes known must give place to some more rational plan, some plan suggested and approved by our reason. The Christ Jesus of Nazareth, of Galilee, who lived on earth eighteen hundred years ago, must yield preference as a Saviour to some other Christ, a Christ consisting of natural human virtue, declared to dwell in every man, waiting only to be sought out and made worthy to be a Saviour by the hand of self-culture, or a Christ of good works. An atonement for sin by a bloody sacrifice, by a literal shedding of blood, by the death of Christ vicariously substituted for that of the sinner, must give place to an atonement by repentance and reformation.

Always this theory of reason tends downward more and more. It is worthy to be remarked, and ought to stand for a warning not to listen to its first stealthy approaches, that reason has never led him who put it in the stead of faith, to embrace the evangelical teachings of the sacred Scriptures, never led any one to Christ, never led any one to the revealed way of forgiveness of sin and acceptance with God. It has always inclined away from Christ, next from the God of the Bible, and finally from any God. Are we not justified,

therefore, in view of what has been said, in saying that the use of reason, as contended for by those against whose theory concerning it we object, is an abuse of it—is unphilosophical and utterly Anti-Christian? And in asserting that it is a bondage? a tyranny? a thralldom to a lie? a slavery of the soul? and that freedom is not in it? Where is liberty, then? In the word of God! In that word how apprehended? By reason? or by faith? By faith! What! Is reason to be rejected then? No! But reason is to determine, upon legitimate grounds of evidence, that we have the word of God, and not upon the wisdom of the contents of that word, and their truth. Having found by a legitimate use of reason, that we have the word of God, we must then heartily accept and believe whatsoever is therein contained, our reason itself taking the place of subjection to that which is, according to its own rightly-formed judgment, from God, to be instructed, to have its pride cast down, its darkness enlightened, its error corrected, its foolishness changed to wisdom. Having used our reason to determine by the means he has himself directed us to employ, that the One claiming to be the great Teacher is indeed he, then reason itself must sit at his feet to hear his words and to believe them to be true; accepting them without cavil, without dispute, without contradiction, in mere childlike, undoubting, simplicity of faith.

By faith in the word of God we are made free. By our faith in the word of God reason is, and never until then, itself emancipated from bondage to a corrupt and enslaving will. The word of God goes forth upon the regions of death, and death lives. It goes forth and searches the hereafter, and out of that dark, dread, mysterious abyss brings life and immortality to light. It goes forth among the mysteries of the soul and its destinies, every-where; and wheresoever it goes, darkness, doubt, uncertainty, flee away, and light and life abound. It searches out everything concerning which the anxious soul makes question, and returns sure answer. That word is not bound. It is free to go whithersoever the

eternal and omnipresent spirit of God listeth, amid the deeps or the heights of spiritual being. This is freedom; and this freedom belongs to the soul emancipated by faith in the word. For the wide regions of that word belong to faith; those vast regions which, by the word, are explored and opened up. Faith, attaching itself to that word, goes forth with, conducted by it, not as uncertainly, but confidently. It sees in the light of God, and sees afar, with more keen than angel-glance penetrating the future through the thick folds of its garments of night and death. Compared with what lies open, fully revealed to faith beholding through the word of God of those great things to which the soul, groaning under the weight of immense, crushing burdens, and agonizing with intense desire after knowledge and relief, is related, how contemptibly little and worthless are the most boasted achievements of reason!

Truth, and truth alone, makes free. And in religious matters the word of God is the only truth, and it is all truth, and all of truth. Only by the word of God can we know God as God and our Saviour. Only there can we know ourself and our sin. Only there can we know that and how our sin may be forgiven, and that and how we may be saved. With the knowledge that we receive by faith from that word, comes the real emancipation of the soul—"the glorious liberty of the children of God." But reason can do nothing for us—nothing for him who, under the power of deep conviction of sin wrought in the soul by the Holy Spirit, goes to it with the momentous inquiry, and demanding a clear and certain solution, able to be satisfied with nothing else—"What must I do to be saved?" It has been tried—and men will continue to try it, notwithstanding the history of its failures—and upon sin and holiness, life and death, time and eternity, guilt and atonement, God and his dealings with and purposes concerning our race, it sits stupidly pondering, or ignorantly and foolishly chattering, and boasting great things, and giving us nothing.

If we had not already occupied so much space, it would

be interesting to notice a little more than has been done, the affectation of superior wisdom and independence on the part of those who sneer at the advocates of evangelical truth, as narrow-minded, bigoted, and anti-progressive. A comparison of the works of both classes would show that nothing is further from the truth than their boastful assertions. Faith indeed works to add to the power and vigor of the reasoning faculty, and enables it to reach a development it would else fail to secure. The works of faith stand all along the course of the history of the Church as grand and enduring monuments of such results. Those monuments stand and will stand forever, while the unsubstantial works of reason without or against faith are continually disappearing—passing away into the vast receptacle of forgotten things. There are no grander works of logical ability, of philosophical acumen, of sound criticisms, of bold independence and fearless far-forth searchings of thought than those of the earnest advocates for creeds and for absolute subjection of the whole mind and soul to the written word of God. They have always been foremost among defenders of human liberty—civil and religious—promoters of education, and of all true progress and genuine enterprise.

Reason fails, fatally fails him who relies upon it as teacher and guide at death. We do not say that the merely reasoning philosopher may not die as calmly as Socrates. But reason affords in death no really sustaining strength. It stretches forth its wings over emptiness, and struggles vainly, however anxiously, with the terrible uncertainties of the nigh future. It does not hope, nor desire, nor exult in any good, intelligent sense. It takes the leap which carries it forever from the experiences of this life "into the dark." But in the hour of death, he who has lived by faith in God, and in Jesus Christ his only begotten Son, finds he has a sure strength, one that does not fail. His soul stretches forth its wings upon the boundless, illuminated expanse of revealed truth and grace, and goes forth exultingly upon the broad regions of the Divine promises, fearing nothing, hoping

all things, secure of life, confident of immortal bliss. Reason offers no rest to the weary, but annihilation—no refuge for the storm-driven, no hiding-place for the troubled soul, but the grave as a place of eternal sleep. Alas for him who trusts it! it can not make that poor offer good. It can not bind the soul in the grave so as to detain it there. Faith carries the soul and lays it upon the bosom of God, in whose paternal smile it abides in peace and joy forever.

ART. II.—*The Covenants of Scripture.*

IT has pleased God, in all his dealings with men, to operate through a system of agencies called covenants. Of these, the number is sufficiently large to utterly perplex the generality of readers, while those who devote more especial attention to such things, and whose business it is to understand and expound the word of God, frequently have but a confused perception of them, failing rightly to discriminate between the several ones, and also to reduce them all to a system that is compact and clear. Wherever the Scriptures seem to be confused and without system, we may rely upon it that we have failed to comprehend them, either through lack of attention, meekness and spiritual insight, or else we have applied to them wrong principles, and with a conceit bordering on presumption, in striving to adapt them thereto, wrest and do violence to those living oracles. He who would interpret God's word to men, must stand with the rod of God in his hand, do reverently, and sanctify him before the people. All parts of God's word have been handled deceitfully, all parts of it have been misunderstood, and what with the deceitfulness of our own hearts, and the malignity of the evil one, there has been so much misrepresentation and misunderstanding, that those who love the Lord have always gladly welcomed, and been edified with every repeated

attempt of any of his servants to make a statement of what he teaches us, and to eviscerate untruth. The Lord has always set himself forth as a covenant-keeping God. In this his honor is concerned. Untruth, instead of being content with deluding souls, must also cast indignity upon him, by showing him false to his own engagements, or denying that he has so bound himself, in the face of his own repeated asseverations to the contrary. Every untruth strikes at some covenant or other; as Pelagianism at the covenant of works, Arminianism at the covenant of redemption, Antipædobaptism at the Abrahamic, and Rationalism at the Gospel covenant. The influence of these errors does not end with the obliteration of the single covenant to which each one is immediately opposed, but by necessary consequence invalidates the others also.

The truth of God unto salvation is a perfect and well-compacted scheme, made up of parts, every one of which is absolutely essential to the whole. It is impossible either to modify or take away one of these parts, or introduce a foreign one, without vitiating the whole. As in chemistry, as change in the proportions of the same elements, much less the taking away of some or the introduction of others, makes an entirely different compound, so in the truth of God, the slightest error vitiates the whole, providing it be logically followed out to its legitimate result. And the only reason why the souls of all persons who hold to any error are not lost, is that they are bad reasoners, and their hearts are stronger than their heads. We do not hesitate in the face of all mankind to declare, that any departure, however slight from God's truth, or any perversion or dilution of it, or any introduction of anything foreign into it, will, if followed out, and the process be carried far enough, end at the last in the total rejection of everything that he has revealed to us; in the denial of his being; of our own existence, and of all things whatsoever. Of course, it is only with the fewest and most radical errors that the human mind is able unerringly to follow this process. But who will deny that

to the infinite intuition of God, or even to the reasonings of higher intelligences, this is not true of every error, however slight? We have sometimes thought that a very profitable book might be written, by taking up the five points of Calvinism, and showing that this is true concerning every one of them. There is certainly no better way to test the truth of any doctrine than to run it out in all its bearings, in all possible aspects, upon every shade and phase, of other truth that is certainly known. The human mind has a wonderful *penchant* for what does not immediately concern it, or what concerns it as little as possible; perhaps it might gratify its taste for speculations and refinings, so as to render its work not altogether useless, by indulging in the manner just indicated.

The fact that all error modifies or denies some one or more of the covenants, renders a distinct statement of them necessary. The fact that all God's dealings with men is through covenants, is a fact which must strike every attentive reader of the Scriptures. When this is examined into, it is discovered that every succeeding one is an advance upon what precedes; that each advance is so distinctly marked from both what precedes and follows, as to possess a kind of unity and be unique, or, in other words, to be a separate dispensation. These dispensations, we all know, are successive manifestations of the plan of redemption. Having observed all this, reason itself would lead us, even if the Scriptures were silent upon the subject, to infer that the whole plan is itself a covenant. There is always some reason revealed or unrevealed, existing either in our own condition or the nature of God, to account for all of his acts concerning us. If we inquire why he should save us by a system of covenants, obvious reasons appear. These are, unbelief in us, and faithfulness in God. Unbelief is the great sin of the unregenerate heart, just as faith is the great grace of the renewed heart; and faithfulness is the great characteristic of the true God, just as faithlessness and deception is of all false gods. That the Lord is a covenant-keeping God is a

truth most precious to the Christian heart, and a fact in which he especially glories. As unbelief and distrust of him are chief obstacles to be overcome in our salvation, the Lord adopts the means best adapted to have this result, and that is by solemn covenant. To all of these he has shown himself faithful, and he fearlessly challenges all nations and tribes of men, in every age, to produce a single instance of a soul that hath trusted him and been put to confusion. The great and mighty God hath most graciously condescended to obligate himself to man, and he appeals to our unbelief, and asks us to trust him far enough to test him. The soul that puts his trust in Christ leans upon the mediator of the eternal covenant. His death is not only sacrificial but covenantal, the slain lamb betwixt whose dis severed portions the parties to the covenant walk. His people perform this action when they are baptized into his death. The covenant secures everything to us; there is not a promise that we can plead, or a spiritual gift that we can ask, but lo! his sacred honor is pledged to grant it infinitely beyond our most consuming longings. Why is it that, after so many ages of faithfulness and high and noble dealing, we still distrust him? And is it not a matter of profound thanksgiving, that he has not long since cast us off, and refused to plead with a faithless, a perverse and a gainsaying generation? And should we not hasten to abase ourselves in the dust before him, and offer him the ready homage of our spirits, and the sacrifice of our lives?

The reasons already given are perhaps enough to satisfy us why God, in dealing with sinners, should always do it by covenant. If, however, we advance a step further, and seek to know why, in dealing with sinless man, he adopted the same plan, we find ourselves on the confines of a great mystery, and should tread reverently and cautiously, and seek not with unholy vision to penetrate the vail which the wand of Omnipotence hath not raised. The covenant of works is of this description. Unfallen man could not distrust his Maker, and he in turn need not resort to this to persuade

man of his faithfulness. But we must here pause, for whatever there might be in the very nature of things to account for it, and however forward a fruitful conjecture might be in assigning reasons, we must be content with two statements: *firstly, so far as we can see*, it would have been impossible to convey the benefit proposed in another way. It was necessary for Adam to be the *federal* as well as the natural head of the race, in order for them to be benefited by his obedience, or to inherit by a natural descent the estate, whatever it might be, into which he himself might be brought by his covenant relation with God, or to go back of this, that he should himself enter into that estate on a given condition; and *secondly*, the eminent wise God always does the best thing, in the best possible way, and though he may not reveal his reasons, yet they are good and sufficient; that they are not revealed argues that they would be inscrutable to us, or that to know them would not benefit us.

God entered into a covenant of life with sinless man, on condition of perfect obedience. We can not suppose that by this covenant a merciful and wise God would have increased the hazard of man's condition. By this covenant he was placed on a probation; but a probation is hazardous; he was, therefore, on a probation before. We can not conceive of a holy and merciful God entering into a new dispensation with an innocent and perfect being, that would not be to better his condition. If now man was on a probation, both before and after the covenant of works, the bettering of his condition must consist in the latter probation being a more merciful one than the former. It is more merciful in this, that it limits the probation as to time, places it within a specified period; and that instead of standing for himself only, he stands for himself and all his natural descendants. It may be replied that this would have been true if he had not fallen; but inasmuch as he fell, it was a calamity instead of a blessing that the race was represented in him. To this the reply is obvious, that if as far as the terms of the covenant itself are concerned the objection lies, God had it in mind

by another covenant, upon the failure of this one, to redeem unto himself a people. There are, in all probability, more redeemed by the covenant of grace than would have kept the first covenant, if they had all stood for themselves. For the truth of this, what we know concerning the angels, fallen and unfallen, affords a strong presumption. There is this advantage also, those who are redeemed attain an infinitely higher happiness than they would if they had kept the first covenant and stood by their own righteousness, to say nothing of the revelation of the Trinity, and many of God's most adorable attributes, of which we could then have known nothing. We have just said, that probably more are saved by the covenant of redemption than would have stood by the covenant of works; but it is an exceedingly charitable supposition to grant that any would have stood at all; for if the representative man of the race failed with a limited probation, under probably the first temptation, how is it possible for any considerable number, or any at all of his descendants, the vast majority of whom must be inferior to himself, to stand in an unlimited probation, and under innumerable temptations? This argument is very ably put in the writings of an eminent living theologian, whom every one at all conversant with the subject will immediately recognize.

If the covenant of works had attained its end, none other had been necessary; but inasmuch as it was broken, the end must be abandoned or sought by another covenant. This and infinitely more is accomplished through the covenant of redemption. This last embraces all that God has done, or will do, for man's salvation; it is the complete plan, from its inception in the eternity past, to its consummation in the eternity to come. It is called a covenant because it was entered into between the three persons of the Trinity, each taking upon himself his peculiar office-work. Inasmuch as it contemplates nothing less than the entire completion of the whole work, it of course embraces whatever subsidiary agencies may be employed to bring about that end. Inasmuch, therefore, as God made many covenants with men in

the successive stages of the plan, they are all of them but outgrowths of the covenant of redemption; nothing more or less than agencies employed to carry out its provisions. The covenant of works is the solitary exception to this rule. The only relation which it bears to the rest is, that the *breach* of it is the occasion of the existence of the covenant of redemption, and consequently of the other covenants. The object of the covenant of redemption is the salvation of sinners; there are no sinners capable of salvation except those who perish by a covenant. The covenant of works was, therefore, a merciful provision, even when broken; for if we perish at all it is infinitely better for us that we so perish that we may be delivered. We perish by a covenanted and natural head; we are restored by a covenanted and supernatural head. We descend from the one by a natural generation, and are born of the flesh. We descend from the other by a supernatural generation, and are born of the spirit. In the covenant of redemption our supernatural head stands for us, and in the counsels of eternity secures from the other persons of the Trinity, and engages himself to perform whatever is necessary for our salvation. In the actual outworking of the plan, minor ends are secured by minor covenants, all looking to the same final issue, though each immediately accomplishing something different. For instance, the objects of the Jewish and Christian æconomys were ultimately the same—the salvation of souls; yet immediately how different! The one restricted, cumbrous, and ceremonial; the other free, simple, and spiritual; the one the *old* covenant, the other the *new*; yet both of them executive provisions of the one eternal covenant of redemption; the latter a more recent, a fuller, and a more spiritual development of it. This covenant is known by two names in theology, which are taken respectively from the *character* of it, and the *end* of it. From the character of it, it is called the *covenant of grace*, because it itself, and all of its provisions toward man, are gracious; from the end of it, which is the redemption of man, it is called the *covenant of redemption*.

We have just seen that the whole plan of salvation, in its widest and most general scope, is a covenant; that the occasion of any salvation at all was a broken covenant; it remains now to be shown that this same plan, in its narrowest and most direct application, to wit, the salvation of the individual soul, is in like manner a covenant; and that in every phase of it, between these two extremes, wherein any part of it is conceived as a whole, or as separate and distinct from other parts, so as to be denominated a dispensation, that part or dispensation is in like manner a covenant. Between the covenant of the individual soul with God, and the whole conception of the plan arising in the exhaustless past, infolding the present in its embrace, and culminating amid the fruition of the world to come, these aspects of it appear: There are first two great divisions, from Adam to Abraham, or the Church without a visible organization separate from the world, constituting the patriarchal covenant; and the period from Abraham to the end, wherein the Church is organized and separate from the world, constituting the Abrahamic covenant. Both of these, and especially the latter, are supplemented by other and subsidiary and executive covenants, to be hereafter explained. Through the whole of these periods, amid changing covenants and expiring dispensations, remains steadfast and indispensable to every one of them, the covenant of the individual soul with God. This is the center of the circle, as the covenant of redemption is its circumference and frame; the changing dispensations and evanishing lesser covenants are the sections that appear and disappear in its mighty revolution; and Jesus Christ is the eternal mediator of them all. This covenant of the individual soul with God, we venture to designate specifically as the *Covenant of Faith*. Faith is the law of the life upon which every individual soul—so far as we have certain knowledge—enters and remains whilst in the flesh. The first act of faith is this covenant. In it, we trust the Lord; intrust ourselves to him, renounce this world, and engage to be his. In it, the Lord perils all his

honor, and unhesitatingly stakes it, forever to be unto us a God and Saviour. The terms are unconditional on both sides, there is no reservation whatever, there is absolutely no appeal from it, it can consequently be abrogated only by the consent of both parties; and though we ourselves may change, and break covenant with him, yet he will not on this account forsake us. We would fall away every moment of time if it were not for his grace sustaining us. If we do fall, it is because sufficient grace is not given; but the promise to all his children is that his grace shall be sufficient for them. He hath sworn that he will not deliver us into the hand of the spoiler, and that we shall never be moved. In the brief compass of nine words he has given us a threefold assurance—*Ὁὐ μὴ σε ἀνᾶ οὐδ' οὐ μὴ σε εγκαταλίπω*—I will never leave thee nor forsake thee. A solemnity should be upon our spirits whenever we treat of the great doctrines of the cross, and particularly those in which the honor of the Most High is concerned; and we should be careful not to lightly handle, and above all to question, the truth of any doctrine in such a manner as to charge covenant-breaking upon the dreadful God. We should also search our own hearts, and be watchful to depart from all iniquity; for in the case of every sin against light and knowledge, we incur not only the guilt of the transgression itself, but add thereto the heinous and dishonorable crime of covenant-breaking.

It is not our purpose to do more concerning the patriarchal covenant than to indicate its general posture in relation to the other covenants; and whatever may now be said must be considered rather in the light of hints, to indicate the course of future investigation, than as well-established doctrine upon the subject; and instead of now treating it fully, this topic will form the subject for a future article, either by the writer of this, or by an abler and more experienced hand. What we have now to say is, that the dispensation from Adam to Abraham seems to us, as far as our present investigation has led us, to be a covenant. We are aware that it is common to divide this period and make two

of it—from Adam to Noah, and from Noah to Abraham. The differences between these two sections of the period do not seem strong enough to invalidate the unity of the whole, and may exist in perfect conformity with that idea. Reasoning from analogy, as has already been indicated, and will presently be seen, every dispensation except this is a covenant, it would seem strange that the initial one of them all should differ in so essential a characteristic from every one of its successors. The very idea of a covenant, however, seems to necessitate two contracting parties—one of them seems to be wanting here. We might, however, with strict propriety, inasmuch as the Scripture usage of the term covers both ideas, make this a testament; against this, the objection just mentioned would not lie. A *covenant*, as we understand it, is a compact, necessitating two or more parties; a *testament* is a *bequeathment*, necessitating but one. The Scriptures, however, call a testament a covenant, so that, with this understanding, the patriarchal dispensation is a covenant still. The Church, under this dispensation, was visible as far as its ordinances made it so; but it had not yet received an organized outward form separate and distinct from the world. This characteristic pervades the entire period, from Adam to Abraham, and is the reason why we have made it one dispensation instead of two. This idea enables us to grasp more definitely the conception of the Church in all time. It is divided into two great periods, without a visible organization, and with it. When it was without the organization, it was feeble and struggling, on the point continually of being extinguished amid the surrounding darkness. After the lapse of ages it was found embracing only eight persons, and confined to a single household. The wickedness of man was great upon the earth, why continue other ages of like effort with like result? It is not in the plans of Omnipotence to do so. The world must be destroyed. The flood came, other ages rolled away, the world has again apostatized from God, and the Church is again found within a single family; must the world again

be destroyed? God never repeats himself in providence. Instead of destroying the world, he will separate his people from it. This is done in Abraham. The Church attains its visible organization; at the first exceedingly impure in comparison with what follows; it is as the weak and beggarly elements of the world. Every succeeding minor dispensation makes it purer and purer, and wider and wider, until, at last, every one shall know the Lord, from the least unto the greatest, and the knowledge of him shall cover the earth as the waters do the great deep!

The Noachic Covenant differs from all others, in that it was not made with the Church of the living God, but with the whole race, from the time it was given to the end of the world; that it did not constitute a separate dispensation, but arising in the bosom of one dispensation, it reaches through all others till time shall end; and that the object of it is not directly the redemption of man or anything spiritual, but temporal blessings only. This might at the first seem to be an exception to the principle, that all covenants except that of works are simply executive of the covenant of redemption; but this would give us a very limited and imperfect view of the work of Christ. He not only makes an atonement for the sins of his people, but he does more. The objections principally made by Arminians against the Calvinistic system, rest chiefly on this misconception. And he who would defend the system against the attacks of errorists, while holding to any such distorted conception of it, will find himself hopelessly worsted and beaten from the field of argument. The passages of Scripture are numerous which teach that the Lord Jesus Christ died for every human being. He tasted death for every man. As in Adam all die, so in Christ are all made alive. He who attempts to explain away Scriptures as plain as that large class, of which the foregoing express the sentiment, brings himself into ridicule, and the system he defends into contempt. So far as redemption is concerned, our blessed Lord took on him only the seed of Abraham; but, in assuming that seed, he took upon

him the nature of that seed, to wit, humanity; by a necessary consequence, humanity is benefited just so far as he assumed it. In addition to his connection with the seed of Abraham, through a common nature, he possesses a union with them—not hypothetical and by a legal fiction—but *real*, of which faith is in them the expression, which union is, as far as he is concerned, a headship and brotherhood, which is to the Father a sonship, and to the Holy Ghost, sanctity. This union secures to the seed of Abraham redemption; while his connection with the whole race, being only that of a common nature, the benefits resulting to them do not amount to salvation, but include only the blessings of this life, and the resurrection from the dead.

The Lord Jesus, in his union with humanity, did not take upon himself a human person, but humanity; he took upon him all the elements of a human person, but not the person. These elements have no union with one another, primarily, but secondarily; that is, they are all of them united to his divinity, and in this manner are united to one another. Hence, when in his death his divinity was separated from his humanity, the elements of it fell asunder, the compound personality God-man was dissolved, and the Lord Jesus died. It was not his humanity that died, but *himself*, the compound person, the God-man. He who says that he did not die, takes away the hope of the righteous; bars the gate of heaven; opens wider the yawning mouth of the bottomless pit; dethrones the mediator; and exalts the god of this world to his matchless empire. Of all his titles, that one which the Saviour most frequently applies to himself, is the *Son of Man*; that is, not son of any particular man, or family, or lineage of men, but *man*, humanity. He has no kinsmen according to the flesh, as we have, for he had not a human person. The only kinship which he recognizes, in addition to this one, is the kinship of faith, or the spiritual seed of Abraham. Matt. xii: 44–50. While he yet talked to the people, behold, his mother and his brethren stood without, desiring to speak with him. Then one said unto

him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren stand without, desiring to speak with thee. But he answered and said unto him that told him, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold, my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother,

Inasmuch as the connection of our Saviour with the race of man which we have just explained, was incidental, and auxiliary to his higher connection with the seed of Abraham, or the elect, so, in the covenant of redemption, the resurrection of the whole race, and the ordinary blessings of this life upon all mankind, are incidental, and auxiliary to the higher blessing, the salvation of the elect. And as the covenant of redemption embraces the latter as its chief end, it in like manner embraces the former, on the principle, that to secure an end, we must secure all the means to that end. And inasmuch as we have said that all covenants subsequent to that of works, are but executive provisions of the covenant of redemption, so, the Noahic covenant, in that it secures to the race many natural and incidental blessings, is one of those executive provisions. We arrive, therefore, at the doctrine, that all mercies to the righteous and the wicked are covenanted mercies, and are the purchase of Christ's blood. This idea is set forth in the Jewish sacrifice of the *peace offering*. This was not to atone for sin, but was a thank offering expressive of the worshiper's gratitude for mercies received or implored; and yet the priest made an atonement with the blood. What could this mean, but that the mercies, for which he expressed his gratitude, were the purchase of the blood of the great sacrifice that was to come? It is upon this idea of the covenant of redemption that we make the Noahic covenant an executive provision of it.

There are three great periods in the Church's history, so far as relates to her visible organization—the Church mingled with the world; the Church separate from the world; the Church triumphant over the world. In the first, the

patriarchal was the only form of government for Church and State; in the second, under different forms, there is the distinction in government between the nation that is God's, a holy nation, a peculiar people, and the nations of this world. In the third, the nations of this earth shall entirely disappear, and the great fifth empire shall be established, the kingdom of the *Son of Man* shall be the only kingdom. The stone cut out of the mountain without hands, shall have smitten all other kingdoms, and broken them to dust, and driven them away as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor. The first is the period of the patriarchal covenant; the second, of the Abrahamic; and the third, of her millennial glory. There is great diversity in the unity of the second of these, but the essential features are the same throughout. As the whole three periods are a progress, the one upon the other, so is this period within itself; that is, it is divided into sub-periods, each of which is an advance upon the other; as from Abraham to the exodus, from the exodus to Christ, from Christ to the millennium. As the Abrahamic covenant covers the whole period from Abraham to the millennium, all the covenants which are found included in this period are simply executive provisions of it; just as it, with those preceding, are of the covenant of redemption. The seal of this covenant is circumcision, *now* as at the first. Baptism comes in the place of circumcision in several respects, but not in the sense that it is the seal of the Abrahamic covenant. Circumcision is the seal of that, while baptism is the seal of another covenant, as will be presently shown. And instead of this being fatal to the doctrine of infant baptism, we think we can show that it is the only tenable ground on which to advocate it. It would seem to an unsophisticated mind, that the reliability and perpetuity of a covenant would depend upon the inviolability of its seal. Neither can we understand why, if the covenant itself be not changed, there should be any propriety in changing the seal; nor can we understand how two parties to a solemn compact having set to a given seal, one of them should afterward

without consulting the other, change it; nor what validity there would be in it when thus changed. But we will treat of this again, in its appropriate place.

The Abrahamic covenant when first given was manifold; it consisted of divers articles or stipulations, and we apprehend that none can gainsay but that it is so still. To the one covenant, embracing all these stipulations as a unit, was the seal of circumcision placed. He who received the mark of circumcision in his flesh, did not by that act receive all the stipulations of the whole covenant, but only such as applied to his condition. The promise was to Abraham and his seed, and yet many who were not his seed received circumcision. When given to Ishmael, or to the sons of Keturah, or to the servants of the household, or to the incorporated stranger, it meant a different thing in each case, and then all of these again differed vastly from the case of Isaac. It is not the whole covenant that we have explicated as covering the immense period of time just mentioned, but that single article or stipulation of it which was applied to Isaac and Jacob. It is not the God of Abraham that is in covenant with us, but *the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob!* This is the branch of the covenant that constitutes the visible church. Neither Ishmael, nor Midian, nor Eliezer were made members of the visible Church by their circumcision if they did not cast in their lot with Isaac. The Lord blessed Ishmael, but established his covenant with Isaac. The limitation did not stop here. Of Isaac's sons, the Lord loved Jacob and hated Esau, and he cast out Esau and established his covenant with Jacob. Now, by this it is not to be for a moment supposed that there was no covenant at all with Ishmael and Esau, but that *par excellence*, that portion of it which was of the most importance was established with Isaac. We have indeed the words of the Lord himself to the contrary, wherein he calls circumcision itself the covenant. Gen. xvii: 10: "This is my covenant, which ye shall keep between me and you, and thy seed after thee; every man child among you shall be circumcised." Whether or not

the other provisions of the covenant, and particularly those promises under it to Ishmael and Esau, are yet fulfilled or not, is a question which will be answered affirmatively or negatively according as the notions of people differ about the interpretation of prophecy. "Ishmael shall be a wild man, warred upon and warring; nevertheless he shall dwell in the presence of his brethren, a fruitful and great nation. The fatness of the earth and the dew of heaven shall be Esau's habitation; by his sword shall he live and serve his brother, but his brother's yoke shall he break from his neck when the time shall come that he shall have the dominion." Whether or not these wonderful promises have yet been fulfilled, can scarcely be doubtful to the mind of him who looks for a great and gracious fullness in every promise of God. To us it seems there is a glorious future for the dweller in the desert and the inhabitant of the rock. "Let the wilderness and the cities thereof lift up their voice, the villages that Kedar doth inhabit: let the inhabitants of the rock sing, let them shout from the top of the mountains." Isa. xlii: 11. The promise that is given them, half blessing, half curse—have they not endured the curse already, in the long ages of wandering, of servitude and of war? And shall not their blessing, when it comes, be as full as their curse has been? "Yea, upon the rocks that Edom doth inhabit shall be reared sanctuaries of the living God, and the desert shall find a voice of praise in the mouth of its wandering sons."

When the Lord took his people by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, he made with them a covenant. The words of this covenant he spake to them from the holy mount. In the midst of thunderings and lightnings, the quaking of the mountain, the smoke and fire, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, the God of Israel descended. The people beholding, feared greatly and stood afar off, trembling. The mighty preparation having ceased, and awful silence ensuing, the voice of God, terrible in majesty, spake in the hearing of all the people the words of this

covenant. With the dread of the Most High upon them, the people solemnly ratified it. Ex. xxiv: 8-11. This covenant was the first one under the Abrahamic. The simple specifications of the original covenant had sufficed hitherto. The household of Abraham widened into a family under Jacob, under Jacob's sons, a mighty clan; but they were not yet a great nation, they needed not a national covenant as yet. In Egypt they became a nation in numbers, but not in privileges. Such a covenant was not yet necessary to them. But when God led them forth, and gave them freedom, he must also give them the laws, customs, and fabric of a nation. They are still his people, in covenant with him, the descendants of Abraham, in the line of Isaac and Jacob. Whatever institutions he may give them must be in the spirit and line of the covenant he made with their fathers. These institutions he gives them in the form of a covenant, which does not supersede the one made with their fathers, but naturally grows out of it. It is a natural branch of the olive tree, and not another tree. This covenant embraced whatever was peculiar to the Levitical economy, or Mosaic dispensation, or Jewish Church. The Theocracy and State Church, all that was fuller than what preceded, and different from what followed, was embraced in it. It was the fulfillment of that promise of the original covenant, which said, I will make of thee a great nation. The fulfillment of that other promise, In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed, was reserved for a subsequent covenant. This covenant they broke. When the *Son of Man* gave up the ghost, and the vail of the Temple was rent from the top to the bottom, then this covenant was annulled, and the God of Israel departed from his throne upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim. It is a remarkable fact, which no one seems to have noticed, that in the writings of the captivity, while this covenant was in abeyance, the Lord is seldom, if ever, called God of Israel, but *God of Heaven*. The God of Israel was the local sovereign of the country, according to the provisions of the Sinaitic covenant. This

was the constitution of the Jewish State. When, therefore, they no longer existed as a State, God was no longer their sovereign, or the God of Israel. The breaking up and passing away of this covenant did not affect the Abrahamic. The branch was torn from the tree, but the tree remained. Gal. iii: 17. And this I say, that the covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, can not disannul, that it should make the promise of none effect.

The stream widens as it flows downward in the course of time. All nations (that is, the heathen) must now be brought into the covenant. The promise was from the beginning that they should be embraced in it, but a special enactment had never been made to bring them in. The affairs of the covenant have now become so immense that special legislation, in the form of minor covenants, must be entered into to carry out its original provisions. In the case of the Gentiles this is done in the Gospel, or new covenant, through Jesus Christ. In the case of the Jewish nation, their special act was repealed; therefore, although not really cast out of the original covenant, they are virtually so. It is held in abeyance, and they are now in it only by promise, as the Gentiles were formerly in it only by promise. Formerly a Gentile could belong to the Church of the living God only by ceasing to be a Gentile and becoming a Jew; now, a Jew can be a member of the Church of the living God, only by ceasing to be a Jew, and becoming a Gentile. A Gentile, though embraced in the covenant by promise, yet, having no minor covenant of his own to bring him in, must conform to the Sinaitic covenant. So, now, the Sinaitic covenant being repealed, the Jew, who is in it, by promise, in order to enjoy its blessings must avail himself of the Gospel covenant, and become a member of the *Gentile Church*. And this must remain so, until God shall graft them in again; that is, make a new covenant with them, which he has promised to do.

The sacrament of baptism is the seal of the *Gospel* or *New Covenant*, but its position in the Abrahamic is peculiar. The

Gospel covenant does not supersede the Abrahamic, but the Sinaitic. Hence baptism does not supersede circumcision as the seal of the Abrahamic covenant, but only as a *caral ordinance*. In so far as circumcision emblemized the work of God upon the heart, it is superseded by baptism; and in this regard baptism is called Christ's circumcision (Col. ii : 11), and may be said to come in the place of circumcision. We come into the Abrahamic covenant, *not by circumcision, but by Christ*. We are united to him by a living faith, so far as it is outward, by baptism. The circumcision is eternal in him, and we are circumcised in him. When asked, therefore, for the seal of the covenant, we point to baptism; if we are questioned further, we point to Christ, saying that baptism is the seal of his covenant with us, and that by it we are one with him (that is outwardly and ceremonially), that he is Abraham's seed, having the circumcision in his flesh. The Apostle Paul says, If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise. If we are faithful, then are we the children of faithful Abraham. But faith does not unite us to Abraham, but to Christ, and he unites us to Abraham. While circumcision will remain forever the seal of the Abrahamic covenant, it will never be again practised, even when the Jews shall be brought back, having become eternal in the flesh of the *Son of Man*. Just as sacrifices, though they will always be necessary for sin, will never again be offered, having been once offered forever, in the person of the Messiah.

It may be well here to remark, though out of its proper connection, that although sacrifices ceased synchronously with the Sinaitic covenant, they did not cease because it did. It did not create them; it found them, and embraced them. They ceased because the great sacrifice that they prefigured had come, and for no other reason. When the substance came the shadow was done away.

It may be well here also to anticipate an objection which may be urged; that the above course of reasoning makes Christ inferior to Abraham. The answer is, that the Abra-

hamic covenant is an external organization; spiritually, Christ does not bring us to Abram; that Abraham himself must be found in Christ, or he will not be saved. And, finally, it is no more degrading for us to be Abraham's children, by virtue of our union to Christ, than it is for Christ himself to be Abraham's child, which the Scriptures confessedly teach him to be; and if the Scriptures shame not to say, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed," it is certainly not wrong in us to endeavor to enforce the truth of this very observation upon our fellow men.

There remains now but one covenant to be explained, the covenant with Israel and Judah. This is still future, and the prediction concerning it is found in Jer. xxxi: 31-34. Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they break, although I was an husband unto them, saith the Lord: But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more. We are perfectly aware that this has invariably been interpreted of the present Gospel dispensation and applied to the Gentiles. Our reasons for differing from this belief, rest upon the general basis of that system of interpretation, which refuses to spiritualize and explain away that large class of Scriptures which promise future blessings to God's ancient people. It is not our purpose to meddle with this general argument farther than is necessary to set forth our conception of this covenant. When the Sinaitic covenant was abolished, the Jews, being the natural

branches of the olive tree, were broken off. In their stead, the Gentiles which were of the wild olive tree, were grafted in; if God be able to graft in the branch of the wild olive tree, how much more will he graft in again the natural branches. Rom. xi: 24-27. For if thou wert cut out of the olive-tree, which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature into a good olive tree; how much more shall these, which be the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive tree? For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part is happened to Israel, *until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in.* And so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, There shall come out of Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob: *For this is my covenant unto them,* when I shall take away their sins! Not only shall the Jews return again to the Church of the living God, but they shall return by covenant. Their sin shall be forgiven them. The blood of the crucified shall no longer rest upon their heads to make them an astonishment and a by-word; but it shall be applied to their hearts to cleanse them, and give them equal rights in the kingdom with those who are the children of Abraham by faith. The Lord shall put his law in their inward parts and write it on their hearts; that is, it shall be an outpouring of the spirit of the living God upon them. It shall be unto them what the present Gospel dispensation is to us. They shall be brought back, not by a fleshly generation, as they were under the Sinaitic covenant, but by a spiritual generation in Jesus Christ. As we stand by the Gospel covenant, so shall they stand by the covenant with Israel and Judah.

The two are the counterpart of each other: Instead of carnal ordinances, spirituality; Jesus Christ the mediator of both, and the connecting link between both and the Abrahamic covenant, the provisions of which they both carry out; both of them are under the one reign of the spirit, the one the beginning, and the other the completion of it. Hence both of them are sometimes taken largely for one and the

same covenant, and are called the *New covenant*. In the eighth chapter of Hebrews, the apostle gives an explication of them in this sense: They are both equally opposed to the Sinaitic covenant, in their spirit and structure, and both equally succeed it.

In the ancient Jewish harvest there were two feasts, Pentecost and Tabernacles—the feast of first fruits and of ingathering; the one at the beginning of the harvest, and the other at the end; the latter one was peculiarly a feast of joy. The annual feast of pentecost was notoriously typical of the great day of pentecost, when Peter preached, three thousand souls were converted, and the Christian Church established; just as the annual feast of the passover was typical of the great passover to come. There was first the slaying of the lamb, then the eating. The Lamb was slain on Calvary, his people have fed on him by faith ever since, expressive of which they have the supper of the Lord. The death of Jesus is the passover; the continual observance of the supper he instituted is the feast connected with it. The great passover day has been kept; there was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, the Sun of Righteousness set in blood, his creature sun could not behold the sight, nature hid her face in darkness, the earth tore her desecrated bosom and cast out her dead, the car of Jehovah dreadfully departed from between the cherubim, leaving the vail of the temple rent and open behind it, disclosing no longer a holy place. Ever since that day his people have feasted upon him by faith, in gladness and singleness of heart.

The great harvest of the world is now come, and we are in its midst. On that memorable day, when our Saviour discoursed with the woman of Samaria, he said unto his disciples, behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields, for they are white already to harvest. And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal; that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together. And herein is that saying true, One soweth, and another reapeth; I sent ye to reap that whereon ye

bestowed no labor; Other men labored, and ye are entered into their labor. Patriarchs, prophets and martyrs, labored in all past time; they sowed, but they reaped not; the apostles of the Lord entered into their labors, and reaped that which they had sown; when they shall return laden with their sheaves, their rejoicing shall not be their own; when their feet shall stand upon the mountain slopes beyond the river, they shall strike hands in gladness with them of old time, and sower and reaper shall rejoice together. The very first effort of the apostles, after that they were endued with power from on high, exceeded in its results the lifetime labors of any who had gone before them. It was the first thrusting of the sickle into the harvest; it was the garnering of the first fruits from every nation under heaven; it was the great day of pentecost.

In the same sense the great day of tabernacles is yet to come: When the fullness of the Gentiles shall have come in, then shall the Jews return. Then shall the Spirit of God be poured out upon all flesh. If the first fruits were such a profusion, what must the ingathering be? It will be seen by reference to Jer. xxxi: 34, that this event immediately succeeds or occurs with the giving of this covenant. God's blessing upon the Jews, is therefore the completion and fullness of his blessing upon the Gentiles. The giving of the covenant with Judah and Israel, is the completion and fullness of the Gospel. As the feast of pentecost was held at the beginning of the harvest, so at its end, the feast of tabernacles, that great feast of joy shall be held by all the countless multitudes that shall constitute that wonderful ingathering.

When this shall have come to pass, then the Abrahamic covenant shall be fulfilled, and shall pass away; all the families of the earth shall have been blessed in Abraham. The separation of the Church from the world will cease, for the Church shall be triumphant over the world. The stone cut out of the mountain without hands shall have filled the whole earth.

ART. III.—*Imputation*.*

PART III.

IMPUTATION AND ORIGINAL SIN.

IN our *first* Essay the following facts were affirmed:
 1. That the Reformed or Calvinistic Church has never attached any importance to the order in which the topics *guilt* and *corruption* are stated, in their relation to the doctrine of original sin, and of course never entertained the dogma that inherent corruption is consequent upon immediate imputation; and 2. That it never, in any such sense, admitted the distinction made by Dr. Hodge and Placæus in treating the subject; and 3. That the dogma of immediate imputation, as presented by Dr. Hodge, never was entertained by the Calvinistic Church, but is, on the contrary, a relic of the old exploded and rejected Supralapsarian scheme. In our *second* Essay, we have shown that this scheme is, in all its essential features, utterly irreconcilable with both the

* Published with some reference to the Tractates mentioned in the note at the beginning of Essay I, (see *Danville Review*, Sept., 1861, p. 390.) Through an oversight, we omitted to remark at an earlier stage of the discussion, that if we err in assuming the correctness of the universal impression that Dr. Hodge is the author of the three articles on Imputation, republished from the *Princeton Review* in vol. 1 of the *Princeton Essays*, and which he appears to us substantially to admit in the *Princeton Review* for April and October, 1860, (in his Remarks upon the views of Dr. Baird,) we shall correct the error on being apprized of it. Those essays have greatly enhanced the reputation of Dr. Hodge as a theological writer, and though universally ascribed to his pen, he has never publicly disowned them. A general and very indefinite statement on the subject, like that in his controversy with Dr. Park, can not be thus construed in view of the facts which appear so clearly to indicate the contrary; and there appears to be something very like disingenuousness in that whole statement. Dr. Park had abundant reason to ascribe to Dr. Hodge the four essays which he does ascribe to him; but if he were mistaken, why could not Dr. Hodge have plainly said so? and if he were not mistaken, why attempt, by innuendo, to convey the contrary impression? See pp. 626-628 of Dr. Hodge's "Essays and Reviews," containing his three essays in reply to Dr. Park; and compare the statements in those pages with those contained in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1852, pp. 214-216.

spirit and the theology of Calvinism, and that consequently an intelligent and consistent reception of the Calvinistic system necessitates an utter repudiation of the fundamental principle of Supralapsarianism, not only in the abstract, but in its application likewise to the doctrines both of reprobation and imputation. But here we are met by the perpetually repeated asseveration of Dr. Hodge, that the doctrine of imputation, (that is, antecedent and immediate,) as explained and asserted by himself, is the doctrine of the Reformed Church, as announced in their acknowledged symbols of doctrine, and by the testimony of their leading divines. The issue raised by Dr. Hodge is, therefore, a very plain one, for the question involved therein is one of simple fact, and can be satisfactorily decided by adducing fairly and fully the testimony referred to. This we shall proceed to do, after a few preliminary remarks which are called for in the connection.

As to our own views of the subject, the rules of fair and honorable discussion require that they be stated, since neither Dr. Hodge, nor Dr. Thornwell, nor Dr. Baird, (with each of whom, it seems, the Reformed Church is so unfortunate as to disagree,) has shrunk from the free expression of the doctrine he entertains on the subject. The view we entertain has been elicited, though not fully, in the course of the discussion, and to prevent misapprehension it will be proper to express it more definitely; after which it will be in place to call attention to some of the specific statements of Dr. Hodge in relation to the whole subject, so that our readers, in approaching the testimony we are about to adduce, and in contemplating the long array of witnesses adduced by Dr. Hodge, may be able to do it with a clear perception of the actual and specific and not merely the general issues involved.

While, therefore, we deny utterly that any antecedent or immediate imputation of the *culpæ alienæ reus* can so constitute the guiltless or innocent creature involuntarily guilty as to render him morally corrupt, and so entitle him justly

to the desert of moral corruption, we affirm that there is a plain and radical difference between the doctrine which teaches that the guilt or sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, and that which teaches that Adam's posterity were merely involved along with him in the calamities or consequences of the Fall.* The latter doctrine is wholly inconsistent with any just claim to Calvinistic soundness. And in order to place in their true light some of the unfounded imputations of Dr. Hodge against those who have ventured to dissent from his views, we further affirm that a person may be *justly punished* for sin of which he is personally not guilty, as in the case of our blessed Lord and Redeemer. In fact, the distinction observed in the typical sacrifices of the Old Testament between the *sin-offering* and the *guilt-offering*, (a fact very generally overlooked in the discussion of the subject,) clearly shadows forth the same idea. An offering was appointed for guilt, and another and different offering was appointed for sin.† The legal responsibility for sin may therefore rest where the moral corruption and guilt of the personal act do not rest; for otherwise such a distinction in these typical references to our Lord and Redeemer is inconceivable. And hence nothing can be more shallow than the common assumptions against the doctrine of imputation. Grotius, in relation to the satisfaction of Christ, truly says: "Non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam poenæ ut quis puniatur ab aliena peccata."‡ But these things are, on no account, to be associated with the aforesaid dogma, that an innocent or guiltless creature may be, by antecedent imputation, constituted morally corrupt, and so be made an heir of hell, as the punishment of another's sin, without any consent or concurrence of his own, and without any connection, by participation or otherwise, with that sin. And hence to adduce such considerations in support of that dogma is unfair and absurd.

* See this point illustrated by Weissmann, in his *Theologica Institutiones*, p. 425, and by Turretin, vol. I, pp. 561, 562.

† This point is well illustrated in vol. II, pp. 212-216 of Dr. Müller's late work on Sin.

‡ De Satisfactione Christi, cap. 4, Opp. tom. IV, p. 312.

Adam of course existed before God entered into covenant with him. And, as this will not be denied, so it is equally certain, that he was the natural head of his posterity before he could possibly become their covenant head.* His natural headship, therefore, in the order of both nature and time, takes precedence of his covenant headship. Dr. Hodge must, as a matter of course, admit this; for he technically admits the twofold relation of Adam to his posterity. We say technically, because his doctrine logically ignores the natural headship in its almost universally conceded relation to the doctrine of original sin. These relationships, moreover, are not to be confounded with each other, for they are essentially distinct and different. The moral headship, however, implies the existence of the natural, necessarily; but not *vice versa*; for the natural headship might, by hypothesis, be supposed to exist without the federal; for it did exist before the federal existed. To ignore the natural headship of Adam, therefore, as antecedent imputation logically does, in explicating the doctrine of original sin (for it makes its transmission to be *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per imputationem*), is plainly as much an inversion of the true order of things, to say the very least, as it would be to ignore the federal headship in explicating that doctrine. In fact it is without any reason, as the circumstances of the case themselves evince. For had there been no covenant with Adam, he would yet have been the natural head of his posterity; and by virtue of this connection all who, by natural descent, should become partakers of his nature, must be partakers of that condition thereof into which he would have brought it, either by persistence in his integrity, or by transgressing the legal precept. Gen. ii: 17. The law is not to be confounded with the covenant, nor the covenant with the law. When God entered into covenant with Adam he was already a

* See this point stated with great precision and clearness in the first volume of Dr. Breckinridge's *Theology*, pp. 461-482; and handsomely defended by Dr. Thornwell, in his very able review of that work, in *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1860, pp. 192-205.

subject of law. And the covenant containing the promise of still higher blessings than he already possessed, found him in this condition; and thus his moral or federal headship was, so to speak, superadded to his natural headship. By his transgression of the law he forfeited not only the continuance of his present blessings, which the law would have secured to him on obedience, but he violated his covenant likewise, and forfeited also all its promised blessings. The forfeiture of the covenanted mercies, therefore, was entirely consequent upon his transgression of the law under which he stood when he, as the natural head of his posterity, entered into the covenant relation. On what principle is it, therefore, that we should regard the simple forfeiture of these covenanted blessings as the basis on which to explicate the whole doctrine, which includes in the fullest manner all his natural and legal relations, or headship? and so, in effect, at least, to ignore these altogether. The covenant relation may, so to speak, arise out of the natural relation; but the natural can not, even by hypothesis, arise out of the covenant relation, and when Adam's existence began, then, of course, began the natural headship of his posterity. It is obvious, therefore, that if the distinction adopted as the basis of their theological explications, by both Placeus and Dr. Hodge, is to be made; and if the doctrine of original sin is to be explicated from the standpoint either of *mediate* or *immediate* imputation; instead of being explicated, as we insist it should be, on the ground of a full and equal recognition of both, it is incomparably more reasonable to explicate it from the natural and legal relationship of Adam to his posterity, than from that which is merely an adventitious arrangement; an arrangement which, whether made or not made, must, in the very nature of the case, leave the natural and legal relationship as it was, and wholly undisturbed. We hold, however, as already stated, that the distinction ought not to be made, as Dr. Hodge and Placeus make it, in treating the subject; that is, as representing Adam's personal sin alone as *causal* of the moral corruption of the race;

or this corruption as causal of the imputation of Adam's sin (neither of which expresses the doctrine of the apostle, or the views of the Reformed Church); but that the doctrine of original sin can be truly explicated only by recognizing the existence of both, and the influence of both in procuring the existing results to the race. In other words, the guilt was common; and therefore the imputation of the Adamic sin, and of our own subjective guilt, are to be viewed, not as cause and effect, as Dr. Hodge will have it, but that Adam's guilt, and our own guilt, are to be viewed as synchronically existing (as the principle of representation itself fully evinces, and as Paul most plainly declares); the imputation not being antecedent to, or causal of the guilt, but coetaneous therewith, and based upon the facts whose existence is clearly recognized and announced by God, Adam being both our natural and federal head, and we sinning in and falling with him. So that, to use the language of one of the most eminent of the Leyden divines, Walæus, who was appointed by the Synod of Dort to draw up its canons, the guilt of the first sin, and our own inherent guilt, are connected, and beget a common guilt.*

We may illustrate this whole subject by adverting to the fact that Drs. Hodge and Placæus, though agreeing to make the distinction aforesaid, are not only in antagonism to each other, but are both equally in antagonism to the Reformed Theology. The fact, moreover, is an interesting one, and has a direct bearing upon our general subject. The antecedent imputation against which Placæus wrote, is defined by him to be "that imputation whereby the act of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit is truly and immediately charged upon his whole posterity, Christ alone being excepted; and on the ground that they are his posterity, this his act is, an-

* "Sed dicimus hæc duo esse connexa, et communem reatum gignere, qui peccatorem ad poenam ejusdem generis obligat: quia reatus primi peccati ad condemnationem . . . non potest posteris imputari nisi mediante illâ peccati inhaerentis vitiositate." p. 151 of his Reply to the Censure of Corvinus (the Arminian) on Molinæus' *Anatomy of Arminianism*.

tecedently to inherent corruption, imputed for a twofold punishment properly so called, to wit, the privation of original righteousness, and eternal death." This is the dogma against which he wrote;* and, as remarked in our second Essay, his aim was to resist the approach of Supralapsarianism which was seeking to regain its position in the theology of the Church under the guise of a superior zeal for the doctrine of original sin. Walch, already referred to, as quoted by De Moor, expressly says, "Placæus at first rejected the imputation of the Adamic sin; but after the Synod of Charenton, in 1645, condemned the sentiment, he, in 1655, *put forth a more distinct explication of his views*; and made a distinction between immediate and mediate imputation, the former of which may depend from the will of God and

* In referring to Placæus, Dr. Hodge remarks, (Princeton Essays, vol. 1, p. 195,) that after the decision of the third Synod of Charenton against his views, he invented the distinction between immediate and mediate imputation. Now, the standing rule of the National Synods did not permit him to write again without leave; which having obtained some years afterwards, he, in 1655 published the work in which he makes this distinction, and expressly declares that the decision aforesaid of the Synod did not conflict with the views he entertained and inculcated. And our readers will please to observe, that at the very next national Synod, that of Loudon, in 1659-1660, (of which the celebrated John Daille was moderator,) which was likewise the next national Synod after that of Charenton in 1644-1645, the matter of the aforesaid decision in respect to Placæus was reconsidered; whereupon the following act was passed: "On reading that article of the last national Synod concerning original sin, divers provinces *demanding with great importunity that the Assembly would be pleased to moderate it*; this decree was made: That for the future all Pastors and Proposans [Candidates] who should offer themselves to the holy ministry, *shall be only obliged to subscribe to the 10th and 11th articles of the Confession of Faith held by all the Reformed Churches of this kingdom*; and in the meanwhile all persons are forbidden to preach or print anything against the imputation mentioned by the said Synod in that article before named, nor shall anything more or less be changed in it." *To this article, as above stated, Placæus expressly declares that he does not object.* Neither Turretin nor De Moor make any allusion to this last action: though without it, as every one can see, the representations which they make of Placæus are partial and distorted, and of course unjust to the memory of a great and good man. The articles of the Confession (10th and 11th) referred to in this last action of the Synod, will be found in their place in our subsequent citations.

arbitrary law," etc. This last clause evinces that it was the direct aim of Placæus to oppose the encroachments of Supralapsarianism. Weissmann, however, in his History of the Church during the seventeenth century, explains precisely the *positive ground* which Placæus assumed, to-wit, that though he recognized both the moral and natural headship of Adam, HE PLACED THE NATURAL HEADSHIP BEFORE THE MORAL. *Ita ut non tam de re ipsa, quam de modo quæstio fuerit; hæcque tandem eo recidat, cum Adamus caput naturale et morale fuerit totius generis humani, quænam ex duobus his relationibus præcedat, atque alterius sit fundamentum? statuente Placæo, naturale præcedere morali, atque ideo imputari peccatum Adami posteris, quia in ipso quoad radicem et naturam fuerunt.*" Precisely here was the error of this truly great and learned divine; and precisely here, though in the opposite direction, is the error of Dr. Hodge; *for he*, in like manner, *places the moral relation before the natural.* The Reformed Theology, however, does not place either relation *before* the other; but regards both equally and synchronously in explicating the doctrine of original sin. The error of Placæus is that of the New England school; and if followed out must ignore the moral headship of Adam, and the imputation of his sin, and lead into Pelagianism; and the error of Dr. Hodge tends to a like ignoring of the natural headship of Adam, and of the great fact that we sinned in and fell with Adam in his first transgression; and to lead directly into Supralapsarianism. Hence it is not remarkable that the celebrated Arminian professor Le Clerc (†1736,) who succeeded Limborch, applauded the position assumed by Placæus; and Dr. Hodge may well ponder, in relation to his own position and its results, the excellent observations to which we have referred in our former essay.*

* Zwinglius also, in opposing the antecedent imputation dogma of the Papal divines, fell into the error similar to those attributed to Placæus, as may be seen by several citations from his writings in our First Essay, pp. 556, 557. And we may here remark, in passing, that the work of Rivetus (so often referred to by Dr. Hodge) on the Placæan controversy, and as Dr. Hodge's citations

Paul, in Rom. v : 12-21, as we have shown, makes a clear and definite distinction between the two great facts which he announces respecting the first sin; to wit, the fact that Adam sinned, and the fact that all sinned—the fact that by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and the fact that because all sinned, death has passed upon all. The offense was *one*, in one sense, and in another sense it was many offenses. It was the sin of Adam, and yet every one of his naturally-begotten posterity sinned likewise.

The apostle merely announces these facts, and adopts them as the basis of his argument, without attempting to explain them on the philosophical principles of traduction, antecedent imputation, identity of personality, or anything else. The facts are, that Adam sinned, and that all sinned; and these facts are given as the reason why guilt was imputed to all, and why, as a consequence, the judgment and

from it abundantly evince,) was not written in defense of *antecedent* imputation, but solely to show that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity was universally held by the Reformed Church. And, moreover, the error of Dr. Hodge, in averring that the view of Edwards (in the "one place" to which he excepts,) is precisely that of Placcæus, may now be seen by comparing the two. Placcæus places the natural headship of Adam *before* the moral; but Edwards, while he justly remarks, that if either must be placed before the other, and that if either sin and imputation is to be viewed as *causal*, it would be more reasonable to regard sin as producing the imputation, rather than imputation as producing the sin; goes on to show, by adducing at great length the exposition of Stapfer, what is the position which he himself assumes, to-wit, that it is *injurious to separate one from the other in any such way*. Edwards, therefore, did not separate the two, but regarded them as synchronously existing. But Placcæus and Dr. Hodge do separate them, and therefore, while Edwards stands firmly upon the very center of Reformed doctrine, both Placcæus and Dr. Hodge, though in opposite directions, have departed therefrom. At first Placcæus was supposed to have denied imputation altogether, as is evident from the decision of the third Synod of Charenton in his case. (See our First Essay, pp. 402, 403.) And hence the treatise of Rivetus was written, as above stated, to show that the Reformed Church had ever admitted that doctrine. But after his explanation appeared, the succeeding Synod modified the decision, as above shown; yet insisting upon the doctrine of imputation as taught in their own standards, in which no distinction is attempted between mediate and immediate imputation.

death came upon all. This same statement runs through the whole theology of the Reformed Church, and is ignored only by some of the Supralapsarians, who persist, like Dr. Hodge, (see Princeton Essays I, pp. 186-189,) in attempting, on the principles of their philosophy, to show that the sinful act of Adam, and our own sin and fall in Adam, are one and the same in the apostle's argument; and that the sin of Adam, irrespective of our own sin and fall, or subjective guilt, is antecedently imputed to us for condemnation. Their design in this procedure is obvious. They need the conclusion in order to be able to deduce the corollary that it is for the sin of Adam alone that pollution and death have come upon all his posterity. So that the doctrine of antecedent imputation was begotten by the Supralapsarian principle, after severing what God has joined together; and by ignoring just one-half of the statement of facts given by the apostle in Romans v.

The claim of Dr. Hodge, as asserted in the foregoing reference, that when the apostle says that *all sinned*, he means nothing more than that Adam sinned, and that his sin became the sin of his posterity by antecedent imputation, is without any real foundation. We will not contend with Dr. Hodge about a word; but a statement like this, based upon a clear ignoring of one of the great facts in the apostle's argument, demands something better to sustain it than mere assumption. We admit that he may plead the language of many divines, even of Walæus, Molinæus, or even of Placæus himself, when, in treating upon the subject in a popular style, the expressions are employed almost interchangeably. As illustrative of this popular mode of speaking, the sermon of President Davies, on Romans v: 12, may be referred to. But it is not to any such representation that a point like the one before us is to be referred, but to *strict theological usage*. And throughout Calvinistic theology, where the matter is carefully exhibited and expounded, it is always in this form; that the guilt of the first transgression was not Adam's alone, but common to him and his posterity,

all of whom participated in his guilt, and sinned and fell with him in his first transgression; and that hence all are treated as he was treated, as sinners, guilty and corrupt. His sin was their sin, in the clear and obvious sense that it was the expression of their own as well as of his guilt; and their sin, according to the representation of the apostle and of the Reformed Church, brought guilt and death upon themselves, as his sin brought guilt and death upon himself and upon them. That is, they participated therein, the guilt was common; he sinned, and all sinned; and hence judgment and death passed upon all, the one offense being common to all. And as his act was confessedly not their act, (as Dr. Hodge fully concedes,) so his sin is not to be confounded with their sin, and *vice versa*; any further than the guilt of the Participator is to be confounded with the guilt of the Principal. It is, of course, common alike to both; but it is, at the same time, individual and distinct; for community of guilt does not destroy individual responsibility. Adam sinned, and was treated as a sinner. This is plainly affirmed. With equal plainness it is likewise affirmed that all sinned, and that all are treated as sinners. The fact is asserted, but it is not explained. And as God has left it unexplained, we have no right to insist on any explanation of our own as the only true one, and then that all are errorists who are unwilling to receive it at our hands. Hence, when Dr. Hodge assures us that the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin will explain the matter, we, while we are perfectly willing he should think so, object that he should insist upon the alternative that we, too, must think so, or be branded as errorists or heretics.

The idea of our really sinning in Adam, or when he sinned and fell, Dr. Hodge denounces, and attempts to hold up to ridicule, (Princeton Essays, I, pp. 137-139, 172, etc.,) simply because he insists on viewing the statement of this fact through his own vague and indefinite ideas of personality, insisting, that if we then sinned otherwise than imputatively, it must have been personally, and this he affirms to be utterly

impossible. Whether he means by this that all sin must consist in action, we shall leave him to say. But we can not here go into a discussion of personality, (nor is it needed, for the question is, What are the facts on the subject as announced in the word of God,) though we should be happy to discuss that matter with him on any suitable occasion; yet it may be well worth while for both Dr. Hodge and Dr. Thornwell to reflect seriously upon their dogmatical utterances in relation to this subject. The speculations of men who reject the doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead, on the ground that they can attach no definite idea to a trifold personality in a unity of essence, may fairly be laid along side of the speculations which aver that the inconceivability of our sinning when Adam sinned is a just reason for either rejecting or explaining away the inspired announcement which asseverates the fact. See also Rom. iii; 9, 23; Gal. iii: 22, etc.

Dr. Hodge, by his philosophical theory of antecedent imputation, makes the sin of Adam really the sin of all men, averring as he does that the posterity of Adam, as such, inasmuch as they did not exist and sin personally, did not sin at all; and that therefore they did not as such, when Adam sinned, contract any subjective guilt whatever. For the personal sin of Adam was all the sin that was then committed; and that personal sin, says Dr. Hodge, became ours by antecedent imputation; and of course then, in the only sense which it seems possible to attach to the terms employed by Dr. Hodge, the posterity of Adam sinned not only when he did, but sinned the very sin that he did. For he alone sinned, and his sins were antecedently imputed to them for condemnation. And this is, of course, true of all his naturally begotten posterity, infants, idiots, and all, according to the argument of Dr. Hodge. Of whom then can it be said, with the apostle, that they sinned not after the similitude of Adam's transgression, and that yet the penalty of the law reigned over them because they were nevertheless guilty of the violation of law? verse 13. The reign of death over them

evinces that they had sinned and violated the law; and it is conceded that, in the sense in which Dr. Hodge employs the terms, they did not yet possess personality and moral agency; and yet they sinned, though not after the similitude of Adam's transgression. Of whom then is this true, according to the theory of Dr. Hodge? It is not true of any one of all the posterity of Adam; for they all sinned the sin that he did, (that is, in the only sense in which Dr. H. admits that they did sin,) and that sin brought the reign of death over all. The language, therefore, not only condemns utterly and directly the dogma of Dr. Hodge, but it is wholly inexplicable on the ground assumed by that dogma; while, on the contrary, it is perfectly intelligible on the principles asserted by the apostle, and recognized in the theology of the Reformed Church. We know not how the race sinned when Adam sinned. We know, however, upon the testimony of God, the fact that they did then sin; and that their sin was not after the similitude of his sin. *They* could not sin as a covenant head, though they participated in the guilt of violating the covenant: and more than these facts it is not necessary we should know on the subject.

It is, moreover, universally conceded that every rational individual of the human race, from the very beginning of the exercise of those powers which constitute moral agency, has a consciousness of subjective guilt, and of a positive alienation from holiness and from God. But it is perfectly apparent that the mere imputation of guilt could of itself bring no such consciousness. It did not bring it to Christ; and if Philemon had charged upon Paul the debt contracted by Onesimus, it could not have brought to Paul the consciousness that he himself had personally contracted the debt which Onesimus had contracted to Philemon. And neither does the imputation of the righteousness of Christ bring to the penitent and believing soul a consciousness that he had personally wrought out that righteousness. How then can the aforesaid consciousness of subjective guilt, which arises with the first dawn of our conscious moral agency, be

explained on the ground of an antecedent imputation of another's sin? Such imputation could bring with it no such consciousness; and the solution is to be found only in the fact asserted by the apostle, that *all sinned*. But to return.

The Calvinistic Church, therefore, without attempting to explain in any way *how* the human race sinned in their first father, acknowledge the fact, on the Divine testimony, that we did sin and fall in him; and also the other fact, that by the one offense death came upon all. And it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge, in all his discussions of the subject, seems never to have really apprehended the issue actually involved in the question. In the doctrine of the Reformed Church, we find both facts fully and clearly recognized, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, and the consequent moral corruption of our whole nature, are imputed to us for condemnation and death; and that this imputation, both immediate and subjective, is the ground upon which judgment has passed upon all. And thus both mediate and subjective imputation, (though with some variety of statement,) are fully recognized as inseparable; as Turretin himself frankly admits: "*Nos vero cum orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus.*"*

The same strange misapprehension, as it appears to us, runs through nearly all of Dr. Hodge's representations of the views of others on this subject. Hence he finds Edwards to be unin-

* Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco. 9, Quest. 9, Sec. 14, 15. The whole sentence is as follows: "*Illi cum quibus hic agimus vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt: nos vero cum orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentam.*" Dr. Hodge, in attempting to show that the doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which the third Synod of Charenton attributed to Placcus, (Princeton Essays I, p. 150,) endeavors to justify the statement by the authority of Turretin; and, referring to the very passage from which we have just quoted, represents Turretin as saying: "The question is, whether his (Adam's) sin is imputed to his posterity with an imputation not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent." And Dr. Hodge adds: "*It is of the LATTER he says, 'nos cum orthodoxis affirmamus.'*" Dr. Hodge has thus not only changed but *reversed* the statement of Turretin, by a direct assertion; and by the omission of a word, in order to sustain the assertion. Turretin says: "We, with the orthodox, affirm *both*"

telligible and self-contradictory. Edwards makes the afore-said distinction clearly, and reasons from it as all the eminent divines of the Reformed Church have ever done. Like them, he speaks of *the sin* of Adam, and of *our sin* in Adam, and of the effects or consequences of both; and avers that the imputation of both by "the just judgment of God," brought the whole race under condemnation and sin. But Dr. Hodge, referring to his statements, represents him as saying that "depravity results from withholding special divine influences, and according to this passage, the withholding these influences is a just judgment FOR ADAM'S SIN," though Edwards, in the very passage cited by Dr. Hodge, expressly states that "All (men) are looked upon as sinning *in and with* their common root." Thus while Edwards asserts both facts, to wit, that Adam sinned, and that all sinned, and without any attempt here at philosophical explanation, proceeds to reason from both, Dr. Hodge represents him as acknowledging but one, and thus finds him so inconsistent with himself and contradictory, that he *is unable to reconcile his statement*. Because, as Dr. Hodge adds, "The one teaches immediate and antecedent imputation, which is the old doctrine; the other mediate and consequent, which the old writers considered as a virtual denial of that doctrine." And on the ground of this strange misapprehension, he would impair confidence in Edwards' great work, which for more than a century the whole Calvinistic Church has regarded as a most triumphant vindication, of the doctrine of original sin.*

mediate and immediate imputation; Dr. Hodge, omitting the word *UTRUMQUE*, makes him say, and affirms that he does say, "We, with the orthodox, affirm immediate imputation." We have examined the earliest and the latest, as well as one or two intermediate editions of Turretin, and find the passage just as we have quoted it above. It would be doing great injustice to Dr. Hodge, however, to decide that either this, or any other of the repeated instances of a similar kind, to which we shall have occasion to refer in the course of this discussion, is not susceptible of an every way satisfactory solution, until he shall have had the opportunity of explanation, and has failed to furnish it.

* See Princeton Essays, I, pp. 151, 152.

Another illustration of what would be regarded in most cases as incapacity or unwillingness to understand the truth, may be found in the Princeton Essays, I, p. 149, where Dr. Hodge repeats the asseveration that the Leyden divines aver that "Imputation being denied inherent corruption, can not be just." We have in our Second Essay, p. 611, briefly adverted to this. But Dr. Hodge so employs this statement as to make it refer to the imputation of Adam's sin exclusive of our own; whereas they refer the imputation just as Paul and the whole Reformed Church ever have done (except the Supralapsarian) *to Adam's sin, and our own sin in and fall with him*, making it immediate so far as relates to Adam's own sin, and mediate so far as it relates to our own. Hence though they held that "imputation being denied, inherent corruption can not be just," they also held that *inherent corruption being denied, imputation can not be just*, which is in direct antagonism to Dr. Hodge's whole view of the subject.* And he thus makes those divines ignore one of the conditions of their own affirmation, and really say the very reverse of what they do say. For the imputation which they declare to be the just occasion and procuring cause of the present fallen condition of our race, it is the imputation of the sin of Adam and of our own sin in Adam; but with Dr. Hodge it is solely the antecedent imputation of Adam's own sin.

When the reformed divines speak of our being condemned for Adam's sin (not for his sin *alone*, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarian school assert) the language is to be understood as in the apostle's argument, as asserting that we are condemned because the guilt was common, and that our own guilt as well as his guilt was imputed to us for condemnation. In the Princeton Essays, I, p. 186-189, already referred to, Dr. Hodge has laboriously endeavored to show, in common with Supralapsarians, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, are regarded as one and the same thing in Re-

* Their own testimony will be adduced presently.

formed theology; but with what success will be apparent to our readers from the citations we shall present from their own testimony. The state of the case is just as we have presented it above. They admit both as facts, and explicate the doctrine of original sin from both, without any attempt (save in a very few instances) to philosophise thereupon. And, in fact, so clearly is this great truth announced in their theology, that even the Supralapsarians do not venture to depart from the common language respecting it; but endeavor as Dr. Hodge does, to reconcile it with their scheme, though on that scheme no definite idea can be attached to the language itself; since they make our guilt, that is, the guilt of Adam's posterity, not to be subjective, but the guilt of Adam's sin alone. In our First Essay, p. 414, an illustration of this is given in a passage cited from Beza, in which he traces our guilt to the fact that *we all sinned in our first parent*; and to the corruption which is the punishment of *this guilt*; and to the sins which *this root of corruption* brings forth. The same passage is likewise found word for word in Danæus, the colleague of Beza, who survived him nine years; and who was not a Supralapsarian, though strongly sympathising with his colleague, in his views of theology. But Dr. Hodge, instead of being satisfied to receive the facts as they are divinely stated, endeavors to philosophise thereon, and to show that the two facts after all are but one, and so endeavors to make out his case by proving a point philosophically, which they would not recognize, and in the elucidation of which they, in general, regarded philosophy as of no account.

It certainly is strange that Dr. Hodge does not see that even on this very point his philosophy fails him, and leads to a conclusion the very reverse of his own. His favorite and reiterated illustration is the principle involved in the doctrine of representation; but it is wholly inconceivable that he should seriously endeavor to reconcile with that principle a denial of the aforesaid truth, to wit: that the guilt of the race is a common guilt, in which all alike are

involved by participation. He can not understand how we could have sinned *when* Adam sinned; neither can we understand the matter, though we are satisfied of its truth on the testimony of God. But this does not seem sufficient for Dr. Hodge, and hence he maintains, that as the testimony, literally taken, involves an absurdity, some other meaning must be attached to the terms in which it is presented; and hence he appeals, as above stated, in illustration of his view of the principle of representation as existing and recognized among men (see, for example, his *Essays and Reviews*, p. 68, note); asserting that, as on this principle, so in the case of Adam, the act of the representative is so far the act of the represented, that they are justly treated as responsible for it. But it never seems to have occurred to Dr. Hodge, to consider this illustration in its true bearing upon the case; for why, otherwise, could he have failed to see that (for example, where guilt is concerned or supposed) the guilt of the representative is imputed to the represented, *not antecedently*, and as *causal of their own guilt*, but simply because the guilt is regarded as *common*; and a common guilt, of course, involves participation. This is the real ground of the imputation, and of course it presupposes the existence of subjective guilt.

But Dr. Hodge, in order to tack about and break the center of the line of argument, of whose advance he seemed to have some conception, claims that if subjective desert be insisted on as the ground of condemnation, or of the imputation of guilt to condemnation, then it must be equally insisted on as the ground of justification, or of the imputation of righteousness to justification; and so adopts the Supralapsarian sophism already mentioned, that if sin be the ground of reprobation, faith and good works must be the ground of election. Nor is this all; for in his controversy with Dr. Park, as shown above, he acknowledges that both he and Dr. Park recognize alike the same principle in this matter, to wit: that "our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of Heaven;" the only difference being, that Dr. Hodge says, "indirectly, through the intervening

links of imputation, guilt," etc. (which also depend solely upon the sovereign will of God, according to Dr. Hodge), and Dr. Park says that they depend on his will "directly" (see Dr. Hodge's *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 618, 619). Both professors, therefore, clearly agree in explicating the matter from the mere will and sovereignty of God; and both alike recognize the fundamental error of the Supralapsarian school. The replication of Dr. Hodge, therefore, to the foregoing argument, and his insisting upon the sophism referred to, can have no weight in the minds of those whose Calvinism is not of the Supralapsarian type. And while we are on this point we may add, that it would be gratifying to know how Dr. Hodge would essay, on his principles, to escape from an open advocacy of the doctrine which the Supralapsarian school have based upon this principle, to wit, that God created a large proportion of mankind expressly to be damned; for if his principles lead to this, he is bound in all candor to abandon them, or else frankly to avow himself a Supralapsarian; and if they do not, he certainly should explain how the conclusion may be avoided. The imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity is affirmed by Dr. Hodge to be solely antecedent and immediate, or "from without," and he claims that the posterity of Adam are as destitute of subjective desert as a ground for this imputation, as they are destitute of such desert as a ground for the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to justification; for they no more deserve subjectively the condemnation they receive for the sin of Adam, than the elect deserve, subjectively, the justification they receive for the obedience of Christ. And Dr. Hodge claims, moreover, that to deny this, is to invalidate the whole doctrine of salvation through the free grace of God. If this be so, it follows, therefore, in respect to those who are saved or rescued from this condemnation, that as it was always God's purpose to save or rescue them from it, (as Dr. Hodge will admit,) so, also, it was his eternal purpose to leave those to perish therein, who do perish. And, consequently, as the imputation of both guilt and righteousness is without sub-

jective desert, in either case, and depends solely upon the will of God in both cases, it follows, according to these principles, that it was God's eternal purpose that the reprobate should perish, without any regard to their subjective desert, as it was his eternal purpose that the elect should be saved, without any regard to their subjective desert. Hence God, of his own mere will and pleasure, created the reprobate, with the eternal purpose of consigning them, of his own mere will and pleasure, to everlasting death. This is the fair and logical conclusion from these principles, and thus the doctrine of antecedent imputation involves, necessarily, the adoption of the whole Supralapsarian scheme.

It is important, too, to notice in this connection, that Dr. Hodge, who, as we have shown in Essay II, p. 610, insists that no view of imputation is true that does not apply to the elucidation of the three points, to wit: the imputation of Adam's sin to us; of our sin to Christ; and of his righteousness to us; affirms, also, that as imputation makes no one a sinner, none of the race of Adam are ever condemned to endure the curse of the law, merely on account of the imputation of his sin. And yet he maintains, in opposition to the Grotian and Socinian schools, that Christ did really endure the curse of the law on account of the imputation of our sin to him.* But Dr. Hodge should have seen that the two ideas can not be made to cohere; for if imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does not bring us under the proper penalty of the law, then on what principle can he aver, that Christ endured that penalty? And if it does bring us under that penalty, then, on what principle does he deny, that any one is condemned to suffer that penalty, on account of the imputation of Adam's sin? Dr. Hodge should frankly assume one or the other of these positions, for he can hardly maintain both. He must either concede, that Christ did not

* "The righteousness of Christ, therefore, consisting in the obedience and death demanded by the law," etc. See Dr. Hodge's Review of Beman on the Atonement, in the *Repertory* for 1845, republished in *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 308-351. A most admirable article.

endure the penalty of the law, and so fall in with the exploded governmental scheme of the atonement; or he must admit, that imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does, on his own principles, necessarily involve the penalty of the law; and if so, that infants perish, and, as above remarked, that the reprobate were created in order that they might be damned. Such are the logical results of his strange assertion, that because the exercise of grace and mercy are gratuitous, on the part of God, therefore condemnation, vengeance, and punishment are equally so, "or the whole foundation of the *Gospel* is undermined;" a sentiment which, if admitted, might impart a meaning to the utterance of the celebrated Dogberry: "O villain! thou wilt be *condemned into everlasting redemption* for this."

It is at all events, however, freely conceded by Dr. Hodge, and those who at the present time sympathize with him in his peculiar views, that no one of the posterity of Adam shall ever suffer the endless penalty of the law merely on account of the imputation of his sin. This, though denied by the earlier Supralapsarians, has long since, though subsequently to the Synod of Dort, been conceded by some who have entertained one or more of their distinctive principles. R. Vogelsangius, for example, as quoted largely by De Moor, (III, 274-276,) to disprove the *mediate* imputation scheme attributed to Placæus, exclaims, "*Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia propter inobedientiam protoplasti, nisi mediante cognata perversitate verissima sententia est.*" Turretin, too, decidedly asserts the same; and when he comes to explain the view entertained by him, it is in perfect accordance with the doctrine as taught by Calvin, Stapfer, Edwards, and Breckinridge, as may be seen by the following passages: "*Pæna quam peccatum in nos accersit, vel est privativa vel positiva. Prior est carentia et privatio justitiæ originalis. Posterior est mors tum temporalis, tum æterna, et in genere mala omnia, quæ peccatoribus immittuntur. Elsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus*

Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad pœnam privationem, quia est causa privationis justiciæ originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet, SALTEM ORDINE NATURÆ; sed quoad posteriorem potest dici IMPUTARI MEDIATE positivam, quia ISTI PÆNÆ obnoxii non sumus, NISI POSTQUAM nati et CORRUPTI SUMUS." * So that moral corruption, which is, according to Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, the penalty of antecedently imputed sin, though it deserve the punishment of eternal death, as all moral corruption must, (and of course deserves it, according to the just judgment of God, for *desert* here can mean nothing else,) yet, according to their own authorities, it never will receive that punishment except *mediately*, and on account of personally subjective desert. So that moral guilt or desert, though justly inflicted, (as Dr. Hodge maintains,) as the penalty of imputed sin, may exist, and exist universally, and from which nothing but the mercy of God can rescue any; and yet no man can reasonably believe that it ever will receive its proper award unless it becomes associated with *new moral desert or guilt!* for this is the obvious meaning of the language. † And if, therefore, no one is ever thus condemned for merely imputed sin; and if we are obnoxious to the "*positive penalty*" only *mediately*, or after we have become corrupt, then the attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin on the ground of immediate or antecedent impu-

* See Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 14. In Section 15, as above remarked, he likewise adds, "Nos vero cum Orthodoxis UTRUMQUE affirmamus."

† In order to maintain this idea in consistency with the theory of immediate imputation, Dr. Hodge can have no alternative, logically, but to resort to the old Papal distinction of *reatum culpæ* and *reatum pœnæ*, originating in the Scheme of Ockham, and sought to be, by a monstrous perversion, associated (as employed by them) with the aforesaid typical institution in the Mosaic economy. Even Turretin condemns their distinction most decidedly in Loc. 9, Quæst. 3, Sect. 6. And Owen condemns it with equal decision, (Justification, chap. 8, p. 226.) Yet Turretin elsewhere, when pressed to expound his idea of sin and the fall, seems to justify it; and asserts the existence of a distinction between *anima pura, impura, et non pura*, which the Polish Socinians also asserted against the theology of Calvin. See in Turretin, Loc. 9, Quæst. 12, Sec. 9, this preposterous distinction.

tation, and to the exclusion of subjective desert, must be conceded to be wholly unauthorized. And the only true position is that of Calvin and the Reformed Church, as illustrated in our First Essay, pp. 396-403, 406, 407.

Turretin and De Moor, as we have seen, maintain that the positive penalty of the law can not come upon us until we are subjectively guilty; (and even Dr. Hodge *in this* professes to agree with them herein;) and thus far they agree with Stapfer, etc. But in treating of subjective guilt itself, they, while they claim that the statement of the apostle, that Adam sinned, is to be understood according to its literal import, practically ignore his other statement that *we all sinned*, by making it substantially a mere figure of speech, which is to be understood in a philosophical sense, and insist that subjective guilt can not be predicated of his descendants, until they have the same manifested existence which he had, and thus existing, perpetuate actual sin; which actual sin is asserted by them to be the fruits of the moral corruption penally inflicted upon us on account of the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. And herein they differ, *toto cælo*, from the theology of the Calvinistic Church; for it holds that our guilt in Adam being common, God finds us subjectively guilty, and that our moral corruption is the punishment of this subjective guilt, and not the punishment of Adam's sin *antecedently* imputed to us. The difference is obvious. And in this sense, therefore, so fully recognized by the Scriptures and the Reformed Church, the doctrine is to be understood. God finds us subjectively guilty, because our guilt is common with that of Adam. *He sinned, and we sinned*, though *how* we then sinned is left unexplained. And God finding us subjectively guilty, treats us as such; and imputes not only our own sin to us, but the sin of Adam also, for he could do no less, as the guilt was common. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is of course the very reverse of the doctrine of Dr. Hodge, that God, of his mere will and pleasure, constitutes us subjectively corrupt merely on account of Adam's sin.

Should it be said, that if we sinned in Adam, or when he sinned, and if this our sin is imputed to us, there is no necessity for supposing that his sin is also imputed to us; since his own sin is not to be so confounded with our sin in him as to suppose them one and the same; the answer is plain: Adam being our natural and federal head, though his act is not our act, nor his sin our sin, yet our participation therein, or our sinning in and falling with him, renders us guilty of that sin, and hence it is justly imputed to us. Our sin was that of participation; (*how*, we know not, and need not know;) but participation begets common guilt, though we may not personally have committed the act in the guilt of which we participate. This is a principle well understood, and fully recognized in ethics and in all jurisprudence. The guilt of the participator is not only charged upon or imputed to him, but he is held responsible for the act by which that common guilt found expression or manifested itself. And so in the matter before us. Hence, though we are justly regarded by God as subjectively guilty with Adam, his sin in which we participated is justly imputed to us. And then further: the imputation of Adam's sin to himself was not *immediate*, but *mediate* and *subjective*; but as his posterity had not the same manifested existence as he, his sin was imputed to them antecedently to such existence, and of course immediately. And as in another sense, unknown and unexplained to us, they did sin when he sinned, or sinned in and fell with him, (the guilt being common,) the imputation of this sin to them was, as in the case of Adam, mediate and in consequence of subjective desert. The punishment of course can not take effect upon them in the sense that it did upon Adam, until they have the same personally manifested existence that Adam had; but that punishment, to be just, as the Leyden divines, and Turretin, and all Calvinists admit, must be in consequence of imputed guilt or sin. To explicate the doctrine of original sin, therefore, on the ground of the antecedent *imputation of Adam's sin alone*, is a grievous error, and has no countenance either in the

word of God, or, as our readers will see, in the theology of the Reformed Church.

The doctrine of antecedent imputation, as held by the Supralapsarians, and asserted by Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, is, therefore, a very different doctrine from the imputation held by the Calvinistic Church, and different, likewise, from that antecedent imputation, which was admitted by Heidegger and others of his day, and so on to our own times. For all, except the late Dr. Ashbel Green* and a few others, who assert the federal headship of Adam, and by consequence the imputation of his sin to his posterity, admit that his sin was antecedent to the formal personal existence of his posterity, and, of course to their privation of original righteousness, moral corruption, or anything else which may depend upon such existence. But this view finds the posterity of Adam, in some way, inexplicable by us, guilty with him, and the imputation as consequent upon that guilt: or, in other words, as resulting from both his natural and moral headship. While, on the contrary, Dr. Hodge's view seems logically to ignore the natural headship, and to make the imputation of Adam's own sin, and of that sin alone, the procuring cause of their guilt and corruption, in the way of penal infliction. It results from the imputation of Adam's sin alone, and not from a common and subjective guilt, a view which Dr. Hodge not only can rarely find outside of the Supralapsarian school, but which, as he can easily learn, the Reformed divines regard as detestable. Even Whittaker, with all his Supralapsarian proclivities, does not hesitate to pronounce it such.

The view entertained by us, and rejected by Dr. Hodge,

* This venerable patriarch of the Presbyterian Church entertained most fully the views of his illustrious preceptor, Witherspoon (see our Essay I, p. 426-7), in respect to the subjective guilt of all creatures who fall under the condemnation of God. Consequently he rejected utterly the doctrine of antecedent imputation; but supposed that when God created Adam, he created also the souls of all his posterity; a view which originated in the ancient Jewish Church. See on this subject the *Summæ* of Thomas Aquinas, Part I, Quæst. 23, Art. 5, in which he treats it in his peculiar style.

and which we have presented (in Essay I) from Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge, recognizes the necessity for explicating the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and moral headship of Adam; and emphatically denies that it can be explicated from either alone. It denies that the native headship alone is the ground upon which God treats the posterity of Adam as sinners, or that the moral headship alone is the ground. But as the Reformed Church has ever so emphatically maintained, it demands that both be taken into the account. Dr. Hodge, as we have shown, discards this view; asserts that it was the view of Placeus, and attempts so to explicate the doctrine on the ground of the federal headship, as to make our moral corruption the penalty of Adam's sin. We have named this the Supralapsarian view, for even though all the Supralapsarians do not assert it as strongly as Dr. Hodge, yet as their scheme makes the will of God the procuring cause of sin, so this doctrine makes his will the procuring cause of moral corruption.*

And then further, in the Repertory for 1860, p. 341, Dr. Hodge asserts in exhibiting his views of antecedent imputation, "that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, *with which inward holiness is*

* As a further illustration of the manner in which Dr. Hodge uses his authorities, we may here mention Dr. John Owen; who in referring to the imputation of righteousness, defines the doctrine thus: "To impute to us that which is not our own antecedently to that imputation, includes also in it two things. 1, A grant or donation of the thing itself to us to be ours, on some just ground or foundation. For a thing must be made ours, before we can justly be dealt with according to what is required on account of it. 2, A will of dealing with us, or an actual dealing with us according to that which is so made ours."—*Justification*, p. 188. This is strictly true as regards the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, to which Dr. Owen applies it; but it is a baseless assumption to say with Dr. Hodge, that it is also true as respects the unrighteousness of Adam. On the same page Dr. Owen objects to the definition of Vasquez, on the ground that it confounds *imputare* with *reputare*. Vasquez says, "To impute a thing to a person is to reckon it among those things which are his and belong to him." On which Owen remarks: "This is *reputare*; *imputare* includes an

connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offense as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence." This statement is necessary to Dr. Hodge's argument, and unless it can be sustained, his whole theory fails; and yet the whole statement is utterly repugnant to Calvinistic theology, and directly at variance with the expression of it as contained in our standards. Where, in all Protestant theology, except in the Supralapsarian school, can Dr. Hodge find the doctrine that inward holiness is connected with justification as a consequence? The penitent soul is justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to it and received by faith, and hence it is said to be justified by faith. Is then the faith by which we are justified the exercise of a renewed, or of an unrenewed soul? Does saving faith result from the saving operation of the Holy Spirit, or does it not? No Calvinist can ever entertain a doubt upon this subject. How then can Dr. Hodge venture to assert in the very face of our standards, and of all Calvinistic theology, that "inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence" with justification? when the faith which justifies is the fruit of the renewal of the Holy Ghost? To this subversion of one of the very fundamental principles of our theology he is led by attempting to carry out his Supralapsarian exposition of Rom. v., and he is thus brought to the alternative of either abandoning the doctrines of grace, or of giving up this exposition. And if it be not true (as it is not) that holiness is the consequence of justification, then it is confessedly, and on Dr. Hodge's own author-

act antecedent to this, accounting or esteeming a thing to belong to any person." And what, pray, is this act? The answer is given above, and is adopted by Dr. Hodge, not only in imputation of righteousness, but also of sin,—it is the act which makes the thing ours. This then is immediate imputation as avowed by Princeton: God makes the sin of Adam ours, and then deals with us according to that sin. See a similar misuse and misapplication of Owen, in *Princeton Essays I*, pp. 145, 146. How greatly he has been misrepresented here will appear in our citation of testimonies *infra*.

ity, not true, according to this analogy, that corruption is the *consequence* of an antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. But on the contrary, as no one is justified without being renewed, (the two being absolutely inseparable in relation to fallen man,) so sin is never imputed unless in connection with moral corruption, the two being inseparable in their relation to fallen creatures, as fully illustrated in our Second Essay. And then, in regard to the sin of Adam being "something out of ourselves a *peccatum alienum*," Dr. Hodge assuredly should know that the Reformed Church never entertained that idea in the sense in which he asserts it. They always maintained that it was "out of ourselves" in no sense that could possibly exclude the fact that "*we* sinned in and fell with Adam;" and that had it been a *peccatum alienum*, in any other sense, it could have been of no more account to us than the sin of any other remote ancestors. Hence, as the Reformed theology always taught—our natural union with Adam is the basis of the imputation of his sin to us, and not merely the federal. We sinned in and fell with him by virtue of this union; for without it God could no more have imputed his sin to us than he could have imputed to us the *peccatum alienum* of the angels themselves, which kept not their first estate. The same is true, as shown in our Essay II, in respect to the righteousness of Christ. It is imputed for justification to none but his "seed"—the seed given him in covenant, and of which he is the Head; and who become partakers of his nature by the power of the Holy Ghost, (Luke i: 35). True, justification *declares* them to be one in law with him, but they become one by being made partakers of this new nature. He represents them therefore, for by virtue of this union they and He are one, as Adam represents his seed, who by virtue of the natural union are one with him. Take away the oneness and you destroy the representation in both cases. Admit the oneness, and where is Dr. Hodge's *alienum peccatum*? *

* Dr. Archibald Alexander, in his tract on Justification, is in utter antagonism to Dr. Hodge in reference to inward holiness being the consequence of

By virtue of the covenant made with Adam, he and his posterity were accounted one, connected as they were by this natural union. And by virtue of the covenant made with Christ, he and the "seed" given to him were one; for there was such a union established between them as constituted them his *seed*. They having been given to him, became his; and hence he redeemed, effectually called, justified and sanctified them: and he will eternally save them, none being able to pluck them out of his hand. And hence, too, in answer to Question 32, of the *Catechism*, "What benefits do they that are effectually called partake of in this life?" the answer is, "They that are effectually called do, in this life, partake of justification, adoption, sanctification," etc. Now, effectual calling being the renewal of our nature by the Holy Ghost, and justification, adoption, and sanctification being "benefits" resulting therefrom, what does Dr. Hodge mean by asserting, in direct opposition to this truth, that "inward holiness is the inseparable consequence of justification?" It is precisely the principle which underlies that most pernicious dogma—"eternal justification."

And then further: Dr. Hodge, in several places, attempts to incorporate with his doctrine of immediate imputation, the doctrine of a natural union between Adam and his posterity; which, while it would justify antecedent imputation in the case of his posterity, would not justify it in the case of any creature not thus connected with him. See, for example, the *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 339, where he says that the sin of Adam, as out of ourselves, is imputed to us

justification. "The truth is," says he, "that the imputation of righteousness, although it procures perfect justification, produces no change in the inherent character of the man; but, as stated before, it merely changes his relation to the law, and therefore the idea of our being made as righteous as Christ, is without reason alleged against this doctrine," p. 36. If this be so, and what Calvinist will doubt it, inward holiness is in no sense the consequence of justification, as Dr. Hodge asserts. And on what ground, therefore, can it be inferred, as he infers, that inward corruption is the consequence of Adam's guilt alone, and not of our subjective guilt, "by sinning and falling with him in his first transgression?"

on the ground of *the union, representative and natural*, between him and his posterity. See also Princeton Essays I, pp. 136, 138, 142. The importance of this natural union is fully asserted by all Calvinistic theologians in explicating the doctrine of original sin; but the attempt to connect it with this view of antecedent imputation is an astounding absurdity. For the natural union either connects the posterity of Adam with his guilt, (as the Calvinistic Church has ever held,) or it does not. If it does, then they are thus far *subjectively* guilty; and the imputation does not, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarians affirm, depend on the mere will and pleasure of God. But if it does not connect them with his guilt, then to plead it as a reason for the antecedent imputation of his sin to them is sheer absurdity; for, in that case, a union which connects us with Adam, can furnish no reason for an imputation which depends solely upon the mere will of God; for it may be pleaded likewise, that a certain union existed between Adam and the angels, by virtue of the fact that they were all intelligent creatures of God; which, on the same principle, might be the basis of an antecedent imputation of the sin of the one to the other. The natural union between Adam and his posterity can in no proper sense, therefore, be pleaded as a ground for such an antecedent imputation of his sin to them, as is taught by Dr. Hodge, though in the Calvinistic theology it is recognized as furnishing the basis of the representation of the apostle, that "all sinned;" and so of connecting the imputation with the justice, instead of the mere will of God.

Before concluding, there is one point to which we must here specifically advert. Dr. Hodge, in his reply to the rejoinder of Dr. Baird, (see Princeton Rev. for Oct., 1860,) adverts to the fact that Dr. Archibald Alexander had read his Commentary on Romans, in manuscript, and approved of it. This is said in order to sustain, by Dr. Alexander's authority, the exposition given therein of Rom. v: 12-21, against which Dr. Baird takes exception. And yet Dr. Alexander regarded the *Theologia Polemica* of Stapfer as expressing his own

views, rather than the *Medulla of Marek*, with which he could not fully coincide on the points in which Marek differed from Stapfer. We regret that Dr. Hodge has adverted to this matter in the way he has, for otherwise the whole question before us could have been left to be adjudicated according to the testimony of the early Reformed Church. But we must now solicit attention to a few facts of a more practical character, and relating to more recent times. For it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge should thus advert to the excellent Dr. Alexander to sustain the soundness of his exposition; when, as above remarked, Dr. Alexander expressed his full sympathy with Stapfer, whom Dr. Hodge repudiates; and not only this, but when Drs. Miller and Alexander, and the whole Calvinistic Church of modern times, have expressed their approbation of the very work of President Edwards, which Dr. Hodge repudiates as Placæan, and have ever regarded it, and justly, as the ablest defense ever written of the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Hodge's voice is almost the only voice which has been heard amongst all the most learned and eminent divines who have, either in this country or in Europe, spoken of Edwards, that has assailed his view as inconsistent with true Calvinism.

In illustration of this representation, we advert to the fact, that amongst all our eminent American theologians, from the time of Edwards, and even before, no one can be found, until about thirty years past, who sides with Dr. Hodge on those points respecting the doctrine before us, on which he disagrees with Edwards. Dickerson, Davies, (who endorsed his views most warmly,) Finley, Witherspoon, S. S. Smith, Dr. Ashbel Green, all reject the doctrine denied by Edwards, and asserted by Dr. Hodge, that imputation is only antecedent to and causative of moral corruption. And if we refer to our brethren of Scotland, we find them equally decided. The Lectures of Dr. Dick, published in this country, with the high commendation of Drs. Alexander and Miller, and which have been even regarded as a text-book in Princeton Seminary, evince the same sympathy, (as may

be seen from our quotation therefrom in *Essay II*, p. 599.) And though he differs from Edwards on a philosophical speculation, he does not hesitate to speak of him and his work in the following style of approval. Referring to the relation between the first and second Adam and their seed, he says: "I have endeavored to prove the fact, but I do not pretend fully to explain it. President Edwards, in his book on Original Sin, *which is an admirable work, and one of the ablest and most triumphant refutations of error which is to be found in our language*, in answering the objection, that to deal with Adam and his posterity as one, was to act contrary to truth," etc., etc. (See Lecture 45.)

In like manner the venerable Dr. GEORGE HILL, Professor of Divinity in St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, and whose Lectures have ever been regarded as truly Calvinistic in Scotland, and in this country, at least by our own Church and by the Dutch Reformed, after stating the doctrine of original sin, as given in the Confession of Faith, chapter 6, and in the 9th article of the Church of England, as expressing the true Calvinistic view, proceeds to take Edwards as his guide in explicating the doctrine. His words are: "This opinion (the one expressed in the symbols aforesaid) is supported in all the Calvinistic systems of divinity by nearly the same arguments. *But in stating the grounds of it, I shall take as my principal guide, Mr. Edwards*, formerly president of the college of New Jersey, in America, who has written able treatises upon the different branches of the Calvinistic system, and *whose defense of the doctrine of original sin contains the fullest and acutest answers that I have seen to the objections commonly urged against that doctrine.*" (Carter's edition, New York, 1856.) Here, then, this learned divine, whose soundness can not be impugned, and whose work has ever held a high rank as a text-book in our schools, adopts as his guide on the subject the very author whose doctrine Dr. Hodge has undertaken to assail, and which he denounces as precisely the doctrine of Placæus.

If we advert to cotemporary Calvinistic literature, and

such as has been and still is regarded as truly sound by our Churches, as well as by those of Europe, the result will be still the same. We do not purpose to anticipate here any portion of the testimonies which we shall proceed to cite presently; but these references are important in the present connection, as showing the present recognized type of Calvinistic soundness (but which Dr. Hodge had seen proper to denounce as unsound and erroneous), that our readers may have it in view while consulting the testimony of the reformed divines, from the very beginning of the Reformation.

Robert Haldane in his *Exposition of Romans*, in which he defends the orthodox faith against Prof. Stuart, Dr. Mac-knight, etc., says, on Rom. v: 16, "*Condemnation*. Here it is expressly asserted, that condemnation has come by the one sin of the one man. If, then, all are condemned by that sin, all must be guilty by it, for the righteous judge would not condemn the innocent. *To say that any are punished or condemned for Adam's sin, who are not guilty of it, is to accuse the righteous God of injustice. Can God impute to any man anything that is not true? If Adam's sin is not ours as truly as it was Adam's sin, could God impute it to us? Does God deal with men as sinners, while they are not truly such? If God deals with men as sinners on account of Adam's sin, then it is self-evident that they are sinners on that account. The just God could not deal with men as sinners on any account which did not make them truly sinners. The assertion, however, that Adam's sin is as truly ours as it was his, does not imply that it is his and ours in the same way. It was his personally; it is ours because we were in him. Adam's sin, then, is as truly ours as it was his sin, though not in the same way.*" (Carter's Ed., p. 217.) Then on verse 12 he says, "*All have sinned*; that is, all have really sinned, though not in their own persons. This does not mean, as some explain it, that infants become involved in the consequences of Adam's sin without his guilt. Adam stood as the head, the forefather and representative of all his posterity. They were all created in him, and in the guilt of his sin, as well as its conse-

quences, they became partakers." . . . "No man can well allege, that it is by a separate act of creative power that each of Adam's descendants come into this world. They were in the loins of Adam when he was created. Heb. vii: 10."

Dr. Chalmers, likewise, presents the same view. In his twenty-fifth lecture on Romans, (chap. v: 12-21,) he says, "The question, how far a native and original depravity exists among mankind, is one thing. The question, how far mankind are justly liable to be reckoned with, or to be dealt with as responsible and worthy of punishment for having such a tendency is another. . . . In as far as the doctrine of original sin affirms a native disposition to sin, and a disposition so strong in all as that all are sinners, then is the doctrine at one with experience. But in as far as the doctrine affirms, that there is a blame or a demerit rightly attachable to man for having such a disposition, or that he is to be held a guilty and condemned creature on account of it—this is a question referable not to the experience of man, but to the moral sense of man." "And if there be a guilt attachable to evil desires, as well as to evil doings; and if the evil desire which prompted Adam to his first transgression, enter into the nature of all his posterity, then are his posterity *the objects of moral blame and moral aversion, not on account of the transgression which Adam committed, but on account of such a wrong principle in their hearts as would lead every one of them to the very same transgression in the very same circumstances. It is thus that Adam has transmitted a guilt the same with his own, as well as a depravity the same as his own, among all the individuals and families of our species; if not that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of the offense committed in the garden of Eden, at least that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of his own separate and personal depravity—a depravity which had its rise in the offense that was then and there committed, and a depravity which would lead in every one instance to the same offense, in the same circumstances of temptation.* According to this explanation,

every man still reapeth, not what another soweth, but what he soweth himself. Every man eateth the fruit of his own doings. Every man beareth the burden of his own tainted and accursed nature. *Every man suffereth for his own guilt, and not for Adam's guilt; and if he is said to suffer for Adam's guilt, the meaning is, that from Adam he inherits a corruption which lands him in a guilt equal to that of Adam.*" pp. 124, 128, Carter's Ed., 1850. In like manner he says, in Lec. iii, (Rom. xi: 22) "When He is severe, it is not because of his delight in the sufferings of his creatures, *but because of his justice, and holiness, and truth.* . . . And except it be to the injury of these high moral attributes, He ever rejoices in scattering the fruits of his beneficence over the wide extent of a grateful and rejoicing family. When he is vindictive, it is not because he desires a work of vengeance, but because the righteousness of his character, and the stability of a righteous government, demand it."

Such, then, are the views, among others, of the representative men of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland; men whose noble monuments of learning and piety have endeared their names to the Calvinistic Church in this land also; and thus are they in utter antagonism to the theory of Dr. Hodge.

To conclude, therefore, the question to be determined by the testimony we shall adduce, is, whether the views advanced by Dr. Hodge, or whether the opposite views are the recognized doctrine of the Calvinistic Church? Does the Reformed Church recognize the distinction adopted by him and Placæus, and entertain the theory, that the imputation of sin is antecedent, and causal of moral corruption? Dr. Hodge maintains that it does, and that the Reformed Church taught, that the imputation of sin, like the imputation of righteousness, is antecedent or immediate; and that the guilt and corruption of the human race is consequent upon that imputation.* And the doctrine that God, in his treatment

* Dr. Hodge not only adopts the view of imputation which he attributes to Owen, as shown in a preceding note, but reiterates it in every form of expression, in *Princeton Essays I*, pp. 171-174, 176, 177 (note), 182, 183. And then

of the posterity of Adam, has respect to the double relation existing between them, and to the facts, that he sinned and that they sinned, as so fully taught by the apostle, and by Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge, Dr. Hodge rejects, and denounces as *mediate* imputation, as is shown in our First Essay. Now, we claim that this doctrine, which Dr. Hodge thus repudiates, is the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church, and that, with the exception of some Supralapsarians, the testimony of that Church is uniform in support of it. And of the conclusiveness (or the contrary) of the testimony to which we appeal to sustain these averments, our readers must judge for themselves. We shall, moreover, fully adopt, and strictly follow out, the formula prescribed by Dr. Hodge in such matters, and which is thus set forth in Princeton Essays I, p. 176: "The only proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, and the current writings of standard Calvinistic writers." We shall likewise adopt the greater portion of the testimonies which he has cited from Rivetus, (and if our limits permitted would present them all,) for, as we shall have occasion to show fully, hereafter, he not only has failed to sustain his position by those testimonies, but has wholly mistaken the very design of Rivetus, in citing them. Rivetus cites them to prove one thing, and Dr. Hodge to prove quite another.*

In considering the subjoined testimony our readers will please to remember, that the marked and essential difference

in Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 338-368, and 764, indorses and reiterates the whole representation; and even asserts, that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches adopt his dogma of antecedent imputation. We are willing to concede this in respect to some of the Lutheran divines, to whose testimony we shall have occasion to refer presently. And as to the Reformed Church, our readers shall soon have the opportunity of deciding for themselves.

* Professor Park, instead of examining the matter for himself, as he professes to have done, has fallen into the same error with Dr. Hodge, and pronounces the citations of Rivetus "decisive" in support of Dr. Hodge's views. *Ut vacca vaccam, autor autorem sequitur.* Will Dr. Hodge own him as an Expositor?

between the Supralapsarians and Calvinists (for we shall not separate their testimony) is, that the former explicate the doctrine of original sin from the standpoint of the will of God, and the latter from the standpoint of his justice. The Supralapsarians, as we have shown, to avoid the charge of having departed from the received doctrine of the Church, have endeavored, in their definitions of its doctrines, to conform, as nearly as possible, to the language of Augustine; and they have done so. It will likewise be seen, that the language of Calvinistic divines, in several instances, is such as a Supralapsarian might adopt; and *vice versa* also, as may be illustrated by a citation from Dr. Thornwell, in our First Essay, p. 408. But it is in the interpretation of this language, that the *toto cælo* difference between them is brought to view. The case is, for example, similar to that of the Arminians, who, in their statements of doctrine, often employ language which is employed on the same subject by Calvinists; or, as with the Arians, who not unfrequently employ terms in speaking of Christ, to which a Trinitarian would scarcely object. But, in both cases, the meaning which they attach to the language is the very reverse of that which has ever been attached to it by the Church of God. So, also, in the instance before us. When the Supralapsarian explains the language of the Church respecting the doctrine of original sin, he refers the imputation of Adam's sin to the mere will and pleasure of God, from a standpoint antecedent to subjective desert, and making the imputation causal of moral corruption; but when the Calvinist explains it, he refers the imputation to the immutable justice of God, and of man's guilt and desert, as we have so fully illustrated in our Second Essay. The former is the view insisted on by Dr. Hodge, the latter is the view which he rejects,* but which we affirm to be taught by the whole Reformed, or Calvinistic Church.

*The employment of the terms, "justice" and "guilt," in this connection, by Dr. Hodge, and his attempt (as also that of Zanchius, and other Supralapsarians,) to attach to those terms such a meaning as to reconcile them with this conception, we had intended to make the subject of special remark. But to

And in citing its testimony, we shall first adduce the Confessions, and then the leading divines of the Church, from the commencement of the Reformation until the present time. We begin with

1. *The Augsburg or Augustan Confession.*

This Confession is claimed without just reason by the Supralapsarians. As originally drawn up and laid before the Emperor Charles V, in July, 1530, the second article reads as follows:

"They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men naturally begotten, *are born with sin*, (*nascantur cum peccato*,) that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease or original blot is truly sin, (*quodque hic morbus, seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum*,) condemning and bringing even now eternal death to those who are not renewed by baptism and the Holy Ghost.

"They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that this original blot is sin; and, that they may extenuate the glory of the merit and benefits of Christ, argue that man by his own powers of reason (*propriis viribus rationis*) is able to obtain justification before God."

As subsequently revised and amended, this article reads as follows:

"They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men propagated in a natural way have original sin when they are born. (*Omnes homines naturali modo propagati nascentes habent peccatum originis*.) By *original sin*, as it is called by the holy fathers, and by all pious men of learning and sound judgment in the Church, we mean that guilt whereby all that come into the world are, through Adam's fall, exposed to the wrath of God and eternal death, and that very corruption of human nature derived from Adam, which *corruption*

expose the glaring unfairness and absurdity of the procedure in the way it deserves, would require too long a digression; and we have moreover supposed that the conception of the moral nature of God, necessarily involved therein, has been sufficiently exhibited in our Second Essay. Should the attempt be reiterated, however, we shall have a few words to offer more directly in relation to it.

of man's nature includes, not only the defect of original righteousness, integrity or obedience, but concupiscence likewise," etc.

How thoroughly Luther, (†1546,) and Melancthon, (†1560,) adopted at the very outset the fundamental principle of the Supralapsarian scheme, is shown in our Second Essay. And the doctrine of Imputation, as taught by Luther, may be learned from his very remarkable annotations on Gal. iii: 13, where, in perfect accordance with that doctrine as held by himself, he pronounces our blessed Lord "the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, and blasphemer that ever was or could be in the world," and asserts that whatever sins we have committed, or may hereafter commit, "are Christ's own sins as verily as if he himself had done them." And these views, moreover, his disciples continued to reiterate for more than a century and a half. Take a single instance from the zealous Jerome Kromayer, (†1670,) Primary Professor of Sacred Theology in Leipsic, who employs on the same subject the following language: "Christus, qui non noverat peccatum, per imputationem factus est peccatum, id est, *peccatorum atrocissimus*.* This terrible blasphemy is the legitimate outgrowth of the principle which bases imputation on the mere will of God, to the ignoring of his moral perfection. Nor is it surprising that such views should have led to the conclusions to which Luther's disciple, J. Agricola, (†1556,) carried them, even during his professorship at Wittemberg. The well known Dr. Crisp was his disciple, and only completed what Agricola begun. In his Sermons, vol. I, p. 430, he says, "Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it (the sin) was;" and he insists that "iniquity," in Is. liii: 5, 6, is not "spoken figuratively, that is, the punishment of it," but

* See his *Scrutinium Religionum*, p. 208, thesis 42, (Second Edition, Leipsic, 1673.) On the title page he is said to be "Vir de Ecclesia multisque officiis meritissimus, nunc beatissimus;" though a grievous calumniator of the Reformed Church. He should not be confounded with his uncle, J. Kromayer, (†1643.)

in the sense that our iniquity became, by imputation, literally the iniquity of Christ. And yet Dr. Hodge has labored to show that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church on this subject does not materially differ from that of the Reformed! *

Luther and Melancthon were, in the main, the authors of the Augsburg symbol. And in further illustration of their earlier views on original sin and imputation, we may refer also to the following: Luther says, "God works the evil in us as well as the good." "He pleases you when he crowns the unworthy; he ought not to displease you when he condemns the innocent." "It is no more unworthy of God to damn the innocent, than to forgive, as he does, the guilty." And "that if any one should complain that he has been created to be damned, he is on that account worthy of damnation," (a sentiment in which Zanchius seems to concur.) And so on through a large part of his *De Servo Arbitrio*, from which work our readers may find in our Second Essay, p. 562, another extract, in which Luther affirms that it is the highest attainment of faith to believe that God of his own will makes us necessarily damnable, and appears to be delighted with the torments of the miserable, and to be worthy rather of hatred than of love. In fact we know of no treatise in existence which advances more decidedly than this, the principles of the Supralapsarian school. And now, in further illustration of our statement that some of the distinguishing dogmas of that school find favor in Princeton, we invite attention to the following extract from an article on original sin, first published in the Repertory for 1830, and subsequently republished in Princeton Essays, vol. 1, on p. 115, of which is found the following high approval and laudation of this very treatise:

"The doctrine of total depravity, derived as an inheritance from our first father, is not inculcated more strongly by any writer than

* The doctrine of the Calvinistic Church is in direct contrast with the foregoing. Turretin expresses it thus: "*Christus propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum, non potest dici peccator, quod importat corruptionem inhaerentem.*" So, too, Owen: "To be *culpæ alienæ reus* makes no man a sinner."

by Luther, in his work entitled *De Servo Arbitrio*, written against the celebrated Erasmus. It was our first purpose to have given an abridgment of this treatise of the great Reformer, but Luther's style and manner are so peculiar, that his writings do not bear to be abridged without much loss," etc.

Dr. Hodge has enjoyed the reputation of the authorship of this Essay. And then in the *Repertory* for 1860, p. 338, he speaks as follows:

"The Lutheran and Reformed Church, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man, the covenant with Adam, the nature of the union between him and his posterity, the effect of his sin on his descendants, AND THEY CONSEQUENTLY ARE OF ONE MIND AS TO IMPUTATION, [the capitals are ours,] depravity and inability, and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. Not only in the symbols of these Churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned."

Our readers, who compare these statements with the remarkable illustration of this "one mind on imputation," as evidenced by the fore-cited testimonies of Luther and Kromayer, as compared with Turretin and Owen, may regard these facts as sufficient. Yet we must, in the same connection, ask attention to the following brief extract from the first of Dr. Hodge's three Essays on Imputation, republished (from the *Repertory*) in the *Princeton Essays*, vol. 1, on p. 137, of which he says:

"We have never been so unhappy as to have our hearts torn by being told that we believe and teach that the blessed Saviour was morally a sinner; that our 'moral character' was transferred to him. If this is imputation, IF THIS 'TRANSFER OF MORAL CHARACTER,' is included in it, we have not words to express our deep abhorrence of the doctrine. We would hold no communion with the man who taught it. And if this is what our brethren [the New Haven divines] mean to charge us with, then is the golden cord of charity forever broken, for

what fellowship can there be between parties where one accuses the other of blasphemy?"

But, though the dogma of antecedent imputation is claimed to be taught in the foregoing article of the Augsburg Confession, it is not found there in the sense in which it is inculcated by Dr. Hodge, and it would be doubtful whether it is taught there in any sense, (that is, as being antecedent to instead of synchronical with corruption,) did not the well known Supralapsarian proclivities of its chief framers seem to render such a conclusion fairly deducible. But however this may be, we do find both Luther and his followers not at all disposed to regard this feature as at all essential, or to constitute it, as Dr. Hodge does, a breaking point of difference with his co-laborers in the cause of God; for at the colloquy held at Marburg, in October of the preceding year, (1529,) the following was agreed upon as expressing the views of the Churches represented by Luther, Zuinglius, and Bucer on original sin: "For the *fourth*, we believe that *original sin descends unto us from Adam by birth and inheritance*, and is such a sin that it damneth all men; and if that Christ had not come to relieve us with his death and life, then had we perished thereby everlastingly, and could never have come to the kingdom of God." These articles are subscribed by Luther, Melancthon,* Jonas, Osiander, Brent, Agricola, Œcolampadius, Zuinglius, Bucer and Hedio, to the first three of whom, along with Bugenhgen, the Augsburg Confession is attributed. Here, then, the doctrine of original sin is clearly explicated, not from the ground of antecedent

* The views entertained by Melancthon were, as we have remarked, subsequently modified. In his *Locis Theol.* he thus expresses them: "*Peccatum originis est carentia justitiæ originalis . . . secuta lapsum Adæ, propter quam corruptionem nati sunt rei, et filii iræ. . . . Si quis vult addere, natos etiam propter lapsum Adæ reos esse, non impediō. Revera autem perpetua Ecclesiæ sententia est, Prophetarum, Apostolorum et Scriptorum veterum: peccatum originale non tantum esse imputationem, sed in ipsa hominum natura caliginem et pravitatem.*" Precisely the sentiment which we insist upon. See also his *Apol. Confessionis*, Art. 1.

imputation, but from that of the natural and federal headship of Adam.

A similar illustration may be found likewise in either of the following symbols, which will be found in their proper places in the subjoined catalogue of testimonies: the Confession of Wittenberg, (1536,) the Articles of Smalcald, (1537,) and the Conference at Worms, (1541,) from all of which, not less than from the foregoing, although alleged to have been prepared mainly by those who were under the influence of the Supralapsarian scheme, two things are apparent: 1. That the Reformers, as we have shown in Essay I, attached very little importance to the logical precedence of either *guilt* or *depravity* in stating the doctrine of original sin, and of course on this essential point they differ *toto cælo* from Dr. Hodge; and 2. That they explicated the doctrine, not from the single point of the federal headship or imputation, as Dr. Hodge insists should be done, but from both the federal and natural headship united, as Stapfer asserts that they do, that is, on the united basis of both imputed and inherent guilt. Our next witness is,

2. *The Former Confession of Basel.*

The exact time when this Confession was prepared is still a matter of uncertainty, though the evidence seems to preponderate in favor of assigning it to the year 1532, two years later than that of Augsburg. Its second article reads as follows: "We confess that MAN was made in the beginning, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness. But he fell into sin by his own will—(est autem sua sponte lapsus in peccatum)—*by which fall the whole human race, being corrupted, was made subject to damnation, (corruptum, damnationi obnoxium factum est.) Even thus was our nature vitiated, and arrived at so great a proneness to sin, that unless it is regenerated by the Holy Ghost, man of himself can neither do nor will anything good.*" Here, then, we are taught that man fell of his own accord; that the whole human race was corrupted by the fall; and that this corruption renders them guilty, and obnoxious to damnation.

3. *The Second Basel, or First Helvetic Confession.*

Great efforts were put forth in preparing this symbol, and great hopes were entertained as to the result. The work was committed chiefly to the two celebrated professors at Basel, Mycomius, (†1546,) Grynæus, (†1541,) along with Bullinger, (†1575,) Capito, (†1542,) Bucer, (†1551,) with whom were several others; and when completed, the Confession was, in 1536, presented by Bucer and Capito to the Assembly of divines at Wittemberg. In the following year, likewise, Bucer presented it at Smalcald, where, as Luther declares, it received the approval of the whole assemblage of the Protestant princes. It was originally written in German, and then translated into Latin. Its language respecting original sin is the following:

"MAN being the most perfect image of God upon earth after he was made holy by God, *having fallen into sin by his own fault, drew with himself into the same ruin the human race, and rendered them obnoxious to the same calamity, (sua culpa in vitium prolapsus, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, accidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit.)* And this infection, (lues,) which they call *original*, has so pervaded the whole human race, that the child of wrath and enemy of God can be cured by no help, except by that which is divine through Christ."—Art. 2.

This Confession was, however, not entirely satisfactory, being regarded as too brief; and it was rewritten and enlarged in 1566, (only two years after Calvin's death,) by the pastors of Zurich; and was approved and subscribed not only by their confederates of Berne and Schaffhausen, and Sangallia, Rhetia, Myllhausia, and Bienna, of the Grison league, but by the Churches of Geneva, Savoy, Poland, Hungary and Scotland. As thus rewritten we now present it in its connection here, though out of the chronological arrangement.

4. *The Second, or Latter Helvetic Confession.*

"MAN was from the beginning created by God, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, good and upright; but by the instigation of the serpent and his own fault, (culpa,) falling from goodness and rectitude, he became *subject to sin, death, and various*

calamities; and such as he became by the fall, (*à lapsu*,) such are all who are propagated from him, they being subject to sin, death, and various calamities. We understand that sin is that native corruption of man, derived or propagated to us all by those our parents, by which we, being sunk in depraved desires, and averse from good, but prone to all evil, filled with all wickedness, distrust, contempt and hatred of God, can of ourselves neither do nor even think that which is good. Nay, rather, as we increase in years, we bring forth corrupt fruit appropriate to the evil tree, *in thoughts, words, and depraved actions* committed against the law of God; by reason of which we, through our own desert, being exposed to the wrath of God, are subjected to just punishment, (*iræ Dei obnoxii, pœnis subjiciemur justis*,) and therefore we should all have been rejected by God, had not Christ our deliverer brought us back again."—Chap. 8.*

5. *The Confession of Wittemburg, 1536.*

"We believe and confess that MAN was originally created by God, just and wise, endowed with free will, and adorned with the Holy Spirit, and was happy; but that afterwards, for his disobedience, he was deprived of the Holy Spirit, and made the bond-slave of Satan, and subject to corporal and eternal damnation; and that this evil did not remain with Adam alone, but was propagated to all his posterity," etc.—Chap. 4.

6. *The Articles of Smalcald, 1537.*

These articles, to which we have already referred, were written by Luther himself; and the first article of Part III reads as follows: "Here it must be confessed by us, that Paul, in Rom. v, affirms that sin sprang from one man, Adam, and entered into the world, (*ortum esse et introiisse*,) by whose disobedience all men were made sinners, subject to death and the devil. This is named original, hereditary, principal and capital sin, (*die Erbsünde oder Heuptsünde*. See Hase, p. 317.)

7. *Conference at Worms, Jan. 1541.*

This colloquy was between Eccius, Mensing, Bucer, and

* Dr. Hodge, in his citation of testimonies, quotes the following two lines and a half as giving the sense of this important article: "Such as Adam became after the fall, such are all those descended from him; that is to say, they are equally obnoxious to sin, death, and all sorts of calamities;" thus leaving an opening for antecedent imputation. But fully quoted, it destroys his doctrine

Melancthon; and they thus express their agreement on the topic before us: "We unanimously admit that *all who are propagated from Adam*, in accordance with the ordinary law, (of nature,) are born with original sin, and so under the displeasure of God; (cum peccato originali, et ita in ira Dei nasci.) But origiaal sin consists in a destitution of original righteousness with concupiscence."

8. *Confession of Saxony, 1551.*

This Confession was written by Melancthon, to be presented to the Council of Trent. He wrote it on behalf of the Churches of Saxony, though the Meissen Churches, and very many others subscribed it. Dr. Hodge presents the sense of the second article in a brief extract, as follows:

"Original sin exists; and on account of the fall of our first parents, and in consequence of the depravation which followed their fall, they that are born are liable to the wrath of God, and deserving eternal damnation, unless remission be obtained through the Mediator."

The same is repeated in article first of the Repetitio Anhaltina, (1579):

"Ita peccatum originis est reatus non tantum propter lapsum primorum parentum sed etiam propter hanc ipsam depravationem, quæ lapsum illum sequita est, et nobiscum nascitur: omnesque homines, naturali ordine progenitos, facit obnoxios iræ Dei, et dignos æterna damnatione nisi fiat remissio propter mediatorem."

9. *The French Confession.*

This Confession of the Faith of the Reformed Churches in France was adopted by the first National Synod, which was held at Paris, in May, 1559, (F. de Morell being the Moderator,) and was presented to Charles IX, at Poissy, in 1561, on behalf of all his Protestant subjects; and it continued to be their recognized symbol, always being read and re-adopted at every National Synod, until the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Winer supposes that it was prepared by Calvin; but this is mere conjecture, unsustained by any historical support. Its testimony is as follows:

"Art. 9. We believe that MAN being created pure and upright, and conformable (*Lat. conformem; Gal. conforme*) to the image of God,

by his own fault fell from the grace which he had received; and thereby so alienated himself from God, the fountain of all righteousness, and of all good, that his nature has become altogether corrupt, (*adeo ut ipsius natura sit prorsus corrupta; en sorte que sa nature est de tout corrompue;*) and being blinded in spirit, and depraved in heart, he has entirely lost all that integrity without any exception. For, although he has some discernment (*discretionem*) of good and evil, we nevertheless affirm, that whatever light he has becomes darkness immediately, when he argues of seeking God, so that he can in no way draw near to him by his own understanding and reason. Also, although he is endowed with will, by which he is moved to this or that, yet inasmuch as it is wholly a captive under sin, it has no liberty at all to desire good, unless what it may receive from grace, and by the gift of God.

"Art. 10. We believe that the entire offspring of Adam is *infected by this contagion*, (*est infectée de telle contagion,*) which we call *original sin*; that is, a stain, (*vitium, un vice héréditaire*, not "fault," as Dr. Hodge translates it,) extending by propagation, and not only by imitation, as *Pelagians* think, all of whose errors we detest. Neither do we think it necessary to inquire how this sin can be propagated from one to another. For it suffices, that the things which God bestowed upon Adam, were given, not to him alone, but to his whole posterity; and therefore, we being in his person despoiled of all those gifts, have fallen into all this misery and curse.

"Art. 11. We believe that *THIS STAIN* is truly sin (*verè peccatum; vrayment péché;*) because it makes all and every man, not excepting unborn infants themselves, guilty of eternal death before God. We affirm, also, that *this stain, even after baptism, is truly sin*, as respects the fault, although they who are the children of God shall not on that account be condemned; because God, out of his goodness and mercy, does not impute it to them. We affirm, moreover, that this perverseness always brings forth some of the fruits of malice and rebellion, so that they even who excel in holiness, although they resist, are yet defiled by many infirmities and offenses, so long as they remain in this world.

"Art. 12. We believe that from this universal corruption and condemnation, in which all men are sunk by nature, God elects certain," etc.

One might have reasonably supposed, that Dr. Hodge, since he has so much to say about *Placeus* and the French

Synod, would have been careful to present this testimony somewhat fully, at least, as it has such an important bearing on the subject. But he has presented a garbled and mis-translated extract, of *barely four lines and a half*, and there leaves the matter. See P. E. I, p. 197.

10. *The Ancient (or First) Scottish Confession.*

This Confession is attributed to John Knox, who prepared it by appointment of the Synod held at Edinburg, in 1560, and it was prepared during the session of that assembly. It was prepared first in the Scottish language, and afterward translated into Latin. The following is Art. III, as published in English, nearly a century ago, at Glasgow, Scotland, and in Hall's *Harmony of Confessions*, in 1842, and in the Latin *Collectio Confessionum*, (Leipsic, 1840,) by Niemeyer:

"By which transgression, commonly called original sin, was the image of God utterly defaced in man; and he and his posterity of nature, became enemies to God, (or, as the Latin gives it, 'ipseque et ejus posterit natura facti sunt inimici Dei,') slaves to Satan, and servants to sin. Eph, ii: 1-3. Inasmuch that death everlasting hath had, and shall have, power and dominion over all, Rom. v: 14, 21, that have not been, are not, or shall not be regenerate from above; which regeneration is wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost. John iii: 5, working in the hearts of the elect of God an assured faith in the promise of God, revealed to us in his word; by which faith we apprehend Jesus Christ, with the graces and benefits promised in him. Rom. v: 1."

In the Princeton Repertory, for 1839, and in Princeton Essays, (1846,) in the catalogue of testimonies on original sin, the above article is professedly given. Three lines and a half are faithfully taken from the Confession, to which the following three lines are added, as part of the article, but which neither are, nor ever have been, any part of it. The quotation, as far as the phrase *servants of sin*, is accurate; and all after that is spurious. It is as follows: "*servants of sin*; and so we, **IN HIS PERSON**, were despoiled of all those gifts, and fell into all this misery and curse. *These things can not be said without imputation. Hæc sine imputatione dici non possunt.*" (The italics and capitals are Dr. Hodge's.) Here, then, we have not only the *English*, thus set off by italics and capitals,

but the *Latin original* is likewise paraded before the reader; and yet both are fictitious. Whence were they obtained? The importance of this question will be seen in the citation we shall presently make from the works of Rivetus.*

11. *The Confession of England, 1562.*

This Confession was inserted in his Apology, (in 1562,) by Bishop Jewell, on behalf of the English Churches. The 18th article reads as follows :

"We say, also, that every person is born in sin, and leadeth his life in sin; that nobody is able truly to say his heart is clean; Prov. xx : 9; that the most righteous person is but an unprofitable servant; Luke, xvii : 10; that the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience; that we are able by no means to fulfill the law in this worldly life; that there is no mortal creature which can be justified by his own deserts, in God's sight."

12. *Articles of the Church of England.*

These Articles were agreed upon by the Archbishop, Bishops, and Clergy of England and Ireland, (after having, it is said, received the approval of Calvin,) in the Convention held in London (an. 1562,) for avoiding diversities of opinion, and establishing unanimity of consent in matters of true religion. Their testimony (see Art. IX) is very important, and the reader will find it on p. 406 of our First Essay.

* Our readers will observe the remarkable unanimity with which these symbols all sustain the representation of Stapfer, respecting the true nature of imputation; to wit, "that it consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him." "Inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing." (See our First Essay, p. 400.) And, moreover, that there is no attempt to distinguish between Adam's federal and natural headship; and not a syllable mentioned which sustains Dr. Hodge's idea of antecedent imputation. The statement is, that all the race were in Adam, all sinned in and fell with him, and all consequently inherited the same moral corruption. Dr. Hodge must have greatly missed the word *imputation* here; and in citing the Confessions, he by some strange process, when he comes to the old Scottish, thinks he has found it; so he first gives the English translation, and then the *Latin original*, when neither had any existence in the Confession. We suppose that in rapid copying, his eye must have rested upon some commentary on the words, and that he mistook the one for the other—a mistake not without frequent precedents. But we respectfully suggest to Dr. Hodge, that even the word *imputatio*, in that connection, is not the same as *imputatio antecedens*.

13. *The Belgic Confession.*

This Confession appears to have been drawn up in 1559, (in the French language, originally,) and was first approved in 1561, and was finally ratified and adopted in Synod by all the Belgic Churches in 1579. The following is from Art. XV.

"We believe that by the disobedience of Adam, the sin which is called original, is diffused into the whole human race. But original sin is a corruption of the whole nature, and a hereditary blot (*vitium hereditarium*;) by which even infants, themselves, in their mother's womb, are polluted; and which, as some noisome root, produces every kind of sin in man; and is so foul and execrable before God, that it alone may suffice for the condemnation of the whole human race. (*Est-que tam fœdum, atque execrabile coram Deo, ut ad universi generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.*)

This last clause, which is, moreover, the conclusion of the sentence, is wholly omitted by Dr. Hodge, and the sentence is given as complete without it. And why? Its testimony is overwhelming on the point that moral corruption is the ground of imputed guilt; while both the fact and the doctrine are denied by Dr. Hodge.

14. *The Heidelberg Catechism, or Catechism of the Reformed Churches, 1563.*

"*Quest. 7.* Whence, then, arose this depravity of human nature?

"*Ans.* From the fall and disobedience of our first parents, Adam and Eve. Hence, our nature is *so depraved that we are all conceived and born in sin.*" See also *Quest. 9.*

15. *Confession of the Bohemians, or Waldenses, 1573.*

After dwelling on the knowledge of man's own self, the Confession thus refers to his sin:

"Wherefore the spring and principal author of all evil is that cruel and detestable Devil, the tempter, liar, and manslayer; and next, the free-will of man, which, notwithstanding being converted to evil, through lust and naughty desires, and perverse concupiscence, chooseth that which is evil. Hereby sins, according to these degrees, and after this order, may be considered and judged of. The first, and weightiest, and most grievous sin of all was, without doubt, after that sin of Adam, which the apostle calleth disobedience, for the which

death reigneth over all, even over those, also, which have not sinned with like transgression as did Adam. A second kind is original sin, naturally engendered in us and hereditary, wherein we are all conceived and born into the world. 'Behold,' saith David, Ps. li, 'I was born in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother conceived me.' And Paul, Eph. ii, 'We are by nature the children of wrath.' *Let the force of this hereditary destruction be acknowledged and judged of by the guilt and fault, by our proneness and declination, by our evil nature, and by the punishment which is laid upon it.* The third kind of sins are those which are called actual," etc. "Here, withal, this is also taught, that by reason of *that corruption and depravation*, common to all mankind, and for the sin, transgressions, and injustice, [unrighteousness,] *which ensued thereof*, all men ought to acknowledge, according to the Holy Scripture, their own just condemnation, and the horrible and severe vengeance of God; and, consequently, the most deserved punishment of death, and eternal torments in hell," etc.

Let our readers compare this most clear statement of the order of the topics *depravity, guilt, and death*, with Dr. Hodge's attempt to represent it as teaching the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation. The passage, as he presents it, is a clear perversion. See Princeton Essays, I, 196.

16. *Synod of Dort, 1618.*

"MAN, from the beginning, was created in the image of God, adorned in his mind with the true and saving knowledge of his Creator, and of spiritual things, with righteousness in his will and heart, and purity in all his affections, and thus was altogether holy; but, by the instigation of the devil and his own free will, (*libera sua voluntate*,) revolting from God, *he bereaved himself of these inestimable gifts; and, on the contrary, in their place, contracted in himself blindness, horrible darkness, and perversity of judgment in the mind; malice, rebellion, hardness in the will and heart; and, finally, impurity in all his affections.* And such as man was after the fall, such children also he begat; namely, being corrupted, corrupt ones—*corruption having been derived from Adam to all his posterity, (Christ only excepted,) not by imitation, as the Pelagians formerly would have it, but by the propagation of a vicious nature through the just judgment of God; therefore, all men are conceived in sin, and born the children of wrath, indisposed to all saving good, propense to evil, dead in sins, and the slaves of sin,*" etc.

This testimony Dr. Hodge has omitted to cite.

17. *The Westminster Confession, and Catechisms.*

This symbol was examined and approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1647, and ratified and established by act of Parliament, in 1649. Having already cited its testimony in our First Essay, pp. 403, 405, from chap. vi, and from Shorter Catechism 2, 16-18, we need not repeat it here. It explicates the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and federal headship of Adam; and, like Calvin and the Reformed Church, bases the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity upon both equally.

18. *The Savoy Confession.*

This symbol, being a declaration of the faith and order of the Congregational Churches in England, was adopted by the representatives of their Churches in their meeting at the Savoy, (London,) in 1658. In 1680, it was approved by a Synod of the representatives of the Churches of Massachusetts, convened in Boston; and subsequently by those of Connecticut, assembled at Saybrook, in 1708:

"1. God having made a covenant of works and life thereupon, with our first parents, and all their posterity in them, they being seduced by the subtlety and temptation of Satan, did wilfully transgress the law of their creation, and break the covenant in eating the forbidden fruit.

"2. *By this sin they, and we in them, fell from original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.*

"3. *They being the root, and by God's appointment standing in the room and stead of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and corrupted nature conveyed, to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.*

"4. *From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.*

"5. *This corruption of nature during this life doth remain in those who are regenerated,*" etc.

We omit the Confessions of the London Baptists, (1646,) Mennonists, (1632,) Moravians, Welch Calvinists, &c., for they merely reiterate the language of the above cited.

Here, then, we have, as expressed by the great body of the

Confessions of the Reformed Church, its testimony on the vital doctrine of original sin. And we look in vain therein for any such dogma on that subject as Dr. Hodge insists upon as essential to the right understanding and true reception of that doctrine. They refer imputation to the fact that we all sinned in Adam, which fact they state without attempting to explain it. They teach that our moral corruption is not the direct penal infliction for the imputed sin of Adam alone, but that it results also from our own sin in Adam. So that the imputation they teach is, as Turretin himself avers, both mediate and immediate,—an imputation of our own sin in and through Adam, rather than the imputation of his own sin alone, as we have already abundantly illustrated. And thus the natural and federal headship of Adam are both equally regarded as essential to the right statement and explication of the doctrine. And thus, moreover, the statement of Stapfer (denounced by Dr. Hodge as Placeanism) stands forth fully vindicated—that it is the adversaries of the Reformed doctrine who assert that it teaches that God imputes the first sin of Adam without any regard to universal corruption, and esteems all Adam's posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they, without any respect had to their own sin, and so as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. And he adds, that those adversaries injuriously suppose those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means to be separated; for they consider imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate, when the Reformed divines suppose that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Dr. Hodge assumes precisely the position of those adversaries, and maintains their very ground.

We shall now proceed to cite the separate testimonies of the eminent divines of the Reformed Church.

ERRATA IN PART II, DEC. 1861.

Several errata in the article on Imputation, in our last number, and which had been placed in the publisher's hands more than two months anterior to its

publication, were not corrected by him; the most important of which are the following:

On p. 560, line 11, for 1285, read 1265; and for 1307, read 1308.

On p. 578, Maccovius is incorrectly declared to have been a member of the Synod of Dort. We were led into the error by Dr. Hodge; and our readers will please regard the statement as withdrawn.

On p. 589, l. 9, for *man* read *men*.

ART. IV.—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relation of both to the General Revolt.*

A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky: To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy which had its Center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.

PART FIRST—Containing the History of the Conspiracy from the Triumph of the Democratic Party in August, 1859, till the Triumph of the Union Party in August, 1861.

I.—1. Kentucky: her Position and Character.—2. Triumph of the Democratic Party in 1859: Subsequent Division and Disorganization: Treason of the Part that adhered to Vice-President Breckinridge.—3. Popular Votes between Aug. 1859, and Aug. 1861: Loyalty of the People: Overthrow of the Vice-President and his Party.

1. The posture of the great border slave States, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, has been every way peculiar in our great civil war. The posture of North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas, lying immediately behind them, and both tiers of States stretching entirely across the somewhat densely-peopled region of the nation, was more nearly analogous to that of the four States first named, than to that of any other portion of the Union. Tennessee had been a portion of North Carolina, and had been originally peopled from that State; and the upper and most populous parts of Arkansas had been settled chiefly by the same class of persons. Kentucky had been a part of Virginia, and had been

peopled chiefly from that State; while Missouri had been peopled chiefly from Kentucky. Centrally situated with respect to the whole Union, Kentucky is bounded on three sides by the three most powerful of the six remaining States named above, to wit, by Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri; while her remaining boundary lays broadside to the three powerful States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. It added greatly to the influence of Kentucky, that an immense proportion of the inhabitants of the three States last named were connected by the closest ties of blood, of mutual friendship and of trade and commerce with her own people; multitudes of their most eminent men, and vast numbers of their most prosperous citizens, being also Kentuckians by birth. Nor can it be denied that States acquire, in the course of ages, just as individuals acquire, in the course of years, a character at once precise and well understood; nor that, in the case of Kentucky, her long succession of great citizens who had adorned every branch of the public service—the general vigor, patriotism, and generosity of her people—and the habitual wisdom, integrity, and prosperity of her internal administration, had invested her with a public character as eminently honorable to her as it was intensely cherished by her. In effect, the course which Kentucky would take in the great crisis which had fallen upon the nation, was apparently important, out of all proportion to her numerical strength, by reason of the circumstances to which we have thus slightly alluded. The course she did take, and the effect of it upon the immediate fate of the civil war, is now matter of history. There is a lesson too valuable to be lost, far too important in all respects to be forgotten, which does not lie on the surface of public acts, but is indissolubly connected with the public and private history of them. It is this we would rescue from oblivion. For its contrast with all that has occurred elsewhere is as instructive as it is remarkable, whether the other border slave States, where the struggle has been so protracted, or the more southerly States where the conspiracy, the pre-concerted fraud, and the sudden violence were everywhere successful, are made the subjects of the comparison.

2. At the general election in Kentucky which immediately preceded the last canvass for the Presidency of the United States, the Democratic party, then undivided and in possession of the whole power of the National Government, perfected the political revolution which had been working for some years in Kentucky. It elected the Governor of the State, it carried both branches of the State Legislature, it sent to Congress a decided majority of our members. Another State was securely chained to the fortunes of that great political organization, which seemed to be in permanent possession of power in the nation, and to need only a moderate share of wisdom and prudence to put its dominion, its principles, and its policy beyond the reach of chance. Long in advance of any necessity, the Democratic Legislature elected John C. Breckinridge, then Vice-President of the United States, to be a Senator in Congress in the place of Mr. Crittenden, whose term would not expire before the 4th of March, 1861. Mr. Powell, a former Democratic Governor of the State, was already the other Senator from Kentucky. After the rupture of the Democratic party at Charleston and Baltimore, Major Breckinridge, already Vice-President and Senator elect, became the candidate of the Southern wing of the party for the Presidency. His acceptance of this nomination, it is now obvious, drew after it his subsequent identification with the secession party, to which we are satisfied he did not at that time belong. They who nominated him neither expected nor desired to elect him. What they designed was, by his means to carry the electoral votes of the border slave States, and in this manner draw closer to the South the Democratic party in those States. His acceptance of the nomination was a fatal political mistake that in the end sealed his destiny, and to us, who were bound to him by so many ties, it may be permitted to believe that his fall was not premeditated, and to say that it was a national calamity. The work of his overthrow began in Kentucky, which had cherished him with so much affection. The first manifest proof that his political ruin was impending, was given in the election of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the State, which

occurred during the heat of the Presidential canvass. By it the division of the Democratic party in the State was shown to be complete, and the Douglas portion of it intensely hostile to Major Breckinridge. At the Presidential election a few months afterward, he was beaten by an immense majority, having received little more than one-third of the votes cast. This result, though not fully understood at the time, proved that the backbone of the secession party in Kentucky was broken. And the results of the same election in all the slave States made it apparent, that so far was it from being possible to array all those States in a national movement against the Federal Government, that very few, if any of them, except South Carolina, could be induced to vote for secession, and that the mass of the people in the bulk of those States, though exasperated at the success of the Republican party, were loyal to the Union. The popular vote given in the slave States, on the Presidential election, demonstrated to the secession party that they were lost if the popular will was to be regarded. They immediately initiated a reign of universal anarchy and violence, and by fraud and terror, violating all laws and trampling constitutions under their feet, proclaimed State after State out of the Union, consummating their work in the organization of the provisional Confederate Government. The whole procedure was a naked and atrocious series of audacious usurpations. What it is of the utmost importance to observe, is, that the whole secession movement has nowhere any foundation but this; and this was resorted to because disunion was not attainable in any other way. We escaped in Kentucky simply because it was perfectly understood that it would be necessary to conquer us first.

3. It will be remembered that the public authorities of Virginia invited a convention of delegates, from the border slave States, to assemble in the Spring of 1861. The result of the vote of the people of Kentucky, on the 4th of May of that year, for members of that convention, showed that the great majority of them were opposed to secession. The same fact was established by a still more decisive vote, on the 20th of June of the same year, in the special election of members of

Congress. And counting the two general elections, mentioned on a previous page, (that for Appellate Clerk, and that for Presidential Electors,) and the two just mentioned, the general State election, on the first Monday of August, 1861, was the fifth occasion, within a year and three months, on which the people had proclaimed their devotion to the Union and the Constitution. The counter Revolution in favor of the Union, as compared with party devotion and disloyalty combined, had wrought so deeply, and had been so completely established by those five popular elections, that after August, 1861, what remained of the Democratic triumph, completed in August, 1859, was three or four members of the State Senate, about a dozen members of the House of Representatives, Mr. Magoffin the governor, and Mr. Powell the Senator in Congress. They stood like a few dead trees scattered over one of our great "clearings," the decaying remnants of a great and betrayed party, which held the State with an apparently irresistible grasp, when Major Breckinridge, its most popular leader, was seduced into accepting a nomination for the Presidency, by a disloyal faction. Now, it is perfectly apparent, from this brief recital of public and notorious facts, that the party which obtained all power in Kentucky, at the election of August, 1859, the party which, with almost indecent haste, prematurely elected Major Breckinridge to the Senate of the United States, was bound by the five popular elections, which took place between August, 1859, and August, 1861—if not indeed by each of them separately to respect the determination of the people of Kentucky not to secede from the Federal Union, and to acquiesce in their settled and reiterated will. Under the most ordinary political circumstances, they were bound to confine themselves to loyal, peaceable, and legal means, in seeking to change the public will. Under the circumstances which existed, the use of any other description of means was traitorous; for it was giving aid and comfort to armed rebels and traitors, who, they knew, were preparing to invade the State, and who did invade it, for the avowed purpose of conquering it into secession, which had been five times repudiated. But to conspire secretly with armed traitors,

to urge and to promote the success of their military invasion of the State; and then, when detected and baffled, to flee secretly to the invading traitors, and take military service with them, in the bosom of Kentucky, against Kentucky; all of which, many thousands of them, embracing most of their leaders, did: these are the most atrocious, as well as the most degrading forms of the highest crimes against society, which it is possible for human beings to commit. Let the horrible condemnation fall where it may, he is no patriot who would arrest it, and that community is unworthy of freedom which hesitates to inflict it.

II.—1. Governor Magoffin, Vice President Breckinridge, and the Legislature, at its Regular Session, in 1859.—2. Public Opinion: Parties: Universal Agitation: Beginning of the Revolt: Neutrality: The People and their leaders.—3. The Mass of the People in the Slave States were Loyal: Violence and Fraud resorted to by the Conspirators: Their attempt upon Kentucky: The Called Session of the Legislature, in 1860: The Adjourned Session of the Legislature in 1861.

1. The elections for members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Kentucky Legislature, are biennial, and the regular sessions of the body of limited duration, and only biennial. In all free governments, the power to make the laws is the most obvious, as well as the most important function of the sovereignty which comes to be exercised by the representatives of the people. But in this country, some years ago, the radical reformers seem to have come clearly to the notion that representative government was a failure, in comparison with party caucuses; and, in numerous States, they succeeded in so changing existing institutions, that the people were required to vote about ten times as much as they did before, while the aggregate possibility of anything effectual, much less anything good being accomplished by the multiplied votings, was scarcely one-hundredth part of what it had been before. It was against the legislative power of society, its most vital power, that this dangerous fanaticism spent its chief fury. Before 1850 Kentucky had one of the noblest Constitutions ever possessed by a free people: since

that time, perhaps the poorest ever reduced to writing in this country. The Legislature, elected in 1859, instead of being in session a single time, in the lapse of two years, and not more than sixty days in all, as the Constitution of 1850 had provided, as the rule, held three separate sessions, amounting in the aggregate to a good deal more than the average of two annual sessions, as of old. It met, as of course, in the Autumn of 1859: it convened again, upon the call of Governor Magoffin, in 1860, (for what purpose we shall see,) and it held a third session in 1861, on its own adjournment at the called session. At its first, or regular session, it elected Major Breckinridge to the Senate of the United States, and he came from Washington city to Frankfort, as was fit, to render them his thanks, and to open his heart and his mind to them, upon the infinite perils which appeared to threaten the country; perils concerning which, his great position as Vice-President, would add force and solemnity to his words, on this imposing occasion. The speech he delivered to the Legislature, was widely published, and most anxiously read. It did not satisfy the public expectation—and it grievously disappointed the loyal friends of Major Breckinridge, of whom the number, at that time, was by no means inconsiderable. The speech clearly showed that he did not desire to be considered a secessionist—that on the contrary, he desired the preservation of the Union, while he doubted if that was possible; but it proved as clearly, that however much he might be a patriot, he was as much, or more, a partizan. It was, essentially, a mere argument from the point of view of a National Democrat, as the faction he led then called themselves; and its object was to show that in the union and triumph of the Democratic party, lay the only hope of saving the country—if, indeed, it was worth while to save it, on any other terms. It was a great occasion lost. Neither the first nor the second opportunity which Providence had offered to him, wherein a career of unspeakable renown to himself, and service to his country, was set clearly before him, and he proved that, although a very superior man, a destiny was set before him to which he was not equal. The letter of Dr.

Robert J. Breckinridge, to him, dated January 9, 1860, and widely published, immediately after the publication of the speech spoken of above, strove to recall the minds of men from all mere party views of the terrible crisis upon which the country was entering, and to make them comprehend that the triumph or the destruction of parties, was as nothing compared with the preservation of our national life and glory, while it sought to prove that this had always been, and would forever be, the sentiment of Kentucky, and that his kinsman had no course, whether as a Senator, or as a man, either of personal honor or public fame, but to espouse it and to adorn it.

2. A year wore away in the midst of indescribable agitations everywhere. Mr. Lincoln had been elected, but was not yet inaugurated. The Southern States had begun to secede. Kentucky was profoundly moved; and the state of opinion was, in its distinguishing characteristics, almost peculiar to herself. At that period there was not, probably, one person out of a thousand in the State, who did not feel persuaded, that the people of the South had received great injury and provocation from the North, and that there was abundant reason for them to apprehend great danger in the future. On the other hand, the number was comparatively small, not one in a hundred, perhaps, of the entire population, who were willing to secede from the Federal Union; nor was the proportion much larger of those who then believed the States had any power to secede; or, even if the power existed, any adequate justification for doing so. The vote of the State had been given to Mr. Bell; the Democratic party had been divided, the larger portion voting for Major Breckinridge, the smaller for Mr. Douglas. The first and third of these three parties, unitedly, made about two-thirds of the people, and of the voters of the State; and the progress of agitation, of discussion, and of events, did ultimately unite them in support of the Union; leaving the other portion of the Democratic party, being hardly one-third of the people, or of the voters, adherents of Major Breckinridge, and ultimately secessionists, embracing the Governor of the State, and most of the con-

spicuous Democrats of it. There were, however, numerous exceptions to these general statements, with reference to individuals, many of them conspicuous, who had acted with each of the three parties just named. And the general tendency was to a decided, but not very rapid fixing of men and parties, more and more distinctly in their respective convictions and aims. As a kind of interlude in the great game of revolution, while the community was intensely heated, and yet reluctant to take any irrevocable step, the idea of the *Neutrality* of the State was suggested, and seemed to afford the very relief and hesitation which the people desired. Among the innumerable follies which marked the course of the Revolt, and stamped upon its leaders the brand of incapacity; the two most fatal, perhaps, were the bombardment of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, which rendered war inevitable, and the invasion and attempted conquest of Kentucky, which rendered the rebel success in the war impossible. The former event had just occurred. The nation was electrified. The new President, whose previous forbearance had been complete, issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers, and was answered by the immediate tender of treble, or quadruple the number. To Kentucky was assigned by the President, one or two regiments, as her quota of the volunteers: and her Governor, Mr. Magoffin, returned to him a curt and insolent refusal; and what, without the explanations we have been making, would seem now to be inconceivable, the Legislature approved his act, without serious opposition. As long as there was a hope that civil war could be avoided; and as long after it commenced, as there was a hope that it would be brief; there were plausible reasons to urge why it might be both possible and wise for Kentucky to occupy a position of neutrality; and there were motives, very opposite from each other, which induced the leaders of hostile parties to concur in the effort to maintain it. But it was inevitable that secessionists and loyal citizens must mean by neutrality, a condition while it lasted, and a result when it was reached, totally the opposite one from the other. It was a truce, responsive to a peculiar and most agitated condition

of the loyal mind of the State, eagerly employed by the leaders of the disloyal portion of the people in maturing their preparations, and suddenly disappearing as soon as the real and terrible issues at stake, came clearly before the general mind. The common people of Kentucky have been wiser, braver, and more loyal, than their leaders. Multitudes of those leaders have already disappeared before the majesty of the simple, and resolute purpose of the true people. Multitudes of them still maintain precarious positions, by mere tolerance, or the force of popular habit, who will presently disappear. Of all those who were conspicuous in the regular session of the Legislature, elected in August, 1859, and of those who were then their conspicuous friends, in the State at large, how small is the number left, who have any appreciable hold upon the public mind! And of that small number, how close is the connection between their fidelity then, and their present hold upon the confidence of their country! Who pleads for neutrality in Kentucky now? Who indorses Governor Magoffin's rebuke of the President, for offering to accept Kentucky volunteers? Who desires to send commissioners to Washington, to demand the removal of loyal Kentucky troops from a Kentucky camp, in the bosom of the State? And yet our public men should understand, that our vision is far more thoroughly purged to day, than it was two years ago, and that the remembrance of acts performed now, will not perish two years hence.

3. Nothing had occurred, during the regular session of the Legislature, to shake the confidence of the leading men of the party, which called itself the *Southern Rights party*, in their ability to lead that body effectually in the way of secession. On the contrary, much had been done during that session to strengthen the disloyal sentiment and party, and to awaken distrust and apprehension in all loyal minds. In November, 1860, the Presidential election occurred, and was followed immediately by the revolt of several Southern States, and by open preparations for revolution and war in all the Cotton States, while secret machinations to the same end agitated all the remaining slave States. The state of the popu-

lar vote throughout the slave States had clearly shown, that the aggregate majority of the whole was hostile to the party that ran Major Breckinridge for the Presidency; and that while this majority was very large in many of those States, there was not one of them in which hostile minorities did not exist; while those minorities were very powerful in many of them. It followed, that any idea of a national movement in the slave States, against the Federal Union and Constitution, was simply preposterous. It also followed, that any attempt to carry the slave States out of the Union, *by voting*, would fail outright, in the majority of those States, embracing all of the first class; and that the loyal minorities, in any that might vote to secede, would be every-where an embarrassment, destructive of success to every peaceful attempt at disunion. In short, first or last, treason meant violence and war. In all possible forms of government, revolutions that can not be accomplished by voting, can be accomplished only by the bayonet. From the very first movement, therefore, of this insurrection in America, it was perfectly clear to every man of common sense, who was engaged in it, that it was an attempt to carry through a revolution by violence and fraud, instead of an attempt to change existing institutions through the agency of opinion, made known by voting. And its whole course has been attended by an uninterrupted use of violence, public and private, and an unbroken stream of falsehood, in word and act, designed to conceal the intimate nature of the atrocious conspiracy. The favorite instrument resorted to, was what were called *sovereign conventions*; that is, a gathering of a certain number of traitors, constituted in permanence, and exercising unlimited despotic power. But the ordinary institutions of society were also seized on, and perverted to the use of treason; and among these, State Legislatures, in secret and in extraordinary sessions, were made effective engines of revolutionary fanaticism. At this stage of the spreading anarchy, Major Breckinridge appeared openly as the leader of the disloyal movement in Kentucky. The time was supposed to have come for the decisive blow to be struck in Kentucky. There was, therefore, widely

published throughout the State, a short letter from him, written at Washington city, laying down the programme for the guidance of Kentucky, amid the darkness which covered the land, about the end of the year 1860. He was careful not to say, in so many words, what ground Kentucky ought to take; but he was explicit in advising those methods to be resorted to, in reaching the ground she would occupy, which had led to secession every-where else. The Legislature was to be called together in extra session; a sovereign convention of the people was to be convened; the State was to put herself right upon the great questions which were convulsing her, and which had dissolved the Union; and the Federal Government was assumed to be at an end, and the Federal Constitution to be destroyed: that is, in plain English, the Revolution being an accomplished fact, and the valid existence of the Government common to the nation being ended; all that remained for Kentucky was to make a revolution for herself, follow the lead of the revolted States, and set up on her own account. What all this was to end in might be determined afterwards, Major Breckinridge not being committed in his letter. Kentucky might see fit to become an independent commonwealth; she might unite in some kind of a reconstruction of the general government; she might form a new and separate league, or federation, or government, with the other Border slave States, or with certain conterminous States, without regard to slavery; or she might unite with all the slave States in a new and limited Confederacy—this last, probably, being the result secretly intended. The letter was probably written after counsel and agreement among the leading men of the Southern Rights party in the State; and its suggestions were followed by the party, as far as they had power to do so. There was a time when it would have produced a great impression, and done much mischief; but the elections of May and November, 1860, had overthrown its author, and his party in Kentucky. With reference to it, and the objects recommended in it, however, Governor Magoffin convened the Legislature in extra session; and his party in that body did all the mischief they

could, and would gladly have done more. With reference, also, to the same perilous topics, but with views considerably modified since their election in August, 1859, the same Legislature held a third session, on its own adjournment, toward the close of their term of service, in the year 1861. Over them, during the existence of this Legislature, parties were distinctly and finally rallied; and the great political battle was fought and won; and the sword was drawn, and the civil victory cemented with human blood.

III.—1. The Legislature first hesitates, and then revolts against Vice-President Breckinridge and Governor Magoffin: James Guthrie, Esq., the nominee of the Legislature for the Presidency: Bearing of that Political Movement.—2. Guilt of the Disloyal Party after the Presidential Election of 1860, and Fate of its Kentucky Leaders: Their Attempts on Kentucky, and how defeated: The Loyal Party in that State—Its Principles, Conduct, and Final Triumph: Political Overthrow of the Traitors followed immediately by the Military Invasion of Kentucky.

1. Whatever may have been the state of opinion in the Legislature, of which so much has been said, when it was elected in August, 1859—whatever may have been the general tenor of its spirit and acts during its regular session, soon after that election—whatever may have been the hopes and designs of Governor Magoffin, and those who co-operated with him, when about a year afterward he convened the body in extra session: it is certain that the body itself paused, during that called session, in the career it had been running, and after a protracted internal struggle, openly revolted against the Vice-President and the Governor at its subsequent adjourned session. The two years of its existence were signalized by six popular votes in Kentucky, as remarkable as any ever cast in the State. The first of these was the vote which elected the body itself, and made the triumph of the Democratic party complete in that State, after a struggle of nearly forty years. The last of the six was the vote electing the next succeeding Legislature, in August, 1861, by which the counter-revolution in support of the Federal Union and Constitution was overwhelmingly established. The other four popular votes occurred in May and November, 1860, and

in May and June, 1861; the first of the four for the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State, the second for Presidential Electors, the third for members of the Border State Convention recommended by Virginia, the fourth for members of Congress from Kentucky. Three of these four elections last named were hotly contested, and in each of the three the secession party was signally beaten; the remaining one—for members of the Border State Convention—that party allowed to go by default, having nominated candidates and then withdrawn them; but nothing was gained by the ruse, for the candidates of the Union party, though not opposed, received considerably over a hundred thousand votes, being more than two-thirds of all the votes in the State. All four of these popular votes occurred after the regular session of the Legislature of 1859 had adjourned, and the first of the four—in May, 1860—gave the first indisputable proof that the Democratic party in Kentucky was rent in twain upon the questions of Union and secession. The Democratic members of that Legislature were no less thoroughly divided among themselves, as the supporters of Major Breckinridge or Mr. Douglas for the Presidency, than the whole party was. And this general difficulty was exasperated by a personal one. For the friends of Mr. James Guthrie had succeeded in securing for him the Democratic nomination in Kentucky for the Presidency, and the vote of the State had been cast for him, in the Charleston Convention, up to the moment of its own disruption. Mr. Guthrie had been, before that, a conspicuous candidate in opposition to Major Breckinridge, for the seat to which the latter had so recently been elected to the Senate of the United States, and he had been for many years a distinguished leader of the party before his successful competitor for its headship, and all its highest honors, had arrived at man's estate. It is possible, also, that some appearance of patronage on the part of Major Breckinridge may have wounded Mr. Guthrie. And his public and continual avowal of indifference to all office, even the highest, coupled with his constant and openly proclaimed refusal to enter into any combinations or pledges with other candidates

for mutual promotion, may have aggravated the wound. It was well understood that the appointment of Mr. Guthrie, instead of the late Lynn Boyd, Esq., to the Secretaryship of the Treasury, by President Buchanan, in which Mr. Guthrie so greatly distinguished himself, was due to the decided interposition of Vice-President Breckinridge. There were obvious causes, numerous and powerful, operating during the two years for which this Legislature held office, and explaining the change which gradually passed upon the body. The party in power was broken to pieces, and the members of the Legislature took opposite sides. The candidate of that Legislature for the Presidency sunk out of view by that rupture, and two new candidates for that high office, one for each fragment of the ruined party, were presented to them as representatives of opinions absolutely irreconcilable, and involving the life of the nation. Moreover, they must have felt the power of the somewhat vague but intense Union feeling which pervaded the State, and which was made manifest in a succession of such immense votes. Possibly they sympathized with that feeling more deeply than was supposed at the time. Probably they recoiled from the calm but resolute opposition with which loyal men confronted all suggestion of every illegal and unconstitutional proceeding, and shrunk from precipitating the perils of the issue to which they distinctly knew that resistance would be carried. At any rate, the time had fully come "for Kentucky to put herself right," as Major Breckinridge's proclamation had defined the accepted secession method, and Governor Magoffin had called the Legislature to Frankfort expressly to take action concerning the interest, the honor, and the duty of Kentucky, in the frightful condition of affairs to which the country had been brought. No one could doubt what the Vice-President and the Governor desired the Legislature to do. The body, as we have before said, paused—was convulsed—and at last revolted against its leaders.

2. The judgment which ought to be formed of the conduct of the party which revolted in Kentucky, up to the Presidential election in November, 1860, may well be different

from the judgment which ought to be formed of its conduct after that period. All parties had been mistaken in some important particulars; Mr. Douglas proved to be a far more patriotic man than he was supposed to be; Mr. Bell proved to be utterly unworthy of the support of the party that nominated him; Major Breckinridge proved to be a mere instrument used for a special purpose by the leaders of a conspiracy, instead of the leader himself of the great State Rights party. And it must be added, that Mr. Lincoln has proved to be far less a partizan than those who elected him supposed he was, and far more a patriot than any of his opponents believed him to be. All that had publicly occurred up to the election of the President might well have passed away; and the fundamental principles not only of our entire political system, but also of all possible forms of free government, required that the person then elected President should be accepted as the choice of the American people, fairly made. After this, opposition to the will of the nation, constitutionally expressed, was factious; armed opposition was treason; secret and concerted opposition was a conspiracy; and anarchy is the natural result of all such opposition when it succeeds. In no portion of the United States was the secession party more fatally guilty, after November, 1860, than in Kentucky; and whoever will reflect on the fate of the conspicuous persons, natives or citizens of that State, Generals Johnson, Breckinridge, Preston, Buckner, Crittenden, Tilghman, Williams, Marshall, Governors Morehead, Powell, Magoffin—nay, even President Davis himself—who have partaken of this guilt, will perhaps more clearly appreciate the swift justice of God and the courageous loyalty of the people. For no violence or fraud which had prospered elsewhere, but was suggested to this Legislature as proper to be undertaken or approved by them; and nothing was suggested of either sort that would not have succeeded, if the loyal people of Kentucky had followed the example of the loyal people in every State that seceded. Secret sessions of the Legislature, which had been the common instruments of successful treason elsewhere, were vehemently urged at Frankfort; and nothing prevented them,

probably, but the recoil of a portion of the majority of those controlling the Legislature, from the extreme personal peril which the attempt involved. Sovereign conventions had been called and used elsewhere; and nothing prevented a resort to this instrument but the deliberate avowal of the Union men, that they would take up arms the moment a sovereign convention was called, under any other authority than that of the majority of the people of the State, lawfully expressed at the polls. Masses of armed secessionists were gathered at Frankfort by concert, in order to overawe the Legislature, as had been done in other States; gathered there at the appointed time by private arrangements, by printed appeals, by votes and resolutions of disloyal meetings, and by inflammatory harangues made by open traitors throughout the State. But when they met at the seat of Government, it was perceived that as many, as resolute, and as well armed Union men had taken care that no such overawing should take place. Whatever credit may be awarded to any portion of the secession party, in or out of the Legislature, for prudence or forbearance—and whatever praise may be due to those members of the party majority in the two Houses, who, by adhering to the Union cause, arrested the headlong career of the Governor and the Vice-President; the chief cause of whatever good was done, and of the much greater evil that was prevented, during these momentous sessions of the Legislature; is to be found in the sagacious and intrepid conduct of leading Union men, in and out of the Legislature, and in the wise and staunch loyalty of the people. In full view of the perils around them and before them, a certain number of persons, clearly seeing a definite course of duty, distinctly proclaimed it, and adhered to it with great forbearance, and yet with unalterable firmness: and, as in all similar cases, a wise, just, and manly course, clearly stated and firmly held, led the State through thick darkness, and along the brink of destruction, with her feet on the solid rock. It finally came to be seen, almost universally, by men deserving to be called loyal, that the salvation of the State depended on two things, and upon keeping the two as nigh together as

possible. *First*, That the Constitution of the State should be held sacred, and all revolutionary proceedings, in contempt of it, resisted to extremity, and if necessary by force. *Secondly*, That the will of the people, lawfully expressed at the polls, should be respected, and where it was possible, enforced; and in no case resisted by Union men with arms. At the back of these openly avowed rules of action—clear, simple, and just—was the calm, but sincere purpose, never concealed, to take up arms in vindication of them, at the first moment of necessity; but yet at the same time to acquiesce, as far as the safety of the State would allow, in the wishes and even in the caprices even of temporary and excited majorities of the people and the Legislature. There is little in the history of parties in Kentucky, during the years 1859, 1860, and 1861; little in the proceedings of the Legislature, which held office from August, 1859, to August, 1861; little in the varying shades of public opinion, during the two years preceding the election of August, 1861, the last that has been held in the State; that is not perfectly explicable when brought to the test of the statements just made. It was a great and protracted contest, wherein the leaders of the loyal party gained, day by day, in a period of revolution, against the party holding all power, civil and military; and finally, and without resorting to violence, achieved a complete triumph, solely by the skill, and courage, and temperance, with which they directed public opinion. Within thirty days after the election of August, 1861, at which the secession cause was politically annihilated in Kentucky, a large confederate army invaded the State. The bloodshed came late, but it came of course in a treason whose nature was violence and fraud. We will show that those thirty days were the most momentous of all, and the most fatal to the cause of treason.

IV.—1. The Conspirators called the *The Knights of the Golden Circle*: Their Infamous Character, and Atrocious Designs.—2. Surreptitious Organization of a Disloyal Force under General Buckner, called the *State Guard*: Object, and Fate of these Troops: Conduct of Governor Magoffin and his party: Military Force of the Disloyal Party in the State.—3. System and Means of Defense of the Loyal Party: Creation of the State Military Board—Effects of that

Expedient: Organization of the *Home Guard*—Nature and Extent of that Force: State Authorities evaded arming it—Private Persons induce the General Government to arm it: Decisive Importance of this Act—Violent Attempts of Secessionists to defeat it, and seize the arms: General Organization of *Union Clubs*—Their Nature and Use.—4. Final and Complete Political Overthrow of the Conspiracy: Elections of June and August, 1861: Reactionary Symptoms among Politicians: Past Conduct—Present Sentiment—Future Course of Kentucky.

1. There are several matters of sufficient importance to require a particular explanation in connection with the state of public affairs, when the Legislature of 1859–1861 adjourned finally, and all parties were organizing for elections near at hand, and whose results, it was seen, must be decisive. Among the chief of these was a secret political and military organization, called the *Knights of the Golden Circle*, which had been widely introduced into Kentucky, by means of a great number of *Castles*, as its lodges were called, organized among the secessionists of the State. We have no means of determining with certainty, what number of initiated members these castles unitedly contained; for, indeed, the practice of secrecy, and the use of numerous grades of membership, together with a complicated jargon made doubly unintelligible by hieroglyphics and pantomime, enabled a select central organization to monopolize at once all knowledge of its force, and all power to use it. It was one of those monsters, sprung from the fermenting dregs of revolutions, whose vile life is nourished only by filth and blood. The paternity of the order was ostentatiously claimed by a person called Beckley, who assumed the title of its General, in certain mysterious advertisements, and in occasional treasonable proclamation. The avowed objects of the order were various. Sometimes, it was to protect the Spanish States on the southern portion of this continent; sometimes, to protect the institution of slavery, in our own Southern States; in Ohio, its secret pretext was, the restoration of the Democratic party to power; while in Kentucky, its repeatedly avowed design was, to aid, by arms, in the separation of the State from the Federal Union, and the annexation of it to a Southern Confederacy. Its modes of proceeding, its hieroglyphics, and its

horrible oaths, were disclosed in Kentucky, and made public through the press; while in several other States, the same result was partially obtained in certain judicial investigations. In short, it was a standing conspiracy against the peace of society, and the safety of individuals, existing in the double form of a menace to all virtue, public and private, and of a refuge for desperadoes and ruffians. Its mere existence proved that society was fatally disordered; while its wide dissemination through the nation, and especially throughout the Southern States, of which its General openly boasted through the press, uncontradicted, was an infallible premonition either of dissolution, or the sword. There was a sort of standing advertisement by this General Beckley, that he had at his bidding an army of Kentucky Knights of the Golden Circle, armed, equipped, always increasing, always ready for battle, and never rated by him at less than 8,000; with which, when the word was given by those with whom he co-operated, he would immediately plant his flag on the capitol. It is manifest that such a force, on a sudden emergency, could not have been cut to pieces, as matters then stood, without costing Kentucky an infinite price, in the lives of her noblest citizens: and that it could not have been resisted at all, by a force hastily collected and imperfectly organized, unless that force was composed of dauntless men, accustomed to the use of arms. After all that has occurred since, it is not boasting to say, that, nevertheless, General Beckley and his Knights would have been cut to pieces, if he had ever got the word he was waiting for. The most surprising part to posterity, of the whole affair, will perhaps be, that not the slightest movement was made, either by the civil or military authorities of the party then in power, from the Governor of the State down, to call this traitor and his band to account, or to protect the loyal people of the State against them. Unless, indeed, the heroic indifference with which that loyal population contemplated both the proceedings of Beckley and his Knights, and the connivance of the Governor, should appear more surprising.

2. A more direct and effectual method than connivance at

the organized treason of the Knights of the Golden Circle, was resorted to by the party which then controlled the Legislature, in order to provide an adequate military force. There were about one hundred and fifty thousand men in the State, of the age of military service fixed by the existing laws: and there were probably fifty thousand more, under and over the military ages, who, upon a great emergency, would be capable of military service. All these might be set down as being two-thirds of them loyal, and one-third or them secessionists. The militia system of the State had been steadily and for a number of years, rendered more and more inefficient, by the passage of numerous laws, designed, apparently, to destroy it, until it had become so completely disorganized that not even a single regiment existed, except on paper, and not even on paper was there a single regiment with a full complement of officers. The people, as a mass, were skilled in the use of arms, from boyhood up; and there were private fire arms enough in the State, to have furnished every person capable of using it, with a tolerably good weapon. There were, also, a considerable number of United States small arms, and some fifty pieces of ordnance in the State, which had been appropriated to Kentucky, as her share of the arms distributed by the Federal Government, in former years, toward the arming of the national militia. Although, as has been shown, Governor Magoffin had tartly rebuffed the President, when he offered to accept a few regiments from Kentucky to aid in saving the Federal city from capture by the rebels; and although, the Legislature had approved his conduct; that was a very different matter from putting Governor Magoffin, himself, at the head of a powerful and well appointed military force—which might be raised and equipped under the pretext of causing the neutrality of Kentucky to be respected—and used in making the governor and his party masters of the State. The natural course to take, was to reorganize the entire militia of the State, promptly and thoroughly; to divide it into classes of thirty to fifty thousand men each; and to have the first class immediately prepared for service upon any emergency that might arise, while the

remaining classes were being more lieisurely and more perfectly organized, for successive service, as it might be necessary. The simplicity, the economy, and the efficacy of such a procedure, were the very reasons that prevented its adoption; for the party in power did not desire to give the State an impregnable position in the Union; but, on the contrary, such a position as would oblige her, at last, to leave the Union, or render her subjugation certain if she resisted their traitorous schemes. To this end, various projects were brought forward involving the expenditure of many millions of money, and the inauguration of vast preparations for defense: but every proposition involved a danger, greater than any a gallant people could incur, by being unprepared for a sudden attack, namely, the danger of having ample preparations so made, that a disloyal governor, and a disloyal majority in the Legislature, would have it in their power to abuse them all, to the ruin of a loyal people. It was a position of extreme embarrassment, for the loyal minority of the Legislature, even though they were sustained by a great majority of the people. The principles which should regulate their conduct, were perfectly simple; namely, that no encroachment should be attempted on the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Governor, and no indignity should be offered to his great office; but on the other hand, that nothing which could be lawfully done, should be left undone, to prevent him from doing mischief. The practical application of these rules of conduct, during three sessions of the Legislature, covering considerable portions of two years, during the struggles of which, the minority continually increased in strength, and finally controlled the Legislature on many important questions; was a difficulty, requiring much higher qualifications than are ordinarily possessed by legislative bodies. Whatever mistakes were made, lay rather in an excess of forbearance to the Governor, than in an excess of zeal for the safety and honor of the State. The shape which the matter finally took, proved in the result, to be every way bad. A considerable sum of money was appropriated for military purposes, in such a way that the Governor was enabled to use it; and he did use a

large part of it in the secret purchase of arms, through an agent of his own, from the secessionists of New Orleans, for the use of the secessionists of Kentucky. In addition, an Act was passed, creating a volunteer force, called the *State Guard*, which was directed to be immediately raised, organized, armed, equipped, and drilled, chiefly at the expense of the State; and in direct violation of the Constitution, and of the whole structure of our own, and every other military system on earth; and in total disregard of all propriety, and even common sense, under the circumstances that existed; a staff officer of Governor Magoffin, himself a person not even belonging to the line of the army about to be raised, was created commander-in-chief, in the body of the law itself. This person proved to be Gen. S. B. Buckner, who was in command of the Confederate army at Fort Donelson, and was made a prisoner there, along with the rebel force under his command. It might as well be added that Col. Roger Hanson, who was captured at the same time, along with the bulk of his regiment, had been one of the Colonels of Gen. Buckner's State Guard; that Gen. Tilghman, who was captured a few days before, while in command of Fort Henry, was another of his Colonels; and that a large portion of the whole body has perished or been captured, in the service of the Confederate States. It consisted of about five thousand fine troops, and would have risen to five times that number if a little more time could have been gained, or the thoroughly disloyal character of the force had been somewhat more carefully concealed from the public. When the secession conspiracy in Kentucky prematurely broke down, this body of troops was transferred, almost entire, to the Confederate forces operating against that State. It is perfectly well known that the law creating this force, was passed almost in the very moment of the adjournment of the first session of the Legislature of 1859-61, by a mere trick of a handful of traitors—when not members enough of both houses were present at the midnight outrage, to have constituted a legal quorum of either of them. What shall be thought of the Governor of the State, who lent his whole personal and

official influence to procure in such a manner, the passage of a law designed to be used, and actually used, for purposes supremely wicked and disloyal—under the scandalous false pretext that it was necessary for the security of the commonwealth; and then, with complete knowledge of the outrageous manner in which the act was violently and disgracefully passed, gave efficacy to the audacious conspiracy, by affixing his official signature to the bill, and causing it to be filed as a good law, among the archives of the State! And what is to be thought of the overwhelming loyal majority, in both branches of the Legislature, elected in August, 1861, who allow two sessions of the body to pass, without calling the Governor to account, for a long series of official acts, of which these are but specimens! Will God approve, or can the country approve of the condemnation or punishment of the inferior instruments of treason, by inferior tribunals—when criminals the most elevated, the most bound to be faithful, and therefore the most guilty and dangerous of all, are thus allowed to go unquestioned by the great tribunal which is bound to call them to account? The sum of what we have been saying, in its military aspect, is this: there was a secret armed force of eight thousand traitors in Kentucky, and under Gen. Beckley, called Knights of the Golden Circle; there were five thousand well appointed State troops, called the State Guard, commanded by Gen. Buckner, an officer of the staff of the Governor; there was a body of secessionists, whose number we have no means of ascertaining with certainty, nor the precise nature or extent of their organization, amounting to twenty thousand men, or upwards, privately armed, in part with State arms, and in part with arms furnished to them from the rebel States—the whole body capable of immediate service, as neighborhood squads—and of being rapidly gathered in companies, and regiments. Immediately after the defeat of the Federal army at Manassas, in July, 1861, the most excitable and organized of this particular force, commenced leaving Kentucky to join the Confederate army; thus disclosing its previous condition. So that, at the period of darkness and peril now spoken of, there was a military force of

between thirty and forty thousand armed secessionists in Kentucky, in readiness to attempt there, what they and we knew, had been accomplished without difficulty, by similar, but far inferior means, in so many other States. Nor did they entertain the least doubt of their ability to accomplish it, whenever the proper time came; a confidence, as the event proved, wholly delusive, but to which is, perhaps, to be attributed in some degree, whatever delay occurred.

3. It may well be supposed that the loyal people of the State were not inattentive to these things; and that the leading men among them, whether in or out of the Legislature, were not ignorant of their real significance and design. The conviction daily extended and strengthened among the people, that the fate of the commonwealth would have to be decided by arms; and as this conviction became settled, their distrust of time-serving and irresolute, professional politicians grew apace; their demand for true and earnest leading became vehement, and partly by the help of insufficient enactments wrung from the Legislature, but chiefly by means of their own spontaneous vigor, a system and means of protection grew up, side by side, with the conspiracy against them. With the view of protecting the State, as far as possible, from Governor Magoffin, when it became obvious to the public what the surreptitious creation of his State Guard, commanded by his staff officer, General Buckner, meant; a military Board was created, at a subsequent session, and invested with as ample power as it was supposed the Constitution allowed. By a great struggle in the Legislature, General Buckner was prevented from being created, by law, a member of this Board; and the majority of persons put on it, by act of Assembly, were supposed to be loyal. After the Legislature itself had grown somewhat in loyalty, the Board was purged of the Governor, by act of Assembly, and its loyalty still farther strengthened. The practical effects of these indirect attempts to accomplish objects, which there were obvious direct methods of accomplishing, were not such as to vindicate the wisdom of their authors. The military patronage, and the military power of the State, fell very largely into the

hands of this Board, elected by the Legislature, and of the Adjutant-General of the State, appointed by the Governor—effects never contemplated by the constitution, theoretically absurd, and in their practical working full of inconvenience, and begetting endless opportunities and temptations of a character which laws ought to prevent instead of creating. The precedent was full of danger, and there was no need of setting it. It would have been far better to repeal the law creating the State guard; far better to have impeached the Governor; far better to have had him arrested—as many far less guilty and dangerous men were—under the authority of the General Government; far better to have left him to do his worst, relying on the power of the General Assembly to cut him short when it should be indispensable, and on the still higher power of organized public opinion, and armed public vengeance, to keep him in bounds, or deal with him when he transgressed them. At a still later period, an Act was passed authorising military companies to be raised, designed more particularly for local service, and called *Home Guards*. These troops were to be armed by the State. But whether through inattention or design, no provision was made authorizing their organization into larger bodies than a company, or the existence of any officer among them higher than a captain. About 20,000 unarmed men were immediately organized into companies, under this law; and it was seen that nearly the entire loyal male population, able to bear arms, could be enrolled in this force. At first, many persons of secession tendencies, more or less decided, encouraged the formation of these companies, and, to a certain extent, became members of them. They did this, however, chiefly as an expression of a political opinion, destructive of the very nature and object of the force itself; namely, that it was designed to protect the neutrality of the State, equally against the Federal and the Confederate Governments, instead of being designed especially to protect the people against sudden violence on the part of a military conspiracy organized within the State, and against sudden invasion by Confederate troops, who were hovering on its frontiers. This

sort of co-operation was, however, soon abandoned; for the companies of Home Guards, spontaneously, and to a considerable extent, supplied the fatal deficiency of the law under which they were organized, by voluntarily uniting into regiments; and, with a common consent, received men of known loyalty as regimental officers, designated by persons who had their confidence. To obtain arms was more difficult; because it was pretended by the State authorities, who should furnish them, that all the State arms had already been distributed; and in numerous instances, the difficulties created by the law itself, and made the means of defeating it, by disloyal civil officers, who were charged with certain preliminary duties connected with its execution, rendered a technically regular application for the arms impossible. In this emergency, successful application was made to the Federal Government, by certain loyal citizens, for arms to be used in their own defense by the loyal people of Kentucky. Chiefly through the instrumentality of Lieutenant Nelson, of the Navy, a native of Kentucky, and at present a General in the volunteer army of the United States; largely through the activity of a few private gentlemen, a large portion of the Home Guard, and a considerable number of private citizens in addition, were furnished with arms by the General Government. These arms were brought into Kentucky, during the spring and summer of 1861. As soon as the secessionists discovered that they were being brought in, attempts were every-where made by them to prevent it. The wildest clamor was raised; threats of violence were openly made; committees of vigilance claimed and exercised the right of inspecting depots and burden trains; bridges were set on fire, and in two instances, (one at Cynthiana and the other at Paris,) men who were guarding them were murdered; riots were attempted to be raised whenever it was known arms were being transported. The coming of these arms to Kentucky was the event which would decide the fate of the State before the summer of that year was passed. This the leading secessionists understood at the time, because, as the event proved, all the necessary arrangements were already made for the inva-

sion of the State after the August election, if in that election the secession party should be finally overthrown; and there was a vast difference between conquering a people, whether it was ready or not ready for the attack. Very few, perhaps none of the loyal men of the State, fully understood at that time the whole importance of what they were doing, for it was only after the *famous Scott dinner, on the 17th of August, 1861*, that the final and secret purpose of the conspirators was fully discovered. But the whole loyal population of the State already knew they must at last fight, or be enslaved, and they both desired and resolved to have better arms. The attempt to drive them from their purpose, first by menace and then by open violence, was met by that calm and intrepid front which finally saved the State, after more than two years of violence. Armed squads of loyal men, more or less numerous, sometimes two or three platoons, sometimes a full company, were always ready to receive and escort the arms that had been ordered. They needed to be the most desperate of mankind, or to be armed in the noblest of all causes, who ventured to obstruct the work these men set out to do. But, what was better even than the arms they so much needed, was the open avowal of the General Government, somewhat tardily made, that it recognized its obligation to stand by all, everywhere, who were faithful to the country; and in particular its assurance to the people of Kentucky that they should not be swallowed up by a traitorous conspiracy and invasion, without having a fair chance of defending ourselves. To crown the whole series of defensive arrangements, and impart vigor and unity to the entire system of protection, *Union Clubs* had been rapidly organized by a concerted movement throughout the State. By their aid about 50,000 loyal men were organized to a certain extent, and placed in a position of mutual concert. As a political force, these associations seemed to be indispensable against combinations which assailed Kentucky without ceasing, and under continually varying aspects, but ever with the same fatal design, and sustained under all circumstances by the whole influence of the revolted States. As the nucleus of a sudden military rising, in

the nature of a levy *en masse*, of the loyal population of the State, they offered the means of encountering the first shock of such an attack as had desolated Missouri; a general rising, namely, of the disloyal people of the State in concert with a powerful invasion by Confederate States.

4. We have now completed, up to a certain point and period, the general view we desired to give of the state of affairs in Kentucky, and the relations of those affairs, on the one hand to the general treason which broke out in civil war in the autumn of 1860, and their relations, on the other hand, to the national movements for the suppression of the traitorous revolt. The period and event at which we have arrived, are the general election in Kentucky, on the first Monday of August, 1861. On the 20th of the preceding June, six weeks earlier, there had been an election for the members of Congress from Kentucky. The total overthrow of the disloyal party in that State, proved, beyond mistake, by three immediately preceding general elections, was made complete, as it would have been accepted as final by patriotic men, by these last elections. By one of them, nine out of ten of the members returned to Congress, were loyal to the country; by the other, at least three-fourths of the members of each branch of the State Legislature were taken from the loyal party. In both cases the aggregate popular majority was very great; in both the tendency of opinion was in the same direction; loyal Representatives supplanting disloyal ones; decidedly loyal ones superseding such as had been weak or irresolute. And when those elections come to be repeated, in August, 1863, it will probably be found that Kentucky has very little sympathy with those untimely and ungracious scruples which seem to be the only contribution which a numerous class of public men are ever able to make, either to their own fame, or to the glory of their country. Having triumphed signally in a common cause, the good old State will hardly appreciate the value of chronic apprehensions, that they who saved her and all she had, may finally wrong or insult her, concerning some small part of the immense possession. She never expected unanimity at the North any more than at the South,

or in her own bosom ; nor did she ever have an idea of taking up arms either to suppress or to defend speculative opinions of any sort whatever. Least of all will she ever be induced to show even bad manners, or bad temper, much less bad principles, in groundless and painstaking distrust of heroic comrades, who have not only trusted and honored her, but have made her very name historic to eternal ages, by their great deeds wrought upon her soil, and in her defense. They who survive have taken her heart away with them ; the life-blood of those who fell in her cause has made her whole land sacred, and she will teach her children to honor every spot where the dust of even a nameless hero rests. No, no : let our public men be done with all unworthy cavils. The American people will never betray Kentucky. And though Kentucky has less than she once had, whereof she might boast, and has no heart now to boast of anything ; she may lift the veil from every loyal bosom in all her wide domain, and he who reads there the record of a quenchless love, and a loyalty so true that it counted all other things but dung, will read also lines of unutterable woe, endured unto the bitterness of death. She has done what she could : and oh ! at what cost ! God forbid, that after offering to sacrifice upon the altar of her duty, the third part of her children, who were dearer to her than her life, she should now be made infamous forever, by false pretexts, and base alarms and murmurings, and ignoble cavilings for nought !

ART. V.—*In Memoriam.*

A Tribute to the Rev. Stuart Robinson : With Notices of the Rev. J. M. Worrall, the Rev. T. A. Hoyt, the Rev. R. L. Breck, and some others.

"THE DANVILLE REVIEW.—Godly and loyal persons who fear the Lord and love their country, every-where, but especially in the West—and of all religious persuasions, but especially Presbyterians—

are requested to consider carefully the statements which follow, and afterward do what shall seem to them good.

"About a year ago a certain number of ministers, of whom I was one, founded the Danville Quarterly Review, four quarterly numbers of which, making a yearly volume, have been issued. It is to prevent the destruction of the work that this appeal is made—a destruction such as could happen only by means that would justify such an appeal as this.

"Before the first number of the work was issued, the Rev. Messrs. Stuart Robinson, Thos. A. Hoyt, and John H. Rice withdrew from our Association, of which they were members, because they understood the majority of its members desired me to advocate in its pages the loyal principles of my Discourse of the 4th of January, 1861—that is, because they were secessionists. At a much later period the Rev. R. L. Breck withdrew from the Association, because the majority of its members besought him not to publish in the Review the political article which he has since published in pamphlet form, and which—as was feared before we had full knowledge of its contents—it was impossible for any loyal man even to appear to endorse. Still later, and in succession, the Rev. Dr. R. W. Landis and the Rev. Prof. James Matthews went into the army of the United States as chaplains, and the Rev. Dr. J. T. Smith removed from the West to Baltimore. Finally, Richard H. Collins, Esq., the publisher of the Review and the owner of an extensive but unqualified property in it—who, if not a secessionist, is much misunderstood—having first notified the Association of his inability and his unwillingness to carry it on upon the terms of his contract with us, refuses to allow us the use of our own mail book, except upon terms which are wholly inadmissible. The Rev. J. M. Worrall approves of his conduct, as he did of Mr. Breck's. What remains is, that the Rev. Drs. E. P. Humphrey and S. Yerkes, together with Prof. J. Cooper and myself, aided by Dr. Landis and Prof. Matthews—as their duties in the army permit—must start the work anew, or it must be discontinued.

"In the present state of the country—and I may add, of the minds of men in the region to which the Review particularly appertains, touching a multitude of subjects of the greatest importance—it seems to me its destruction, especially by the means that have been resorted to, is both a calamity and a wrong, which loyal Christian people will not hesitate to defeat.

"The insuperable difficulty is the suppression of our mail book, for we had subscribers enough to sustain the publication, and enough

money was paid by them within the year to have covered all proper expenses. The object of this appeal is to secure the names of a certain number of subscribers immediately, whether of those who have already taken the work or of new patrons. And so great is my confidence in the loyalty of my countrymen, in their approval of the past course of this Review, and in their love of upright conduct, and so little am I either inclined or accustomed to be baffled in important matters deliberately undertaken, by such conduct as I have described, that I have become personally responsible for the expense of continuing the work, under the conviction that a sufficient number of patrons would be ready as soon as the next number can be issued, which I hope will be by the end of March.

"The subscription price is \$3.00 per annum; \$2.50 if paid strictly in advance; \$2.00, when a club of five numbers is paid for strictly in advance. Every one friendly to the enterprise is requested to obtain subscribers, and remit by mail their names and address, with money current where received, to the Rev. Prof. Jacob Cooper at this place. Exchanges, and works sent to be noticed, must be directed hereafter to Danville, Ky.

"Whoever will consider the state of public affairs in Kentucky a year ago, will hardly need any explanation of the mistakes which loyal men were liable to commit in organizing our Association and starting our Review. And perhaps, those who bear in mind the present state of affairs in this region, and the perils of all kinds through which the favorable change has been wrought, will hardly agree that any instrument, or any man, used in any degree by God in producing that change, shall be, just yet, ignominiously put out of the way, in the interest of the most flagitious conspiracy that ever assailed human society. If in these things I am mistaken, I desire at least that all who feel any interest in the matter should understand by what means this enterprise failed, and how thorough was my conviction that the failure ought to have been prevented.

"RO. J. BRECKINRIDGE.

"*Danville, Ky., Feb. 26, 1862.*"

"DR. BRECKINRIDGE AND THE DANVILLE REVIEW AGAIN.—In the Journal of Wednesday (5th), Dr. R. J. Breckinridge publishes a singular sensation advertisement of the wants of the Danville Review, from which it appears that, after a final quarrel with his publisher, preceded by three distinct quarrels, during the single year, with five out of the original eleven of Dr. B.'s associates, the Review is natu-

rally in a dying condition. The public will surely suspect that in such a series of quarrels, with parties so various in character, and all occupying a large place in the affection and confidence of Christian people, there may possibly have been some wrong even on the part of Dr. B. himself, notwithstanding his reputation for piety, profound wisdom, and philosophic evenness of temper.

"Now, granting the right of all literary enterprises to "drum" according to the adventurer's taste, no one will deny that it is of questionable taste, to say nothing more, for a venerable Professor of Theology, set to train and model the rising Ministry of the Church, to attempt the art by the rather unmanly and unchristian ruse of hounding on popular passion, already half frantic with excitement, against his brethren, merely because popular prejudices are just now in a condition to be easily roused, and credulous beyond degree in a direction to suit him.

"I know nothing of the causes of quarrel with the other gentlemen. For, so far from conspiring with them, it happens that I have not spoken or written to either of them, except Mr. Hoyt, that I can remember, during the existence of the Danville Review; certainly I have had no conference with them on that subject. But so far as relates to myself, the simple statement of facts and dates will show, that Dr. B.'s charges and insinuations, all and singular of them, are wholly untrue.

"An agreement was made—not 'a year ago,' but in October, 1860, before the trying times—to establish an organ for Danville Seminary, *provided four hundred subscribers could be obtained.* In the height of the financial distress which followed the Presidential election, Dr. B., who had charge of the experiment, wrote me—in December and again in January—that one hundred and twenty subscribers had been obtained; that Mr. Collins had agreed to risk publication with less than four hundred—say two hundred subscribers; that he desired to write an article on the political crisis, which, if I pleased, I could write on the other side in response to; and urged that the work go on immediately. To all of which I responded, in effect, as well as I remember, *First*, that the enterprise, if attempted in such a crisis, must fail, and thereby damage our reputation. (The event shows I judged rightly.) *Second*, that though Mr. Collins might agree to publish, we might not be willing to undergo the labor of writing for less than the covenanted four hundred subscribers. *Third*, that as to the political article, I thought it unwise, in *casting* our work, to discuss such a subject, except in its purely religious and ecclesiastical aspects. But at the

same time, not wishing to embarrass and discourage, by my objections, those who had faith in its success, I desired to withdraw my name as one of the responsible conductors, and, as an outside friend, do all I could for the enterprise. Accordingly, I withdrew two months before their first issue, before an article had been written, and before all the covenanted number of subscribers had been obtained; and I suppose they never were obtained. Since that period, not having been invited to assist as an outside friend, I have had no concern with or about the Danville Review, except to read and pay for it. Nor, except in private conversation with friends, have I spoken or written a word about it, good, bad, or indifferent.

"As to the unworthy cry of 'secessionist,' I know of no ground for Dr. B.'s charge, except that I do not concur in Dr. B.'s despotic and intolerant spirit, nor in his Jacobinical contempt for courts' and judges' decisions, nor in his judgment of the ability and the importance of his articles, in which I have discovered few important ideas, that the Louisville Journal and other papers had not presented before, though with less of the '*vox et praeterea nihil*' in the style of doing it.

"There is, indeed, an important difference between Dr. B.'s views and my own; but one with which 'secession' has nothing to do. I have for years held, taught, and practiced the doctrine, that Ministers of the Gospel, Professors of Theology, and teachers of religion generally, have no right to use a position given by the Church, to inculcate political dogmas, either Northern or Southern. Neither I, as pastor, nor he, as professor, may take advantage of the pulpit or theological chair as a politician. The secular press is open to us as to other citizens. If that is not to his taste, Dr. B., as a gentleman of wealth, has abundant means to publish his views in serial or occasional form, without claiming the solemnity and dignity of a Theological Quarterly, and a Theological Seminary, to invest them with a fictitious solemnity.

"So important do I consider this principle, and so much have I been pained at the disregard of it by the religious journals, that I have long meditated the publication of a weekly religious paper, which should exemplify the idea in the entire exclusion of secular matters, and be devoted wholly to religious intelligence, practical religion, and the advance of the doctrine, that the confounding of the two orders, spiritual and secular, is the great bane of religion and the Church. I have hesitated, lest, not being understood, the enterprise should disturb the quiet of the Church. Dr. Breckinridge having, by his singular pronouncement, removed the last obstacle, by showing a deter-

mination to disturb and agitate the Church, at all events, I now feel free to go forward. All I ask of our brethren is, to bear in mind I have not been the disturber, nor disposed to be. And if they will extend a kind confidence and support to the enterprize for six months, I shall then be content that they decide between my views and Dr. B.'s, after practical exemplification of them, and determine which are most for the glory and power of religion.

“STUART ROBINSON.”

The former of the two foregoing cards, was published in the *Louisville Journal* of March 5th. About the same time, covering a period of ten or fifteen days, it was published very extensively in many religious and secular newspapers of the highest character, and very large circulation, in most of the loyal States. I, the author of it, as well as my honored colleagues, have the greatest reason to be thankful to the conductors of the loyal press, for giving to it a publicity, so great and so rapid. And while all of us esteem their cordial and generous appreciation of our gratuitous labors on the Review, as among the very most flattering testimonials, which this generation could have bestowed on our endeavors; I, in particular, to whom it fell by the partial confidence of these colleagues, to prepare those articles which have given so much offense to traitors, and so much satisfaction to patriots, bow my gray hairs in meek thankfulness, beneath praise far greater than I merit—before I lift them up in open scorn and defiance, alike of the menaces and the calumnies of those, whose hate and vengeance are in near proportion to their own guilt.

By means of this cordial and universal approbation of the loyal press, in great part, our success has been instant and decided. The confidence I avowed in those who loved either God, or their country, and in which I acted, has proved to be perfectly well founded. When my card was issued, our work was put to press, without a single subscriber; and the largest number of copies our publisher had previously issued, according to our information, was ordered. On the tenth day after the first publication of my card, we found ourselves

obliged to increase the number by one-half. Less than a week afterward, we had to order a second enlargement, making the whole number double the original order. And already, at the date of this paper, a few days later, we are about to order another large increase of copies. The whole of this patronage has been absolutely spontaneous. And while it covers a very large area, it is attended with many striking local circumstances—some of them interesting, I would suppose, to the authors of the ferocious attacks, which immediately followed the publication of my card. Thus, I presume, it would interest the Rev. Stuart Robinson, and the Rev. Thomas A. Hoyt, to know, that since the publication of their unscrupulous abuse of me, we have received from the congregation of each of them, many more subscribers than the old Association previously had in the whole city of Louisville. And, perhaps, it may help the Rev. J. M. Worrall to discover which side he is on, to know that our prospects in Covington brighten under his condemnation. And, possibly, it may stimulate the Rev. R. L. Breck in his researches for the faintest possible line, between loyalty and treason, to be made aware that both in the city of his late charge, New Albany, Indiana, and in that of his present charge, Maysville, Ky., a large patronage for us has suddenly sprung up. Nor can it fail to interest all four of those ministers, to know, that in the county of my birth, and life-long citizenship, (Fayette,) more subscribers were added to our list, within two weeks after the publication of all our cards, than had previously been given to it, and all other American Quarterlies united, in that county. These are but samples of all.

The public has a right to know this decided success. Moreover, it is a point in my personal defense; for it is the endorsement of the community of the conduct of myself and my colleagues, upon the case as presented to them, merely upon "*Bill and Answer*," as they say in Courts of Equity; my short card, assailed and vilified, both it and myself, in four much longer cards, by the ministers before named. The force of this defense would be immeasurably strengthened by the publication of the names of the subscribers already sent

to us, and being daily sent: by the vehement expressions leveled against all such people as my assailants, in general, and against Mr. Robinson, with double emphasis; by the words of confidence, affection, and applause, addressed to me by persons whose approbation is fame. Now, however this aspect of the matter may strike those who have assailed me, I confess the way it looks to me is, that it is the solemn and recorded verdict of that great jury of upright, courageous, and patriotic men, which we call society. I am satisfied with the verdict. And I am going to show, that the more men know about all the facts of the case, the more obliged will they be to see that I have done my duty, and that in a way that good men ought to approve—my success in the fearless and effectual discharge of it being my real offense.

Mr. Robinson has allowed himself to say, that as far as relates to him, "Dr. B.'s charges and insinuations, all and singular of them, are wholly untrue:" and he precedes this assertion by this other one, that "the simple statement of facts and dates will show," the complete untruth, proclaimed in the words first quoted. Society, as appears, does not believe Mr. Robinson, and does believe me; wherein society is right; because, omitting our relative characters for veracity—it is positively certain in this case, that all I said was true, and his assertion that it was untrue is false, and that within his own knowledge so far as anything I said or insinuated, related to him; which I will make apparent, presently. Just now, what I wish to call attention to, is the relation of my colleagues—as before the relation of the loyal public, to the issues under discussion. It is more convenient, no doubt, to separate me to myself, and damage me separately, if possible. As for a matter of that sort, not apprehending any danger in the present case, I have no temptation to evade any amount of personal responsibility Mr. Robinson and the rest desire me to assume; besides the force of invincible habit, commencing before my recollection, of being rather provoked than frightened by insolence. But it is due to all concerned, that the whole state of the case should be known—whereby the accusation of falsehood, made against me, may be seen to have

just the bearing it actually has upon my colleagues; and where by the aggregate of their character for veracity added to mine, may show the relative value of these unmannerly accusations. The facts applying to this particular case, are decisive, and are as follows:

The members of the Review Association, remaining at Danville, at the period when my card was drawn up and issued, were Dr. Humphrey, Dr. Yerkes, Prof. Cooper, and myself. I had been confined to my house since the beginning of January, so that all the conferences relating to the difficulties connected with the Review, after that date, took place in my study. They were numerous, and very embarrassing; and resulted, apparently, in a general conviction among us, that our way was closed up. It is possible I would have acquiesced in this conclusion as a necessity, much as I chafed under it; but for well authenticated rumors, that "certain brethren about Louisville," under the lead of this turbulent Professor of extra holiness, were set upon plans and movements of various descriptions, against which, after the destruction of our Review, I knew of no adequate organ of defense. I therefore determined to furnish the first necessity for the continuance of the work—the money; and to make a personal appeal to the public, for the second necessity—the readers. Thereupon, I called my colleagues together—developed my ideas—made my pledge, and read my card to them. The plan was accepted and adopted; the card was carefully examined by all of us, with regard to *the exact truth of its statements*—and was published. Moreover, a limited number of manuscript copies was made, distributed among the four of us as equally as we could, and sent by those thus receiving them, to the different public journals, agreed on by us. I did not send the copy that went to Louisville. But the member of the Association who did send it, and who wrote a private letter to a personal friend there, an eminent citizen of the place, in order to secure its prompt publication, is known to every respectable person there, to be more incapable, if possible, of stating or giving currency to falsehood, than Mr. Robinson appears to be of frankly own-

ing the truth, when he risks something by so doing. I feel authorized to say, after repeated conferences, extending through the entire year 1861, with Dr. Landis, and Professor Matthews, now in the army, that they will endorse, as exactly true and fair, the statements of my card, in every particular, including specially those specially denounced as untrue by Mr. Robinson.

Here then, is the general state of the case, *a priori*, upon the face of the *Bill and Answer*, with the general facts, and the general character of the parties added. So considered, Mr. Robinson's conduct is reckless, and his statements are immoral. To these considerations, further general considerations also crushing, might be added; such as follow: *First*: That the whole tenor of his life, conduct, writings, conversations, associations, and opinions, during a year past, are utterly inexplicable, except upon the supposition that he is a secessionist—which is the specific allegation I made, all the rest depending on that. *Secondly*: That in this very card, he shrinks from plainly denying that he is a secessionist, and resorts to unworthy subterfuges and evasions; interlarding various misstatements of fact, groundless personal accusations and insinuations, and great pretensions to high spiritual aspirations, instead of honestly owning, or openly denying the simple and pregnant matter in issue. Certainly I should never think of flying into a passion, if Mr. Robinson were to charge me directly with being a Union man. Nor would I find it necessary to use nearly a column of fine print, in evading a direct answer to the charge, or a naked confession of it. Now, I ask any man to look at Mr. Robinson's card, and then at mine, and ask himself, which has the stamp of truth?

I might, well enough, let the matter drop here. But Mr. R. has made what he calls "a simple statement of facts and dates," which show, as he asserts, all my "charges and insinuations," as he calls my explicit statements, to be untrue, as to him. This "simple statement" of his is a model of bad manners, improper language, coarse insinuations, and disregard of truth. It is with regard to the last quality, chiefly, that his "facts and dates" need to be treated here. I ought

to state that the card of Mr. R., which I use, is the one printed on a previous page, and originally in the Louisville Journal of the 7th of March. How many others he printed I can not say—nor how unlike this one. One other I have seen, printed in the Cincinnati Gazette of March 8th—not a copy of this—but a different card. I shall leave it, however, under the hand of the Editor of the Gazette, whose notice of it is as deadly as the fire of our friends was upon the friends of Mr. R., *at the same moment*, in the great battle we won at Pea Ridge, in Arkansas. The Gazette commences, “If this is the best defense Dr. Robinson has to make, it is worse for him than if he had remained silent.” And it closes its appreciative criticism, by uniting Mr. Worrall’s long article with Mr. R.’s pert one, saying of both writers, “*Their defense condemns them.*” That is what I am about to show of the one printed in Louisville, the previous day.

In the first paragraph of his card he intimates that our Review had died, and that I had caused its death by three distinct quarrels during the year, which he asserts I had with five of my colleagues, and a fourth and final one with my publisher. This assertion is the only intimation I ever had, that there had been any quarrel among us at all: and I have no idea he believes there was any such thing. If, in all the business of the Review, I was not the efficient friend of the publisher, (Mr. Collins,) up to the very moment of the final inability of himself and the Review Association to settle their affairs to their mutual satisfaction, he never had one in his life. No word of unkindness ever passed between Mr. Breck and myself, or Mr. Rice and myself, or Mr. Hoyt and myself, on any subject, whatever; nor such a word ever between Mr. Worrall and myself, concerning any matter connected with the Review. Mr. Robinson expressly precludes himself from embracing my published card, as one of these alleged quarrels. As to himself, I once had intimate relations with him; I was, far more than he deserved, his friend; he gave me abundant, ungrateful, and gross cause of quarrel; but I did not quarrel, even with him. His last provocation, even, I should have preferred to pass over; but pious, wise, and honorable friends,

whom I confide in, said I could not, I must not. And now, I limit myself, here, to the same comment I did before: such conduct is reckless, such statements are immoral.

His second paragraph is merely a series of insolent and calumnious insinuations, turgid in expression, and sprinkled with a few pious words, like salt on spoiled meat. The third one contains some immaterial statements, which may or may not be true; and, of course, some impertinence. The closing sentence of it I have before quoted, and remarked on.

The fourth paragraph is the longest of the whole, and, if any distinction can be made, the most erroneous. I am ready to blush at some of its littleness, and almost to marvel at its general baseness. Take one specimen, illustrative of both aspects. I had said, "*about a year ago*" we had formed our Association. Well: our *Articles of Agreement* had the first four names signed to them not earlier than the 5th of December, 1860; and afterward eight other names were added; the last being in February, 1861. On the 20th of December, 1860, the *Agreement* for the publication of the Review was signed by Mr. Collins, and the first number was issued about the end of March, 1861. On the 26th of February, 1862, in making a general statement to cover these facts, in my card, I wrote, "*about a year ago*," etc. Was not the statement true, and fair, even if there was any importance to me in the exact dates? But this person, with the view of making "*facts and dates*" extricate him, strikes out the word "*about*" from my statement, then quotes, with inverted commas, the mutilated sentence "*one year*," then denies its truth, and bases a defense on the alleged error he had created! He substitutes the first of several meetings for conference, for the organization of the Association, which I had reported from the record of the body; then he antedates a couple of months, saying, "an agreement was made in October, 1860;" and runs off with a rigmarole about the "*trying times*" which came round *after* that "*fact and date*," surreptitiously fixed up to suit the matter he had in hand; namely, to fix up a false pretext for his withdrawing from the Association. It is unfortunate for Mr. R.'s "*facts and dates*," that I am in possession of his letter

written at the time, as well as of the written memorandum of all these proceedings, made at the time, and read to and approved by the Association long ago. He ought to have kept, at least in sight of shore, when he undertook to manufacture "facts and dates" for the destruction of a man, who, he ought to have known, was somewhat careful in the preservation of that description of materials.

It is altogether idle for Mr. R. to draw on his versatile memory for "facts and dates," and trust to his passions and his imagination to work them into a "simple statement," by means of which it may be possible to make upright men doubt whether his conduct was not most unworthy at the beginning, wicked at the end, and disloyal throughout. He reduced to writing, at the time, the reasons of his withdrawal from the Association, and sent them to me, and they are now before me. The date, of course, is fixed by the letter, January 24, 1861, and I suppose he has my reply dated the day following, which I invite him to publish, along with my previous letter of January 22d, addressed jointly to Mr. Hoyt, Mr. Rice, and himself. Mr. Robinson's letter of January 24th, from which I am about to quote, was in reply to that joint letter; Mr. Hoyt's reply to it is dated January 26th: Mr. Rice's, January 25th. Under date of the 26th of January, Dr. Hill, the editor of the Presbyterian Herald, informed me that Messrs. Robinson, Rice, and Hoyt, had all erased their names from the list of editors of the Review, and had given me their reasons by letter. The letters are noted above. It may throw light on the motives and conduct of all concerned, to add, that Dr. Hill's immediate object in writing was to ascertain whether he should proceed to insert the advertisement of the Review, after the withdrawal of so large and so important a portion of those who had bound themselves in a written covenant to establish and conduct it, and bound themselves in another written covenant with Mr. Collins as the publisher of it. Dr. Hill seemed to have doubts of the wisdom of our going any further, and in a friendly manner suggested what appeared to be the grounds of those doubts. He tells me that brethren further South are

greatly exercised about my Discourse delivered on the 4th of January—and already very widely circulated, and that the immediate effect of their displeasure would probably be loss of patronage by the Theological Seminary at Danville. He gives his opinion that Tennessee would certainly go with the South, and that if Tennessee and Virginia should secede, the secessionists would carry Kentucky, and that already they were gaining every day and rapidly in many parts of the State. Now, we have here, upon unquestionable authority, the fact of withdrawal, the date of withdrawal, the fact that the reasons of withdrawal had been given to me in letters dated that day and the two previous days, together with the posture and bearing of the revolt in the South at that time, and with regard to Kentucky, and together with the publicity and effects of my 4th of January Discourse, as all these matters appeared to a third party occupying a position which made him familiar with the state of mind both of the Louisville ministers and of the Danville ministers. I do not see that it is possible to doubt that Mr. R.'s opinions and mine were as opposite as our conduct, or that the conduct of both of us was the fruit of our opinions, or that secession was the subject-matter of division, which he thought incompatible with joint action in conducting a Review avowedly designed to be particularly free, while I thought otherwise at that time. If it is not as yet clearly proved that he intended and desired this withdrawal from the Review Association to destroy the work on the spot, he now boasts that he then knew the enterprise must fail. And it is impossible not to see that the drift of expectation ran that way. The totally erroneous statement of the facts of the case, concerning the condition of the Review at that time, which Mr. R. makes in his card, by way of false pretext for his withdrawal, incontestibly proves that he believed it would not be difficult to kill it at that moment. Faithless and ignoble toward country, colleagues, friends, and engagements, he is also faithless and ignoble toward his own former convictions.

In this fourth paragraph of his card, Mr. R. has stated *three reasons*, which, he now says, were those which induced

him to withdraw from the Association which established the Review: and in the fifth paragraph he says, he knows of no ground for my charge of secession, except his freedom from my "despotic and intolerant spirit,"—from my "jacobinical contempt of courts' and judges' decisions,"—and from my "judgment of the ability and importance" of my articles, of which he expresses his judgment that they contain few important ideas that he has not discovered better and previously expressed in the newspapers, and that their style is wordy and empty. Possibly he may find *this* article somewhat less liable to that criticism: nay, he may discern grounds for charging him, different from those he guesses. In his letter of January 24, 1861, he also gives three reasons for withdrawing. By comparing what follows with the fourth and fifth paragraphs of his card, the reader will see how the real "facts and dates" bear upon the "simple statement." The first reason assigned in the letter is, that he had never felt hopeful of success, and that the great events which had distracted the country had increased the difficulties so much as to make it inexpedient to go on, and risk the damage of failure. The second reason assigned is, that the required number of subscribers had not then been obtained. The third and chief reason, occupying nearly a page and a half, while both the others do not quite occupy a page—and which he has summed up in about four utterly false printed lines—I give in full:

"3. In reference to your proposed article on the state of the country, allow me to say that no man in Kentucky will rejoice more than I, if you will either in the Review or out of it, expose that miserable compound of Jesuitry and Black Republicanism from the Princeton Review. At the same time, I should be unwilling to have the answer made on the basis of your Discourse of the 4th of January, in a Review bearing my name on the cover as one of the responsible parties, and especially the first number of the Review, which must settle the general impressions of the public with regard to its position and spirit. It seems to me that a foot-note avowing the authorship would not counteract the impression. Nor, on the other hand, would it be expedient, in the very first number, to have another article presenting

a different side of the subject, especially in view of our third article, "No direct controversy," etc., I am not aware of holding any views on the present state of the country in special sympathy with South Carolina. Except that in the event of no Union on the Crittenden Compromise, I think Kentucky, as the next best thing, or rather as the least of evils, should go to a Southern Confederacy. I have studiously avoided becoming a partizan on the subject, or as a minister of the Gospel obtruding my views on the subject. But I can not accept your views, in so far as they look hostile to the South, or complacently upon a confederacy with Ohio."

"For these and similar reasons," he adds, that he desires to have his name stricken from the list, and, as shown by Dr. Hill's letter dated two days afterward, had then stricken his name from the advertisement, at the office of the Presbyterian Herald. This state of mind in Mr. R., decided as it appears, was of sudden growth. I have a letter of his dated nine days before the one just quoted—namely, January 15, 1861—in which he announces absence from home, sickness, and the pressure of business since his return, as accounting for some delay in attending to certain business of the Review. He then excuses himself, by reason of the pressure of his affairs, "from writing for the Review within the next sixty days." He then explains the difficulty of getting subscribers in his congregation at that time. And then he closes the letter with these words: "I trust, however, to better prospects ahead." What had happened between the 15th and 24th of January to dash all these prospects, and put such an opposite mind in Mr. R.? The answer is clear. My Discourse of January 4, 1861, had been read by him in the mean time, and my letter of January 22, 1861, laying before him the wishes of the Review Association that I would write the article which appeared in March, 1861, had been received by him. He was a secessionist, and the facts and inference, stated very briefly in my card, are strictly fair and true. And the disgraceful statements of Mr. Robinson's card in March, 1862, as compared with his statements in writing in January, 1861, are perfectly explicable when the state of the secession party in Kentucky at the two dates is recollected and

compared with each other. At the one date, Mr. R. and his comrades were in high hopes; at the other, they are in strong apprehensions. At both periods, it was no way to their disadvantage to silence the Danville Review. But how different are the pretexts alleged by the same oracle on the two occasions! "*Third*: That as to the political article, I thought it unwise in *casting* the work, to discuss such a subject, except in its purely religious and ecclesiastical aspects." This is Mr. R.'s summary on the 7th of March, 1862, of reason third and chief, as given on the 24th of January, 1861, and printed at large on a previous page! Is there on earth a rational creature capable of believing the summary to be either true or fair? Is there a gentleman or a Christian under the sun, capable of believing the original statement and the representation he makes of it near enough alike, to justify any portion of the prevarications and insolence of his published card? Is it not perfectly certain that his conduct and principles, as exhibited by his published card, are disgraceful, even as compared with his previous bad conduct and principles, which that card professes to explain and vindicate?

The last two paragraphs of the card, are devoted, *first*, to an attack upon me, on the charge that I have used the pulpit, and the chair of a Professor of Theology, "to inculcate political dogmas;" and *secondly*, to a glorification of the character, conduct, principles, and aims of the author of the card, who alleges that he has, "for years held, taught, and practiced the doctrine" that is sound and pure, though amid wide defections of others, and at great pain, and with many meditations of his own; and who now sets forth his desire and purpose to publish a weekly religious newspaper, in order to enforce that wholesome doctrine of his, whatever it may turn out to be, which the years of his holding, teaching, and living, have not advanced to his satisfaction. The connection of both these topics, and the many subdivisions of them, with the professed objects of the attack on me, is disclosed by himself, as it lay in his own mind. He says, he had been apprehensive lest his "enterprise should disturb the quiet of the Church;" which was rather an odd apprehension

in so godly a minister, in pursuit of an object not only purely godly, but by the most godly of all ways. One would think, if there was any godliness at all mixed with that "quiet of the Church," which he feared to disturb, that quiet would be confirmed by his pure doctrine: whereas, if there was no godliness in the quiet, the disturbance of it by his pure doctrine, was the very thing needed. Not so Mr. R.: but, as he says, "Dr. Breckinridge, having by his singular pronunciamiento, removed the last obstacle, by showing a determination to disturb and agitate the Church at all events, I now feel free to go forward." Here, again, the pretext is rather odd—even admitting the assertion it rests on, were as true as it is false. For if bad men will "disturb and agitate the Church at all events," that may be a very sufficient reason why *they* should be dealt with; a truth, which Mr. R. will be wise to digest inwardly. But it is a singular reason for robbing the poor Church of what little quiet might remain to her, and hardly justifies even the most eminent practitioner upon her patience, in entering systematically upon the administration of a "doctrine," whose agitating qualities have so long restrained the patentee. However silly the reasoning may be, the motive for traducing me as a help to the establishment of a newspaper, is made plain enough. Mr. Robinson having failed to strangle the Review in its birth—and being doubtful of the fatal effects of his card upon it, puts on his Sunday coat, puts a thin varnish of piety over his turbulent spirit, and his schismatical and disloyal schemes, and announces an organ. Very good. We shall see—as the old grammarians used to define concerning the principal part of speech—what this new organ of holding, teaching, and practicing—is to be—to do—and to suffer.

As to my abusing either the pulpit, or the Professor's chair "to inculcate political dogmas," I reply, that no minister or Professor ever lived, who was less amenable to such an accusation, than myself: and for the past fifteen years of my ministry, and during the whole period of my Professorship, Mr. Robinson has had ample opportunity to know, that his statement is a shameless calumny. During about thirty years that I have exercised the Gospel ministry, over a wide

area, and to an innumerable multitude of people, in the aggregate; every one who knows me, knows that I have preached the Gospel of God, to the best of my ability—and *nothing else*. And during nine yearly sessions, now nearly finished, wherein I have taught theology as a science—all men may judge of the grossness of the slander, that I have abused my office—by looking into the volumes published and widely circulated—wherein the substance and method of two parts out of three of Theology, as taught by me, are disclosed to mankind. He may pretend that his charge has not that meaning—and that what he intended was, that although I was a preacher and a teacher, I was, with habitual and shameful engagedness, a politician also. His words do not admit of such a sense—but if they did, they would be utterly false. On ordinary occasions, I have habitually avoided the excitement of party politics since I became a minister of Jesus Christ, and have abstained even from voting for years together. On the several great occasions which have vehemently pressed my country, in my day—I have openly and vigorously, as a free citizen, ranged myself on her side; and it fills me, all the more, with satisfaction, to believe that I have done her service, and won her confidence—that thereby, I extricated from shame and dishonor, a name not unknown in her history, which others, who shared it with me, rendered odious by treason. It may be admitted that the line which lies between the duties of a patriot and the duties of a Christian, is not always perfectly distinct—and, further, that in the case of ministers of the Gospel, and Professors of Theology, there ought to be a particularly careful endeavor, both to observe the distinction, and to perform both classes of duties. My country has already decided, repeatedly, and with emphasis, and I leave to posterity to ratify or annul the decision—that all my endeavors to serve her, have been directed to noble ends, by just, upright, and effective ways. And however miscreants may hoot and scoff, the case is obliged to go to posterity—for no traitor will ever truly recount how this vast and audacious conspiracy was foiled, without making mention of me: and no loyal man will ever

truly explain how the public sentiment, by which the glorious country was saved, was roused and directed, without alluding to my efforts. And the lesson will live—not for my sake, but for the sake of the immense truth it conveys, to all generations. The power, namely, of a simple citizen, under circumstances the most adverse, and with no means of influence but his character, his voice, and his pen—to become an element worthy to be noted, in a revolt, such as no government upon earth, had ever before withstood. And, now, what judgment should society render concerning a turbulent and unscrupulous ecclesiastical demagogue, whose best possible defense is, that he did nothing, when his bleeding country needed that he should do everything? What judgment concerning a coarse and ostentatious pretender to a higher spiritual enlightenment, who demands, by way of cover to his past iniquities, opportunity to expound this doctrine, which, as he boasts, he has so held for years, that it has formed the basis of his teaching, and the substance of his practice; whereby he may prove, that I have dishonored the Christian ministry, and betrayed the Gospel of God, by whatever service I have rendered to my country, when she was staggering under his “doctrine”—the treason of his comrades—and the powers of darkness, combined?

But even in this avowed endeavor to develop and enforce a higher spiritual life, he is characteristically unable to pursue a simple and sincere course. The pretense that my card determined his mind, while he was yet hesitating whether to establish a paper, has no foundation in truth. I have seen the written statement of one who was obliged to know, not only that Mr. R., (united, perhaps, with others,) was desirous of purchasing the Presbyterian Herald, but that he declared he would have an organ before the 1st of March: all this, and much more like it, not only before my card was published, but before it was even thought of by me. And the statement, whether by him, or of him, was not a casual, or a thoughtless one; but was made by him in an endeavor to purchase the paper, and was repeated as an inducement to the “Danville Brethren” to provide a purchaser for it.

Moreover, his pretense of extreme sensitiveness about the "quiet" of the Church, may be better estimated when it is known that Dr. Hill had in his editorial desk, at one time, fifteen manuscript attacks on me, which he suppressed; though I have reason to believe that Mr. R. was not the writer of any of those particular attacks—they were all written by persons sharing his views. Moreover, my advice was asked, and my answer given—and I doubt not repeated to Mr. R.—as to what should be done with him, when his Oracle was fairly at work, in the privately avowed object of attacking both the Princeton and the Danville influence. Moreover, I was again consulted concerning the way to proceed in order to defeat a project, believed to exist, and to be likely to succeed, of inducing the Louisville Presbytery, at its approaching spring meeting, to refuse to send Commissioners to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, this year: and I gave advice of the most decided kind, which I said ought to be made known to Mr. R. And it is in accordance with my way of doing things, to repeat here, that I advised that the orthodox and loyal members of the Louisville Presbytery, if overpowered by a schismatical and disloyal majority, in the way apprehended, should constitute as the Presbytery, irrespective of numbers, send Commissioners to the Assembly, and make report of the others—no matter how many—to Synod, that the traitorous schism might be frankly met at its first organized movement. And concerning the threatened Oracle, with its threatened course, at that time, I openly declared I would go to Louisville, and if I could get some place where I could be heard, I would bring the whole subject at once before the Presbyterian public, by a public attack upon the disloyal and schismatic conduct of Mr. R. Now, I can not say that these things had any effect, or were even made known to Mr. R.; but this much is certain—that the *public* tenor of his purposes, about his new organ, and quiet in the Church, and obedience to the settlement at the last Synod, is exactly the reverse of the *private* tenor of them all, as made known to me before I had any idea of publishing my card. Moreover, if Mr. R., with all his alleged scruples concerning the nature of his office,

and the power of his "doctrine," did not habitually write political, nay, editorial articles, for the Louisville Courier, until the paper was suppressed, and the owners and editors escaped arrest by flight, the public is far more misled than is common in such cases. Perhaps it was with an eye to this very state of unlucky facts, that he put into his card the following sentence, which is as pregnant, as it seems inconsistent with all the rest he says on the subject: "*The secular press is open to us as to other citizens.*" Mr. Haldeman, and perhaps some others, may not at present consider it quite as wholesome doctrine as Mr. R. does, that while it is desperately wicked for a minister to be loyal openly, and take the risk of it, to be disloyal anonymously, at the peril of other people, is the very doctrine to be "held, taught, and practiced," by ministers and Professors of Theology, more especially through the secular press.

I have already said, that the great change in the condition and prospects of the secession conspiracy in Kentucky, between the latter part of January, 1861, and the early part of March, 1862, may account for the immense difference in *reason No. 3*, for withdrawing from our Review Association, as given by Mr. R. at the two dates. The condition of the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky, as guessed at, at the former date, and as developed and ascertained at the latter date, may account for the difference in Mr. R.'s purposes, and plans, during the winter and spring of 1862, as they are understood by those who had intercourse with him in private, and as he finally develops them in a printed prospectus for a newspaper. So far as that newspaper, in its origin or object, is connected with denunciations of me, private or public, and is projected as an engine of personal injury and defamation of me, I have only to say, that if those who set out on such an enterprize imagine that either their godliness, their gain, or their influence, will be promoted thereby, I can have no personal objection to their trying the experiment. So far as the design may be to promote a disloyal schism in Kentucky; or to undermine the institutions, the doctrine, the order, the policy, or the deliverances of the Presbyterian Church in the United

States; or to advocate immature crotchets of Mr. R.; or be the vehicle of his shallow and ever varying, and ever failing projects; I, of course, do not fall into the class that can take any interest, except in the early occurrence of that fate which, alas! attends, sooner or later, men and oracles alike. The gentlemen who have associated themselves with Mr. R. in this undertaking, under circumstances so peculiar, of course must be aware, that the orthodox and loyal Presbyterians of Kentucky, are both able and resolved to have a weekly religious newspaper, in sympathy with their views; and that, by no possibility, can Mr. R. be accepted as one of its conductors, much less as its projector and chief guide. Those people will not trust the statements of Mr. R. in his prospectus; for, considering his character and past conduct, not even the addition of certain respectable names to his, makes it credible that those statements convey all the truth, or that they can be practically realized. The scheme must be viewed as an absurdity and a sham, and a delusion, if it refuses to pass as a covert preparation for schism. As for Mr. R.'s being a fit person to develop a high type of practical religion, that is simply ludicrous. The total want of all spiritual unction, was the marked defect of his ministry, even in those earlier and better days of it when his heart was so far in it, that his vigorous mental powers, and his impressive manner, made his exhibitions attractive, chiefly to those who had little piety, or none. As to his capacity to settle the boundaries of great questions of any sort, and last of all in theology, either scientific or casuistical, he has neither the acquaintance with the learning on those subjects, nor the digested possession of such information as he has picked up, nor the habits of patient thought, nor the mental refinement of a high and varied culture, which fit him for such a work, either with credit to himself, or advantage to the public. Did Mr. R. ever command permanent success, in anything? Can he do it in this matter, where every circumstance attending the attempt is a mark of condemnation—and the very qualities indispensable to the undertaking *as professed*, are absent or deficient? We shall see: perhaps in half a year; perhaps sooner than that, if

success continues to attend the Federal arms—and the conspirators in Kentucky desire peace.

For the present, I will let the matter rest here. So far as Mr. Robinson is concerned, whether I shall feel obliged to deal with him any further, will depend on the opinion I shall have of the bearing of his conduct, whether past or future, upon public interests which it is my duty to regard. His personal conduct toward me, can be no longer of any importance whatever, except as it explains his character and designs, and gives a particular, and not the most agreeable, shape, to discussions having a certain importance.

There are also other cards—and some advertisements; concerning which I reserve the question, as to what notice—beyond the few words I will add—I should take of them; or whether any at all. For obvious reasons, it was proper, if I did anything—to deal with Mr. Robinson first, and by himself. So far as any of the rest may have made statements in relation to me or my published card, similar to any made by Mr. R., and now answered by me; it is not necessary for me to consider them over again, here. What more, if anything, my duty may require me to say—will be said in due time.

The Rev. J. M. Worrall, at present of Covington, Ky., has published a column and a third, directed, so far as I am concerned, to an attempt to weaken the impression of one sentence, consisting of nine words—besides his own name and title—and asserting one fact, not denied by him—namely, his approval of the conduct of Mr. Collins toward the Review Association; and of that of Mr. Breck, which led to his withdrawing from it. It was impossible for me to avoid stating that fact in my card; because that fact, if there had been nothing else to complain of, rendered it impossible for Mr. Worrall's former associates to allow him, even if he desired it, to co-operate with them in their attempt to start the work afresh. Whether Mr. Worrall is fairly entitled to the character of a secessionist—about which the public press near him, and the general public seem to have no doubt—is perfectly immaterial to anything I said about him. Let him be what he might, his conduct could do nothing but injure us: while

all injury to us, was directly to the interest of the detestable secession conspiracy. All I have now to say about the substance of his defense is, that a large part of it confirms a great deal of what I have said concerning Mr. Robinson: that all of it that relates to the matter of Mr. Collins and Mr. Breck, is an entire perversion of the facts; and the aggregate impression of the card conclusive to the unfitness of Mr. Worrall for the Association which aimed to restore the Review.

The Rev. Thos. A. Hoyt, has published a card. He is a native of the South—removed from South Carolina to Kentucky, several years ago—and has since been the pastor of the fine congregation in Louisville, of which my only surviving brother, Dr. Wm. L. Breckinridge, was pastor during above twenty years. I regretted, sincerely, to be obliged to make public mention of his name, as the unquestionable facts demanded. I now regret still more to be obliged to say, that his card proves him to be utterly unworthy of my sympathy, for his awkward position as a South Carolina secessionist, in the pastorate of a loyal Kentucky Church. His card is a gross and malicious personal attack, based on, apparently intentional perversions of my meaning, and full of mean and unmanly misrepresentations of my motives. Except his charges, to which I allude at the close of this paper, it needs only, for the present, to say in general, that terribly as *Southern Chivalry* has run down of late, I would not have believed that a Presbyterian minister, whom I considered a gentleman, would—under any provocation—much less with almost none that was just—have put his name to a publication so completely disgraceful.

The Rev. Robert L. Breck has also published a long card, of which it is possible I may be obliged, hereafter, to take some notice. He is a native of Kentucky: his venerable father is a man I have loved from my early boyhood: his maternal ancestors and kindred, and my people, have been hereditary friends always: and he will not say, that, except in one sentence in my published card, which he distorts, he ever received from me, anything but proofs of respect and affection. These are things which I can not wholly forget.

If, in such circumstances, he can be satisfied with the course he has adopted, and the things he has allowed himself to say, and to insinuate, concerning me; I feel strong enough, alike in the rectitude of my conduct, the purity of my intentions, and the power of a character established through a life of more than sixty years; not only to give full space for his attack to work me all the harm it can—but to testify in his behalf, that neither the men with whom he is co-operating, nor the business in which he is engaged, are worthy of his race, or his former self.

Richard H. Collins, Esq., the former publisher of the Review, appears to have procured certain statements to be made in a number of widely circulated newspapers; bearing mainly upon his alleged losses by that work—and certain proposed means, involving an implied agency in the circulation of the present work, for retrieving them. Mr. Collins is a member, and I believe an office-bearer, in the church of which Mr. Worrall is the pastor; and thus the false exposition of Mr. Collins's affairs made in Mr. Worrall's card, supplemented by Mr. Collins's published statements—make a case demanding, for the present, this slight notice. The public will therefore understand, that it is not I, but the old Review Association, that had any business difficulties with Mr. Collins; that all the members of that Association, except Mr. Worrall and Mr. Breck, have concurred in whatever acts Mr. Collins has found cause to object to; that all the members of it, now engaged in resuscitating the work, repudiate the published statements both of Mr. Worrall and Mr. Collins; and that Mr. Collins is not authorised to do any act whatever, concerning the present work, or its circulation. I would be glad to promote the pecuniary interest of Mr. Collins, in any proper way; and I desire, of course, the circulation of my own writings. But, I reiterate the statements of my card—and am ready to vindicate their exact truth and fairness—in every particular, whether of business, of politics, or of morals.

It is merely to complete the list of names mentioned in my card, that I now allude to the Rev. Dr. John H. Rice, late of Louisville, Ky. I have not heard that he has made any publication;

nor do I know that he has seen my card. My understanding is that he left Louisville, and removed into one of the seceded States, about the time that Virginia, of which State he is, I believe, a native, took up arms against the nation. So far as he is concerned, it is obvious, I could mean no more than I asserted; namely, that whatever else might concur in inducing him to withdraw from our Review Association, that act—in which he virtually united with Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt—was an expression of his political sympathies: he was a secessionist. Perhaps mankind will accept his fidelity to his convictions, as being a more reputable course than the one adopted by Mr. Hoyt, even according to his own explanation of his; and certainly any course that has the smallest element of truth or manhood, is wronged by being compared with that of Mr. Robinson.

The tribunal of public opinion is the one to which all matters of the sort involved in these discussions, must come at last. But in all cases of much extent or importance, there are points which are susceptible of decision by other tribunals: and these collateral decisions of other tribunals, sometimes important of themselves, become elements of the final judgment of society. Among my various and heavy responsibilities in the present case, one is to a tribunal singularly illustrious. I hold my office of Professor in the Theological Seminary at Danville, during the pleasure of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. I was elected to it, by that august Court of the Church of the living God, nine years ago, come May next. I am publicly accused with abusing that high office, in what I have done to maintain the integrity of the nation, the sovereignty and loyalty of my native State, and the decrees of the General Assembly of my Church, and of the particular Synod and Presbytery to which I am amenable. That is, in my endeavors to uphold every civil and every ecclesiastical authority to which I am accountable, I am publicly and insultingly upbraided by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt, Presbyterian ministers in regular standing, with having abused and degraded the pulpit and the professor's chair. To this Mr. Hoyt has

added the direct charge—and Mr. Robinson seems to imply it, that the substance, the manner, and the form of what I have done in the premises, amounts to such use of the sacred funds of the School of Theology in which I occupy a chair, as to be a wicked perversion of them, for wicked ends—destructive of the peace of the Churches that contributed those funds, for a noble and perpetual charity: funds, that is, which, with great and completely gratuitous labors, through many years, I have, in connection with a few friends, been one of the chief instruments in so founding, collecting, and enlarging—that they now exceed, by many thousands of dollars, the aggregate of all that was ever bestowed on the institution. These are charges which I can not allow to pass by, without a more serious notice, than any that can be taken of them through the public press. No matter what gloss may be put on them, they are charges, the bare colorable suspicion of whose propriety, ought to deprive me of my office of teacher of the teacher's of God's people; and in the absence of even any colorable suspicion of their justice or propriety—he who basely and cruelly utters them, ought to be held to be a ruffian and a barbarian.

Upon this issue I shall put myself at the bar of the great tribunal of my whole Church, which of its own motion called me to my office, and whose good pleasure is the tenure by which I hold it. And I shall ask that illustrious Court, convened in the name, and by the authority of the Lord of lords, to do unto me, and unto my accusers, as they will answer to God in the great day. And that no obstacle I can remove, may stand in the way either of a full ability or a clear necessity, to meet the issue and decide it; I shall place the resignation of my office, with a brief memorial to the effect of this statement, in the hands of the Moderator of the Assembly, as soon as may be proper after it shall be constituted, at its immediately approaching sessions. Let my accusers take heed to this notice. And let God's people discern, by this case, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience.

R. J. B.

DANVILLE, KY., March 22, 1862.

ART. VI.—Jurisprudence, Sacred and Civil.—*The published Criticisms on some of the Principles heretofore discussed in the Danville Quarterly Review.*

In the September number of this Review for last year, appeared an article on the action of the General Assembly on the famous Spring resolutions; the probable consequences in general of that action; and the use made of it to divide the Church. The article attracted the attention of the weekly religious press, and extracts from it, accompanied by editorial comments more or less extended, were made by all the Old School papers which the United States' mail brought to our hand, with one exception. In several instances these extracts were quite copious. The interests and principles involved, are of such magnitude and importance as to justify, in our judgment, a notice of some of these editorial comments, and a re-statement of the views maintained in that article. The same would have been submitted to the public in the December No., had it not been for difficulties connected with the publication of the Review, and of which its readers have been advised.

The exception referred to above, is the Presbyterian Herald. That paper, in a brief announcement of the contents of the Review for September, took occasion simply to express its judgment, characterizing the review of the action of the Assembly as wanting in ability, false in its conclusions, and as "giving up the whole point in dispute." As the remarks of the Herald were intended, of course, to do good, it will not be disagreeable to their author to have them repeated on these pages.

"The one (article) on the General Assembly, we think, will disappoint the expectations of the readers of the *Review* generally. It was expected that an able and searching review of the action of the Assembly would emanate from Danville, going to the bottom of the questions at issue and showing that the Spring resolutions were based upon wrong views of the province of the Church. This the *Reviewer* has not done. He gives up the whole point in dispute, admits that the Assembly not only had the right to act in the premises, but was bound

to do so. He contends that they did not come to a correct decision, it is true, but asserts that they should have acted in a way quite as objectionable to the mass of those who opposed their action as the action which they did take. The true point of complaint against their action was not in the nature of it, but that they acted at all on such a subject."

Alas! we are doomed to disappointment. A child of sin must needs be a child of sorrow. The Herald was looking for "an able and searching review of the action of the Assembly," but looked in vain. It is amusing to observe what the Herald would have considered "able and searching"—"going to the bottom of the questions at issue." Had the article attempted to show "that the Spring resolutions were based upon wrong views of the province of the Church," i. e., according to the standard adopted by the Herald—all would have been well; but because, forsooth, it places the unconstitutionality of the Assembly's action upon a different ground from that taken by Dr. Hodge and the other protestors at Philadelphia, it is shallow, and "gives up the whole point in dispute." Profound logic! "*able and searching*," "*going to the bottom*." Assume the unquestionable truth of a proposition, make that the infallible standard of judgment, and then decry every counter-proposition as weak and giving up the point! There may, indeed, be no great depth in our September article. It may present a sorry contrast by the side of the masterly disquisitions and the brilliant illustrations of great truths, which, from time to time, grace the columns of our cotemporary; still, we think it was not fairly dealt by. A contemptuous sneer and a begging of the question may impose upon the prejudiced and unthinking, but will hardly pass either for decent manners or sound reasoning with sensible persons.

But really if the said article is the weakling the Herald pretends, why did it not expose its weaknesses? Why did it not point out its follies and fallacies? Surely the subject is an important one, and the discussion of it timely. The position taken in the Danville Review, upon which the unconstitutionality of the resolution of the Assembly is predicated, has been presented, so far as we are informed, in no other

periodical; and however weak in itself, the Review might naturally be supposed to impart currency, if not credit, to it. The Presbyterian Herald, therefore, might well have condescended to notice what some few at least have the temerity to dignify with the name of argument. An ounce of proof is worth a whole cart-load of authoritative *dicta*. All the more was the Herald bound, as a reputable Kentucky journal, to point out the insufficiency of our constitutional objection to the action of the Assembly, inasmuch as just about the time the September number of the Danville Review was published, the Presbytery of West Lexington, implicitly discarding the doctrine, asserted by the protesters and endorsed by the Herald, did, by a unanimous vote, declare the Assembly to be in error as to the fundamental principles upon which the objectionable parts of their deliverance rested, *upon the very ground maintained by "the Reviewer."* In proof of this assertion, and for the information and satisfaction of the reader, the second of the series of resolutions passed by the Presbytery is transcribed.

"2. But more than this; it is our deliberate judgment that the General Assembly was in error, as to the fundamental principles upon which the objectionable parts of the deliverance alluded to above rested for their support. It is undoubtedly certain, that the Assembly had no authority, either from Christ or from the Constitution of the Church, to require, or even advise, the tens of thousands of Presbyterians who are citizens of the States which had seceded from the United States, and are at war with them, to revolt against the actual governments under which they live; nor should it, under the pretext of a general fast, have required them to perform acts, which the Assembly could not fail to know, would subject them to criminal prosecutions, and in the present condition of things, probably destroy the Presbyterian Church throughout considerable portions of at least ten States. This aspect of the matter seems to us perfectly conclusive, even upon the admission that the subject matter of the minute of the Assembly was clearly within the jurisdiction of the court, and even upon the further admission that it was wise and proper for the Assembly to take action upon it at that time. The objection we make is that the particular view taken, and the general order given, and the fundamental principles on which all rested, were

erroneous and destructive. The Assembly ought, by no means, to have taken any action that necessarily involved the idea that it required any members of the Church, as a Christian duty, to revolt against any *actual* government under which they lived."

This is the solemn official action of a large Kentucky Presbytery. The man who drew that resolution is not unknown to fame—a foeman unworthy of no man's steel. Even the Herald might have deigned to enter the lists with *him*. He is "able and searching." Yet even he, "able and searching" though he be, and noted for "going to the bottom," and his able coadjutors of the West Lexington Presbytery, arrive at the same conclusion with "the Reviewer" touching the fundamental principle on which the deliverance of the Assembly ought to be impugned. The Churches of West Lexington Presbytery must have been disappointed too, as well as the readers of this Review, for nothing better "emanated" from that quarter than "from Danville." Aye, and the readers of the Presbyterian Herald have been disappointed, and that for many months past. Nay, more; their indignation has been aroused, and their voice will not be stifled much longer. They believe that allegiance to the civil and ecclesiastical authorities is a religious duty, and that silence is moral treason when a wicked effort is made to subvert them. They believe it is the duty of all men, and especially the conductors of religious journals, to give an open and cordial support to the powers of Church and State. The loyal Presbyterians of Kentucky do not intend to tolerate anything short of this. They do not intend to become partakers of other men's sins by a sinful acquiescence in what they conscientiously believe to be wrong. They *will* have a paper that utters a clear and constant testimony in behalf of the old Church and the old State. They are not to be scared by the stale outcry of wishing to unite Church and State; nor to be duped by the pious pretext of keeping politics and religion distinct. They have not yet to learn to distinguish between the schemes and measures of parties, and the religious obligation of fidelity to the Government itself. They do not desire or permit their religious newspaper to join in the hue-and-cry of bank or no

bank, tariff or no tariff, Pacific railroad or no Pacific railroad; but they do demand one that shall teach boldly the duty—a great duty imposed of God—of upholding the National Government, whose existence is imperiled, and which they believe ought to be preserved. They demand a paper that will manfully oppose all efforts, whether open or covert, to divide the Church, or to alienate them and their children from it. Loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the Church is a part of their religion, and a *positively* loyal paper they will have. They would like the Presbyterian Herald to be that paper.

But not only did the West Lexington Presbytery ratify the doctrine of the Danville Review as to the true ground of opposition to the deliverance of the Assembly, the Synod of Kentucky did the same. The number of the Herald containing the unfair and indecorous notice already quoted, came to hand during the sessions of the last meeting of the Synod. That very day, and by a vote closely approximating unanimity, the Synod passed the following resolution :

“This Synod deeply regrets that part of the action of the last General Assembly touching the order for a day of general prayer, which was liable to be construed and was construed into a requisition on all the members, and office-bearers of the Church, living in the numerous States which had seceded from the United States, and were in a state of war with them, as bound by Christian duty and by the authority of the Church, to disregard the hostile governments which had been established over them, and in defiance of the actual authority of these governments, pray for their overthrow. In the judgment of a large minority of the Assembly, and of multitudes in the Church, the subject-matter of the action of the Assembly in the premises, being purely political, was incompetent to a spiritual court. Undoubtedly it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require, or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments—in the manner, and under the circumstances which existed; and still further, it was neither wise nor discreet for the Assembly of the whole Church to disregard, in its action, the difficulties and dangers, which rendered it impossible for large portions of the Church to obey its order, without being liable to the highest penalties. The action of the Assembly, being exhausted by the occurrence of the

day of prayer recommended—and no ulterior proceedings under the order of the Assembly being contemplated—this Synod contents itself with this expression of its grave disapprobation of this action of the General Assembly, which the Synod judges to be repugnant to the word of God, as that word is expounded in our Confession of Faith.”

So the Synod of Kentucky is in the same category with the West Lexington Presbytery and the Danville Review. It does *not* adopt the theory of the protesters. It alludes to it indeed as “the judgment of a large minority of the Assembly, and of multitudes in the Church,” but expresses its own judgment in these words: “Undoubtedly, it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require, or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments.” Alas for the Synod of Kentucky! It once had some reputation for ability, but its glory has departed! Its deliverances may no longer be characterized as “*able and searching*,” but as deficient in *profundity*—not “*going to the bottom*.” Ought not the Presbyterian Herald to expose its shallowness? Surely, no work is more becoming a high-toned journal than the discussion of a principle that is alleged “to go to the bottom of the great questions at issue”—alleged not only by an anonymous writer in a Review, but also by high ecclesiastical courts. The Herald says, “The true point of complaint against their (the Assembly’s) action was not in the nature of it, but that they acted at all on such a subject.” The Presbytery of West Lexington and the Synod of Kentucky say, the true point of complaint is in the *nature* of their action.

The unfairness of the Herald’s notice is evinced in the following remark: “He gives up the whole point in dispute, admits that the Assembly not only had the right to act in the premises, but was bound to do so.” Now, the legitimate inference from this is, that the writer in the Review held that the Assembly had the right and was bound to decide *in these* the question of allegiance as between the Federal Government and that of the Confederate States. On the contrary, he denied the right of the Assembly, under the circumstances, to make a deliverance on that question. What he did affirm

the Assembly had a right to do in the premises, and was imperatively required to do, was to issue a Pastoral Letter to the Churches and people, expounding the law of God as the rule of duty by which all men ought to govern their conduct in the terrible crisis. We quote the *ipsissima verba*; Dan. Quar. Rev., p. 515, 1861:

"Appreciating the actual posture of affairs in the country, and resolutely resisting pressure from the world without, the Assembly ought to have issued a pastoral letter to the Churches, rivaling in dignity, piety, and wisdom, that of their illustrious predecessors of the old Synod. A day of prayer should have been appointed—to the end that, among other things, all might receive from on high the wisdom profitable to direct in a crisis so full of hazard: the law of God should have been faithfully expounded in its application to the case in hand, without fear, favor, or partiality; the distinction between the relation of the Church to the civil power, and that of her members, *as citizens*, should have been clearly presented; the people of God should have been warned of the duty of submission to the higher powers, 'not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake;' the limits of the right of revolution should have been carefully pointed out, and the people besought to keep a good conscience therein; and great circumspection, moderation, forbearance, and brotherly love, should have been enjoined upon all."

This was our position then, and is still, and of this the Herald asserts that it would have proved "quite as objectionable to the mass of those who opposed their (the Assembly's) action as the action which they did take." It might have been so; but we trow not—not in Kentucky certainly. Would any man who did not cherish rebellion in his heart, with a determination to carry it out at all hazards—the law of God to the contrary notwithstanding—have objected to a pastoral letter of that stamp? Or does it transcend the authority of the General Assembly to teach mankind their duties as laid down in the word of God, and exhort them to the performance thereof? Or must the truth be withheld at the very moment it is most needed and most pertinent, because, forsooth, it might not be palatable in some quarters? We have not so learned Presbyterianism. If the General Assembly

may not commend the Colonization Society, has it come to this, that it may not teach the truth of God and execute his will? This is *high-church* Presbyterianism with a vengeance; so ethereal that it disdains to intermeddle with sublunary relations at all.

Recurring to the want of fairness exhibited in the Herald's notice of our previous article, we add what might, perhaps, be considered worse than unfair, were all the facts known by the public.

In the Presbyterian Herald for December 5, 1861, appeared an editorial of nearly two columns and a half, with this heading, "*Rev. Dr. Bullock in the Papers.*" After some remarks on the obligation to observe days of fasting and thanksgiving appointed by the *civil power*—the spirit of which, by the way, needs to be modified a good deal so as to accord with Chap. XIV of the Directory for Worship, the writer adds:

"The truth is, the civil appointment of Thanksgiving and Fasts, in its origin in our country, is an off-shoot of the New England Erastianism, which sought to remedy the evils of "Church and State," by the institution of "State and Church." And perhaps no other one cause has done more to bring us into our present troubles than the institution of two days in the year—a Feast and a Fast day, on which the clergy may have a clear field, with no Sabbath-day restraints, to "put through" the politicians and the Government. The thing is an exotic in the more Southern States, and indeed in the Presbyterian Church. Our people, however, have accepted the Thanksgiving-day as an agreeable arrangement, some for the sake of the social enjoyment—others, of the *bluer* stripe, as a good substitute for the Episcopal and Roman Catholic Christmas—others for other reasons. But none of the true Presbyterian sort have ever accepted it on the ground of an appointment of civil government, and *as by authority*, which it would be "impious audacity" and "treason" to fail in the observance of. We hope, therefore, that due allowance will be made for Dr. Bullock's want of Yankee raising."

We regretted to read this. The pious people of Kentucky accepted with gratitude to God the annual appointment of a day of thanksgiving by their Governor, as a step in the right direction. They did not stop to inquire into its origin, or to

ask, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" They went up to the house of God at the summons of their chief magistrate, with gladness of heart, to render thanks to their Preserver and Bountiful Benefactor. Moreover, Presbyterians knew it to be in harmony with the teaching of their standards. They had been taught that "if at any time the civil power should think it proper to appoint a fast or thanksgiving, it is the duty of the ministers and people of our communion, as we live under a Christian government, to pay all due respect to the same." It was a pity and a wrong, therefore, to attempt to discredit the day by attributing its origin to New England Erastianism. If the thing is right in itself, in accordance with the word of God, let us hold fast to it, no matter in what part of the land it was first observed. Least of all should anything be done to lessen a general and devout observance of the day, by an appeal to the unworthy prejudices of men, intensified now as never before. There are facts, however, connected with the original appointment of Thanksgiving-day in Kentucky, which ought to be known, and which may go far toward disarming the prejudices that might be engendered or quickened by this unwise editorial. Its immediate paternity among us is of unsullied purity; not a taint of New England Erastianism about it; not a smell of the *Yankee*, either dead or alive. If "the thing is an exotic," it was introduced through the influence of one who hails from a more distant land than New England; one who hates Erastianism with a perfect hatred; one whose proclivities and likings are known to be intensely Southern, and intensely Presbyterian; and who, if he ever entertained any partialities for despised Yankeedom, must have undergone a complete metamorphosis. In a word, we are indebted for Thanksgiving in Kentucky to one of the ablest and most distinguished of the present ministers of our Synod; a man who is supposed to consider well the ground he takes, and to be able to maintain it with irresistible *logic*. We are informed by a venerable ex-governor, that his predecessor, the late Governor Letcher, issued the first proclamation for a day of Thanksgiving. We are informed by another venerable man, that he has

frequently heard the distinguished minister referred to, claim that it was he who induced Gov. Letcher, (then a member of his congregation in Frankfort,) to issue that first proclamation, and that he himself drafted it for the Governor: and further, that the distinguished minister aforesaid congratulated himself on having inserted in the proclamation a reference to the Mediator. Such are the facts.

We have always rejoiced to find in these gubernatorial proclamations a recognition of the Divine Mediator; for we know of no other way of acceptable approach to the Great God, even when we desire only to offer thanks for his preserving care and providential benefits. The Lord Jesus Christ, the anointed Saviour, is King of kings and Lord of lords, and Governor among the nations. He is head over all things to the Church. By him "kings reign and princes decree justice." It is meet, therefore, in issuing such proclamations, to direct attention to the Mediator. Yet at least one able Christian author would seem to be of a different opinion. For if it be true, that "the rule for the guidance of the civil power in its exercise, is the light of nature and reason, the law which the Author of nature reveals through reason to man;" and if this calling upon the people by the Governor, to render thanks to God, be a legitimate exercise of the civil power, as the language of our standards plainly implies, then we do not see the propriety of referring to the Mediator. "The light of nature and reason" reveals no Mediator. (See Robinson's Church of God, p. 85.)

It may appear to some that a brief notice, though uncourteous and unfair, does not require these extended remarks—particularly at this late day. But those who will carefully consider what has now been written, as well as what will be found in the sequel; and who have kept themselves informed of the course of events among us, for the last seven months; and who are aware of the reasons for believing movements to be on foot, whose object is to detach the Synod of Kentucky from the General Assembly, or at least to prepare the public mind for that deplorable result—such persons will take a different view of the matter. The issues growing out of the

action of the last Assembly are *living* issues still; nay, more vital and imminent in Kentucky than ever. It is to call attention to *these*, to arouse our loyal Presbyterian brethren, that we take the trouble to write this article. As to the defects of the previous article, we have no overweening sensitiveness about them. All we ask is fair play. But, let it be remembered, there are always two sides to a question. In this case, the weakness may have been in our September article—that is one side; or, the weakness may have been in the intellect of the Presbyterian Herald to appreciate its force—that is the other.

The positions taken and maintained at that time, are these:

1. It is *safe, scriptural, constitutional, and in accordance with the practice of the fathers*, for the General Assembly to decide the question of allegiance, when that question comes fairly before it in the orderly discharge of its ecclesiastical duties, and the decision of it is necessary in order to discharge those duties faithfully and fully.

2. The error of the Assembly of 1861 consisted in this, that the resolution adopted was tantamount to advising the Presbyterians of the seceded States to overthrow the governments actually established over them; or, in the language of the Synod of Kentucky, "It was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments."

3. It was constitutional, and the condition of affairs in the country required, that the Assembly should issue a Pastoral Letter of the character described above.

4. The action of the Assembly, unwise and erroneous as it may have been, furnished no sufficient justification for schismatically dividing the Church—the Constitution providing a remedy in the right of protest, adequately meeting the exigencies of the case. Such also is the deliverance of the Synod of Kentucky: "The action of the Assembly being exhausted by the occurrence of the day of prayer recommended—and no ulterior proceedings under the order of the Assembly being contemplated—this Synod contents itself with this expression of its grave disapprobation of this action of the General Assembly."

5. The schismatical and violent disruption of the Church was a foregone conclusion. The action of the Assembly was only a pretext.

We have seen as yet no reason to alter these views, though we may at no distant day. Positive notice is given to the world that a great light is to break *forthwith* upon our dark horizon. We hope to have grace to hail its rising with joy, and to profit by its genial rays. It may be the harbinger of the millennium. On the contrary, it may prove but an *ignis fatuus*; a baleful star that leads its followers to ruin; an inflammable *gas*, ignited in the murky strata of the lower atmosphere, and soon dying out over the spot where it was generated. We shall watch for it, and keep a watch on it. Not every one who prophesieth, saying, "Thus saith the Lord," is a prophet of the Lord. If the effect of the coming light be to make its followers disturbers of the peace of the Church, seeking to break up existing ecclesiastical relations and institutions, they may perhaps be regarded, so far forth, rather as "Illuminati" than truly illuminated.

It is time, however, to direct attention to the criticisms of two other religious weeklies.

The editor of the *Presbyter* had the kindness to send us a copy of his paper, criticising at some length the article in the Danville Review. His estimate of it was different from that of the Presbyterian Herald, and his strictures candid and courteous. It is not our purpose to enter into a discussion with the *Presbyter*; we desire simply to submit a remark or two on two of its statements. (1.) "The views of this article will displease both sections of the Church." Quite likely; and for that very reason, likely to be about right. In times of high excitement, with the rock on the one hand and the whirlpool on the other, "*in medio tutissimus ibis*." (2.) "The writer in the Review we regard as a pro-slavery man. His opinions are certainly not in harmony with the action of our Church." Our respected brother is mistaken. The writer is not a pro-slavery man, as he understands that term; and he sincerely believes his opinions *are* in harmony with the action of our Church. But *pro-slavery* may mean one thing in one

latitude, and quite a different thing in another. Hence the difference of opinion between the Presbyter and ourselves. Holding fast the opinions of Washington and the early fathers of our Church, on this politico-religious question, we abhor alike the doctrine of Dr. Palmer's sermon, as we interpret it, and the insane vituperation of William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips. A real and lasting peace will not be restored to our bleeding country till these antipodal opinions are crushed out by a wholesome and overpowering public sentiment. While on the one side, slavery is regarded as the "sum of human villanies," which ought to be instantly abolished; and on the other, as a beneficent institution, to be cherished, perpetuated, and extended, and made the very corner-stone of the social fabric, it is in vain to look for a cessation to angry conflict. A spirit of moderation and forbearance, and a harmonious co-operation all round, are indispensable to a successful handling of a gigantic difficulty. There can be at best but an imperfect union hereafter, unless a kindly spirit and some degree of homogeneity of sentiment on the vexed question can be brought about. The safe and honorable way for us Presbyterians at any rate, is to abide by the judicious views and practice of our Church hitherto.

But really we were not a little amused, perhaps gratified, at being called *pro-slavery*. It was a healing oil. The brethren in Danville are denounced as "Abolitionists" by Secessionists all over Kentucky. This is a chief article of their stock in trade. The institutions here are said to be "*abolitionized*," and thus it is sought "to hound on popular prejudice" against them. Now if our brethren across the river, departing from the mild and respectful manner of speech observed by the Presbyter, would *denounce* us right soundly as *pro-slavery* men, they might enable us possibly to stand up against the charge of abolitionism. Of this, however, more hereafter.

The remarks in the *New York Observer* of Oct. 10th, 1861, were read with amazement. Far be it from us to charge the writer with intentional misrepresentation; but that an acute and practiced polemic, and withal an honest one, should so misconceive and misconstrue the views of another, is passing

strange; and all the more so when he says, "we have read the article attentively," and gives an extract from page 514 of the Review, which is as far from supporting his statements and inferences as anything well can be. In attempting to correct them it is hard to tell where to begin or where to end. The whole critique is a tissue of misconception. We respectfully ask the writer to review it in the light of what follows.

The Danville Review did *not* affirm the right of the General Assembly to decide in the abstract the question of allegiance, i. e., of contested allegiance, "and to direct the citizen to the government which it is his bounden duty to obey." On the contrary, it expressly disclaimed that right. It did *not* contend that "inasmuch as the Confederate Government was in operation, and no other government had existence in the seceded States, it was the right of the Assembly to decide that citizens living there owe their allegiance to it." It did *not* hold "the shocking morality that the Church ought to inculcate the duty of its members to submit to wicked rebellion, without an effort to preserve the benign institutions which they have enjoyed, and which God gave them to preserve and transmit to their children." It did *not* maintain the childish paralogism, either directly or inferentially, "of denying the right of secession, and of admitting the right of the Assembly to decide the question of allegiance, and *then* deny its right to teach the duty of upholding the best government in the world." And it is absolutely astounding how any man of a clear head and an honest heart, who had read the article in the Review *attentively*, could allege that these propositions are advocated there.

On the other hand, the Danville Review *did* affirm the right of the Assembly to determine the question of allegiance, "when that question comes fairly before it in the orderly discharge of its ecclesiastical duties, and the decision of it is necessary in order to discharge those duties faithfully and fully," and then only not *in thesi*; or, as stated in the passage the Observer extracts, "when such a question comes fairly before it in determining the moral conduct of any within its pale." It *did* affirm the right and the duty of the Church to

teach the principles laid down in the word of God, and our standards, touching obedience to civil government, and the limits of the right of revolution. As to these principles and limitations, our views accord with those of the Observer. But just here is the point. The Church may teach these principles as general rules of duty, just as she teaches the law of God respecting theft or homicide. She may and does teach the general duty of obedience to superiors, as a religious duty, and the guilt of rebellion against them; and may judge before her tribunals those of her members who fail in that duty or incur that guilt. But it is no part of her teaching office to decide in the abstract conflicting claims of allegiance, or to declare a particular rebellion justifiable or unjustifiable. "Synods and councils are to handle or conclude nothing but that which is ecclesiastical." That decision rests, in the first instance, with each individual citizen, under all his responsibilities to his God, his country, and the Church, if a member of it. But then the Church must execute the revealed will of God within her own pale. There is a judicial as well as a teaching function attaching to her. Her members are as liable to be tried at her bar for a violation of the fifth commandment, as the sixth, or seventh. Rebellion against constituted authority is a case ecclesiastic, as well as civil, as soon as it becomes concrete in the person of a member of the Church. The Bible has nothing to say about railroads, or the most judicious methods of treating the ills that flesh is heir to, but it has much to say about the duty of obedience to civil power; and our standards assert that God, on Sinai, out of the midst of devouring fire, gave as one of his eternal laws of rectitude a commandment, which, by good and necessary inference, settles that question irreversibly and forever. "A Christian congregation," it is said, "would be shocked, if their pastor should preach a sermon on the importance of the Pacific Railroad." (Our Country and the Church: by N. L. Rice, D. D.) Very true; but in the name of all that is august and sacred in the principles of immutable morality, are illustrations drawn from railroads and the scientific treatment of disease, whether by

steam or calomel, to settle the question of the Church's authority to decide a case made and brought before her bar; as to the right and wrong of which God has spoken in a voice of thunder? It is sheer folly to talk here of "intermeddling with civil affairs which concern the Commonwealth." In the manifold relations which man bears to God, to the Church, to his country, and to his fellows, some fall exclusively within the purview of the State; others exclusively within the purview of the Church; and others are of such a nature that he becomes amenable to the laws of both State and Church, when he is at the same time a citizen and a member of the household of faith. These divinely ordained powers have concurrent jurisdiction over him; the one, as his offense is related to what is civil and temporal,—the other, as it is related to what is ecclesiastic and spiritual. Each must execute its laws upon delinquents: and while the Church claims only the right to exclude from the privileges of her spiritual household for breaches of the Divine law—not pretending to determine any thing as to the immunities and obligations of men as citizens,—she does not interfere with civil affairs. Nay, more; when the same offense falls within the purview of both Church and State; the former, being a court of conscience, may be obliged to go farther than the latter actually does, or is obliged to go. The law of homicide in the State may inflict no penalty for manslaughter in the duello; the Church should excommunicate the offender. So in the matter of obedience to the civil power. The State may be satisfied if no overt act of treason is committed; the law of the Church reaches further: and were that law, as expounded in the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism, faithfully executed to-day, some eminent men would be dealt with, who now sadly need the correcting hand of discipline. The practical difficulties in the way of dealing with treason in spiritual courts, are the same in kind as attach to all questions of duty where the obligation is not absolute. To murder is always wrong; there are no conditions which can justify it. But the case is different when we come to consider the relation of parent and child, or that of the State and its citizens.

Here rights and obligations are conditional, and, at times exceedingly intricate. A child is not always bound to obey its parent; a citizen is not always bound to abide in true allegiance to the existing government. The court must use great caution and weigh well the conditions and limitations of duty in both instances; but surely no considerate man will maintain that because great, it may be, well-nigh insuperable difficulties, are in the way of reaching a just decision, therefore such cases are shut out of court altogether.

Again: the Danville Review *did* affirm that the Assembly had no right to advise its members in the seceded States to revolt against the actual governments established over them. It took issue exactly here with the Assembly. But are the perceptive faculties of the Observer so blunted as to confound this negative proposition with the assertion of the Assembly's right to decide that citizens of the seceded States, under existing circumstances, owe true allegiance to the Confederate Government? Does the converse positive proposition necessarily follow because the negative is true? A proposition and its converse may both be true, or may not; and it may happen that both are false. We utterly deny that it can be fairly inferred from any statement in our former article, that citizens of the seceded States owe allegiance to the Confederate Government, or that the Assembly had a right so to decide, or to decide that question at all in the premises. We said the Assembly had no right to *advise revolt* against actual governments, however wicked, or however wickedly established. If the seceded States should succeed in their attempted revolution, and be recognized as one of the powers of the earth, then allegiance might become due to their government. There are countless things the members of the Church *as citizens* have a right to do, and yet the Assembly no right to advise the doing of them. Among these is the right, in certain contingencies, to rebel against a bad government; but it is no business of the Church to advise them to do it. It is a strange logical process indeed whereby this is twisted into teaching "that the Church ought to inculcate the duty of its members to submit to wicked rebellion." The Observer closes its remarks with

this noble sentiment: "If we are to perish, let us perish with the language of truth and Christian patriotism on our lips." But when the day to perish comes, we apprehend the venerable editor will perish as a citizen of the United States, and not as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ. The teaching function of the Church ends as to the matter in hand, with publishing the law of God respecting the duty of obedience to "the powers that be," as a great general truth, coupled with the admission of the right of revolution for sufficient cause. These are *divine* truths—truths settled by God himself. Obedience is due to the government under which a man lives. This is to him "the powers that be." But there may arise sufficient reasons for an attempt to overthrow it. Of this, all Christian citizens, *as such*, must judge for themselves, in the exercise of their Christian liberty. The Church has no authority to come in at this point to decide the question of allegiance. If it had, we could vote for even more emphatic resolutions than Dr. Spring's. As a citizen, a Christian citizen, we yield neither to that venerable name, nor to the editor of the New York Observer, nor to any other man, in ardent attachment to the Government of the United States, or in a profound sense of obligation to bear true allegiance to it. We hope to see its authority re-established over its rightful and imperial domain, stretching from the great lakes to the Gulf, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. We believe the Southern revolt, both in Church and State, to be without justification; that it is a wicked rebellion, inaugurated and carried over the heads of the great body of the Southern people by fraud and violence; and hope the day is nigh at hand when they will be able to subvert the revolutionary governments and return to the benign government of their fathers and ours. As a citizen we belong to that great Union party which Henry Clay predicted, and of which he declared his purpose to be a member should he be alive. But in the name of common sense, which is the best logic and metaphysics we know of, is there any contrariety between holding these opinions as a citizen of the State, and acting on them too, and at the same time holding that the Church has

no right to advise rebellion against actual governments? Many things are competent to me as a *citizen*, which are wholly incompetent to me as a constituent member of a spiritual court. Or is there any contrariety between teaching that the General Assembly, acting in the name of the Great Teacher, has the right to declare simply the fundamental principles of God's word touching obedience and rebellion, and yet no right to say to the Presbyterians of the seceded States, you ought to uphold and defend the Government of the United States? Or again, is there any between teaching that the Church has a right to judge at her bar one charged with a violation of the fifth commandment, and yet no right to decide *in thesi* the question of allegiance as between the Federal and Confederate Governments? Do any or all of the propositions maintained by us conduce to the conclusion that "when a lawful, mild and wholesome government has been for a time displaced, and one as bad as 'Nero's,' and which may prove 'permanent or not,' has been set up, that it is the duty of all men to submit to that revolution?" Is there anything in them that militates against the right of citizens to rise up instantly in rebellion against such a usurpation, when there is a reasonable prospect of success? God forbid. Let him show it who can. On a more careful scrutiny, perhaps the Observer will find its *own logic*, not *ours*, at fault.

A sentence in our September article may have been misunderstood. A word of explanation is offered here. In noting some suitable topics for a Pastoral Letter, the following one is named among others: "The law of God should have been faithfully expounded in its application to the case in hand, without fear, favor, or partiality." In writing this sentence, special reference was had to the people of the States which had not yet revolted. The rebellion, it will be remembered, was still progressing. The object to be aimed at was to call attention to the precise issue. Shall we join in a revolt against the government of the United States? Has that government failed so far in securing the prosperity of the nation, ample protection of person and property, and the largest de-

gree of personal liberty consistent with the good of the whole, as to justify its overthrow? In a word, has it so failed to answer the ends of civil government as to justify a revolution? The purpose was to bring the matter home to each individual soul as a question of religious duty; to enforce upon every one the awful responsibility resting upon *him*. Can *I*, with the law of God before my eyes, keep a good conscience and join in this rebellion? Can I answer for a part in it at the bar of God? This is what was intended by the application of the law of God to the case in hand,—bringing it to bear directly on the conscience as the rule of duty in choosing between loyalty and rebellion. This is what we have preached from the pulpit, but erred in that we did not preach it early enough; this is what ought to have been preached to every congregation in the land months and months ago. It would have been, and would be still, practical preaching well-timed. Had the standard of the Lord been lifted up in season by the ministers and office-bearers of the Churches, the incoming flood of iniquity might have been stayed. The rebellion might not have extended beyond the Cotton States. The populations of the other slave States had not been inoculated with the virus of secession, unless the tide-water region of Virginia be a partial exception. Here and there may have been a politician of the extreme Calhoun school; here and there a preacher of that complexion who had come up from a more Southern latitude, or one who by the distinguishing grace of God and the force of democratic institutions, had emerged from the lower stratum of society, and then assumed the lordly airs and principles which he foolishly supposed characterized high Southern blood; but these were mere exceptions—*rare aves*. The great body of the people were sound on the question of nationality. They had no doubt about allegiance being due primarily to the Federal Government. They had at hand no such quack plasters as the right of secession, or the prior claim of the State government to the allegiance of the citizen, wherewith to ease their consciences. What they needed was instruction, *religious* instruction, from the pulpit, the Christian press, the assemblies of

the Church. This it was the duty of the General Assembly of 1861 to give them.

Aside from the establishment of just principles on the relations of Church and State, we feel a profound and most pressing interest in all the matters discussed in the former part of this article, because of their bearing on the position and peace of the Synod of Kentucky. That the purpose to carry the Synod, or a part of it, into the Southern Assembly has been entertained, we have not the shadow of a doubt. That plans have been devised and measures initiated, looking to that end, we have as little doubt—no more than that plots have been laid and prosecuted, to carry the State into the Southern Confederacy. If the latter purpose has been abandoned at all, it is because it has been found impracticable, and because the persistent prosecution of it would involve its abettors in ruin; and so of the former. It is true the editor of the Presbyterian Herald asserted a short time since, that after *diligent search* he had found but two Presbyterians, and these private members of the Church, "who were willing to admit" that they desired the ministers and churches of Kentucky to join the Southern Assembly. But has that excellent man yet to learn that men may desire many things they are not "willing to admit;" entertain purposes they do not consider it politic to avow at once; and labor earnestly but quietly for their accomplishment till the opportune moment arrives for a public avowal and a *coup de grace*. The suspicion of no wrong doing on the part of our brethren, is a beautiful and edifying exhibition of simplicity of Christian character. Experience, however, warns us to be on our guard. Even good men may do unseemly and wicked things. Eternal vigilance is the price of political liberty, and peace is best maintained by being always prepared for war. The saints of God are exhorted to "follow after the things which make for peace;" and one of the best ways to do it, is to sound a timely warning against opening the flood-gates of strife.

Some of our reasons for believing the purpose has been entertained, and for aught known to us may be still enter-

tained, to revolutionize our Church in Kentucky, are the following:

1. It is a well-known fact that a number of our ministers sympathized so profoundly with the rebellion of the South, that they abandoned, for that reason and no other, the flocks over which they most solemnly averred they believed the Holy Ghost had made them overseers, and removed to seceded States. One of these brethren wrote back to the congregation he had forsaken in violation of his covenant "to discharge all the duties of a pastor" to them, that he would return provided Kentucky would retrieve her character by joining the rebellion. It is equally well known that other ministers, who have remained with their charges, sympathize with the belligerent movement against the Government of the United States—some avowedly, others more quietly. It is also well known that influential elders and private members of the Church have openly advocated secession. Now, can any one believe these gentlemen are not in favor of separating from the old Assembly and uniting with the one advertised to meet in Memphis this spring? Is it any mark of a suspicious nature to think they have harbored the purpose to do so? or that they have devised plans looking to that end? and that they have abandoned them, if indeed they are abandoned, because they are found impracticable? All the more are we driven to these conclusions, when we consider how important a part the ministers and churches of the South have played in urging forward and sustaining the secession scheme, and what a mighty impulse ecclesiastical secession would give to political in Kentucky. Still it is true there are brethren among us who make no strong professions of loyalty to the Union, yet repudiate utterly the idea of schism. We know of such and honor them—men of stern integrity, and loyalty to the Church.

2. The printing and circulating of a pamphlet bearing the following title: "*Address from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, to all the Churches throughout the Earth; as reported by Rev. J. H. Thornwell, D. D., from a committee appointed to prepare it, and*

unanimously adopted by the Assembly." From the cover we learn it was printed at Louisville "by private members of the Presbyterian Church;" but—and it is somewhat singular and begetteth suspicion—the name of the printer is not given. All we have to say about the merits of this surreptitiously printed Address is this: if it is the best the great logician can do in behalf of the great schism, who told the General Assembly of 1860 that his library contained all the valuable works on logic of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, his cause must be a bad one. But what was the intent in publishing it in Kentucky at the time and under the circumstances it was done? Most obviously, to prepare the minds of Presbyterians here also to separate from the Church of their fathers—to follow suit in the precipitate and outrageous schism already consummated elsewhere. This was the intent; and along with it, to forward the secession of the State. The proof of it is found in the prefatory note: "The publication" (in the Presbyterian Herald) "of the extract relating to the slavery question, apart from the statement of the chief grounds of separation which precedes it, may tend to confirm the prevalent error that it is the difference touching slavery that has caused the rending of the Church, instead of the fatal heresy of the late General Assembly, in the unscriptural assumption of power in ecclesiastical courts over civic and political questions. It is therefore perhaps the more important that the whole argument be laid before our Church members." Now if the argument is good for one latitude, it is equally so for another. If "the fatal heresy of the late General Assembly" was a sufficient reason for *their* renunciation of its authority, it is for *ours* also; for, be it noted, the Address is said to breathe the spirit of "manly Christian logic." This is perfectly manifest. But the fact is, the prefatory note misrepresents the Address. In relation to what the note calls "the fatal heresy," the Address says, "We frankly admit that the mere unconstitutionality of the proceedings of the last Assembly is not, in itself, considered a sufficient ground of separation." That is to say, the action of the Assembly was made a *pretext* for rending the Church—the very point insisted

on at the close of our previous article. And again, the prominence of the slavery question as a reason for separation, is ignored in the note, whereas the Address maintains "there is one difference which so radically and fundamentally distinguishes the North and the South, that it is becoming every day more and more apparent, that the religious, as well as the secular interests of both, will be more effectually promoted by a complete and lasting separation;" and about one-half of it is taken up in defining and supporting the modern position of Southern Christians on that question. This occurs in immediate connexion with the only strong argument for a division of the Church, in the vaunted performance. Granted the severance of the Union into two distinct and permanent nationalities, and we make no objection to two Assemblies.

We argue the same insidious and wicked intent from the fact that the Address is introduced to the public with another deceptive statement. "It was hoped that the Presbyterian Herald might find room for the entire Address in its columns, instead of a mere extract from the latter part of it." The fair construction of this sentence is that the press of matter on the columns of the Herald did not admit of the publication of the entire Address. This is the impression necessarily made on a plain and honest mind, whether sought to be made or not. Was it so? "*Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.*" A far more probable supposition, and one not without foundation, is that the editor of the Herald was not willing to assume the responsibility of publishing the whole of the precious document, when its obvious and designed effect here, if any, could only be to alienate the affections of his readers from the old Church. Hence another channel of communication with the public, whereby to regale their spiritual and intellectual appetite with a fragrant morsel "breathing so much of the spirit of Christian kindness, and of manly Christian logic." Oh, precious *logic*! LOGIC!!

Two reasons are assigned by "private members of the Presbyterian Church," for publishing the Address." (1.) "As an act of courtesy towards separated brethren." (2.) "As in itself

a true exposition of the results of the present tendency to the secularizing of the ecclesiastical courts." The invalidity of the second reason is an additional argument for our view of the real intent of the publication. The tendency alleged is *not* the present one in our highest court, unless a single rash act, in a season of unprecedented excitement and pressure, constitutes a *tendency*. Was not the Colonization Society ruled out at Indianapolis? Was not the slavery question most significantly ignored at Rochester? If there ever was such a tendency, it had been abundantly corrected; and it is well known that Dr. Thornwell himself has had no little influence in moulding the sentiment and shaping the legislation of the Church for several years past. Speaking of it in this Address, he says, "That venerable Church had always been distinguished for its conservative influence." Again, referring to slavery: "The Presbyterian Church in the United States has been enabled, by Divine grace, to pursue for the most part an eminently conservative, because a thoroughly Scriptural policy in relation to this delicate question." If the General Assembly is a fair index of the tendencies of the Church, it is not true that the "present tendency is to the secularizing of the ecclesiastical courts." To the first reason assigned for publishing the Address, the words of Laocoon—our fellow schoolmasters will indulge us in another Latin quotation—may be aptly applied:

"Aut aliquis latet error: equo ne credite, Teucri:
Quicquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentas."

3. Very serious apprehensions have been felt, and may be still, by loyal members of the Presbytery of Louisville, respecting an effort which they feared would be made at their next meeting to prevent the appointment of commissioners to the General Assembly of the current year. This, it has been supposed, was to be the entering wedge in the way of ecclesiastical action. Should it succeed, the way could soon be prepared for more positive measures. The numerical ministerial strength in other Presbyteries, on the side of the grand old Church, has prevented serious alarm there. Yet

in one of them, as we are informed, an aged minister, who is greatly belied if he is not a blatant secessionist, remarked some time since, that care should be taken to have elders of the *right stripe* elected to the Spring meeting of his Presbytery. That minister may not be "willing to admit" that he desires the Synod of Kentucky to renounce the jurisdiction of the General Assembly, but who can doubt it? Who doubts that he would strive to get his Presbytery to take that step were there a reasonable prospect of success? In Missouri, too, it appears the same purpose is entertained, and the first step in the programme the same. So writes a minister in that State to a friend in Kentucky. He inquires very anxiously, too, what the Presbyteries in Kentucky will do. This confirms the supposition of a like purpose and plan here.

4. The assaults upon the institutions and people of Danville. Centre College is the child of the Synod of Kentucky, and the Theological Seminary was founded by the General Assembly and is under its control. These institutions have heretofore commanded the confidence and patronage of the Presbyterian people of Kentucky. They have been the objects of their fostering care and earnest prayers. Why should they be assailed now? What evil have they done? All the Professors now connected with them have been in office for years. They hold the same opinions now they have held heretofore. They have been quietly occupied the past year in their appropriate duties as formerly. With one exception, they have taken no public part in the political discussions of the day; and he only with the pen, as the most honored ministers all over the land have done. Neither the President of the College, nor the Professors in the Seminary have taken military commands in the army in defense of the Federal Government, as like official persons have done elsewhere in rebellion against it. What have they done to forfeit the confidence of their brethren? It is true, they are all decided Union men. Is this a rock of offense? It is true one of the Professors in the Seminary drafted the minutes passed at the last meeting of Synod, another proposed an amendment to

it, which was accepted, and all voted for it. Is this a rock of offense? It is true they are resolutely opposed to separation from the General Assembly, and determined to resist it at all hazards, and to the last extremity. In a word, they are loyal to the nation and loyal to the Church. So are the overwhelming majority of the Presbyterian inhabitants of the town and its vicinity. Why, under these circumstances should Danville be denounced as that "*Abolition Hole*?" Why should the Professors in these Institutions be stigmatized by some as abolitionists? Why should others whine out their pious sorrow, saying, "We are sorry indeed, but the Seminary is gone—Danville is dead?" And this too by men, some of whom have been fed and clothed by the hand of charity, most generously and cordially extended to them by the good citizens of Danville, and educated on foundations belonging to the institutions here! Unspeakable baseness! To bite the hand that fed them, and sting the bosom that nursed them and warmed them into life! Oh shame "thou art fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost their reason!" Can mortal man conceive of any reason for these denunciations, and this vile conduct, other than the loyal sentiments entertained here toward both Church and State? Can any man wish to crush these institutions of the Church, who is not either a secessionist at heart, or an advocate of schism, or both? When Wicklif was supposed by his enemies to be dying, he was raised a little on his couch, and said to his persecutors, "*I shall not die, but live and declare the evil deeds of the friars.*" Thank God, Danville is not quite dead yet. By His help she hopes to live yet many days, always holding "full high advanced" a banner in defense of truth and godly living. She will be found standing hard by the ancient land-marks, immovably fixed on the old foundations, her face set as a flint against sectional fanaticisms and new-fangled notions in both theology and morals. If we perish, we perish; but will not die with a lie in our right hand, nor recreant to the Church that gave us being, and the benignant Government under whose shade we have rested as under the shadow of a great rock in a weary land. We are willing to

sacrifice every earthly interest on the Altar of God and our Country.

These are all the reasons we have either time or space at command to give for believing a purpose was formed, and initiatory measures instituted, to revolutionize the Synod of Kentucky; and they are sufficient. If that purpose has been abandoned or adjourned, it is because found impracticable at present. The pear is not yet ripe. If any Christian man denies that *he* ever entertained such a purpose, we credit his words. We should be glad to believe ourselves mistaken altogether, but can not. The force of the evidence given herein, is necessarily and greatly weakened by the suppression of names and facts which prudence and justice for the present require to be withheld. The time may come, (we hope not,) when the interests of truth and righteousness may demand an exposure of the whole.

It only remains to add, that the larger part of this article was written from the beginning to the middle of March, before the *Presbyterian Herald* was sold.